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JULY, 1939

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## CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

BY H. NOEL FIELDHOUSE

THE most signal fact about Canadian foreign policy, at the moment, is that its fundamental aim is not foreign but domestic; the maintenance of Canada's unity as a nation.

Englishmen may be tempted, perhaps, to dismiss this statement as a platitude, since none know better than they that any democratically elected government—in Britain as much as in Canada—must always seek to conduct its foreign policy so as to command the substantial support of virtually all sections of its people, if only because foreign policy may involve war and because no democratic nation can venture to embark upon a major war, with any hope of success, unless the overwhelming mass of its people is united upon the issue on which war breaks out. If this is true of all democratic Governments, however, it is peculiarly true of the Canadian Government. For in Canada there are certain factors which, even in times of peace, are always working to make the national unity, if not precarious, at least something less than assured, and which make it particularly difficult, therefore, to evolve a foreign policy which shall, in the words of the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. W. L. MacKenzie King, “ensure unity and common consent in Canada as well as the achievement of peace abroad”.

The first of these factors is the very size of the country. Intellectually, of course, the Englishman is aware that Canada is a very large country with a very small population, but he is generally somewhat less aware of the political and economic consequences of this fact. As Mr. King once remarked: “If some countries have too much history, we have too much geography”; for geography, in Canada, spells separation. The Maritime Provinces are separated from the rest of Canada by a broken wilderness which it still requires twenty-four hours



by train to cross. Quebec and Ontario are separated from the Prairie Provinces by a second belt, 800 miles in breadth, of sparsely-covered rock plateaux north of Lake Superior; and between the prairies and British Columbia, lies the barrier of the Rocky Mountains. The presence of these physical barriers between the four great divisions of the country would alone go far to explain why many Canadians think in terms of their province or of their section rather than of the nation as a whole. In addition, however, the marked contrast in geographic conditions as between these widely separated sections of the country, produces sharp cleavages of economic interest. Sixty per cent. of Canada's population and eighty per cent. of her manufactures are concentrated in the two central provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and there is a strong tendency for the seven poorer provinces to feel that, under the federal system, the economic and financial policies of the Dominion are manipulated for the benefit of Ontario and Quebec, while there are occasions when these two wealthier provinces would appear to regard their Maritime and Western partners as being somewhat in the nature of 'poor relations' living on the charity of the Federal Treasury.

The exact degree of truth which underlies these sour provincial resentments, and the extent to which, under certain circumstances, they might result in actual separatism, does not concern us here, but it is important to realize that they constitute a factor which no Dominion Government can ignore. It is true that a genuine national sentiment does exist in Canada, but its very self-consciousness is itself a proof of its youth.

The second great factor which militates against national unity is the diversity of origins in the Canadian population. According to the census of 1931, only 51.86% of our population was of British stock; 28.22% was French; and 19.93% came from other stocks, chiefly German, Scandinavian, Hebrew, Dutch, Ukrainian and Polish. Clearly, with a population so mixed, we cannot look for the instinctive unity of an older and more homogeneous people. At social gatherings across the Dominion, much after-dinner oratory is devoted to dilating upon the way in which, in this new country, English and French have learned to live together. Actually, they do not live



together. They live side by side—since they can do no other—within the framework of Confederation, but without cordiality, and upon terms of somewhat unamiable mutual guardedness. There is, at bottom, neither fusion nor agreement.

The importance of this racial division for the conduct of foreign policy will be better appreciated when it is realized that, in Quebec, the French control one of the two most influential provinces. This means, in effect, that it is always unlikely that any major Dominion legislation will be passed, or any major Dominion policy adopted, which cannot command, at least, the passive acquiescence of Quebec. When it is remembered that isolationism, in the sense of opposition to any participation in any war outside Canada, is probably stronger among French Canadians than among any other section of our population, something of the problem which their influence creates for Canadian foreign policy can be understood.

It was no platitude, therefore, when, in 1926, the Hon. C. H. Cahan was driven to express the hope that "Canada shall only undertake such inter-imperial and international responsibilities as . . . shall have the approval not only of a majority of the electoral constituencies throughout Canada, but also have the substantial support and co-operation of the constituencies in every important section, district or province of the Dominion". "I am confident", he told the House of Commons, "that it is only by restricting all our external commitments and obligations within such limits . . . that we can ever hope to have such cordial co-operation between the peoples who compose the Canadian electorate as will enable us . . . to maintain the continued solidarity and unity of the great Canadian nation".

Given this cardinal need to preserve her national unity, what are the aims of Canada's foreign policy? First, the assertion of her status as an independent nation. Secondly, the preservation of her security. Thirdly, the safeguarding and promoting of her external trade. Now these three aims have this in common; that they are all primarily matters of Canada's relations with Britain and with the U.S.

In the matter of trade, the figures speak for themselves. "Canada is built", it has been said, "upon the assumption that other people can and will buy her staple products"; and,

in a country which, in 1935, enjoyed the fifth largest export trade in the world and ranked sixth in the total value of its world trade, it is obviously difficult to exaggerate the importance of her foreign trade. The enormous bulk of that trade, however, is done with two Powers. In 1937, the U.S. took 41% of Canada's exports and supplied 58.7% of her imports. In the same year, the United Kingdom took 38.4% of Canada's exports and supplied 19.3% of her imports.

As for security, Canada is an international dwarf locked in the same North American house with the U.S. giant. Vast as are the Canadian territories, the settled area of the country forms a comparatively narrow belt, some 200 miles in breadth, running along the length of the U.S. border. Within that belt live nine-tenths of our population, and, in the last resort, it is a final condition of Canada's foreign policy that she can never set herself, or join with any group which should set itself, in opposition to the vital interests of the U.S.A. It can be said, indeed, that the implicit protection which she undoubtedly enjoys from the U.S. makes Canada safe from any attack from any other quarter, and that, against attack from the U.S., no other power on earth could save her.

The assertion and preservation of Canada's status as an independent nation is also, in essence, a question of her dual relationship to Britain and to the U.S. In the more recent past, that status has been asserted, pacifically, against imperial control from Britain, but there was a time when only the British connection saved Canadian independence from the expansionist appetites of the U.S. ; and while the latter is now nothing if not a 'good neighbour', there are many Canadians who still feel that the time may well come when the imperial connection will again be necessary if we are to resist the pressure for political or economic or cultural absorption in the Great Power to the south. Canadian independence, in this sense, depends on a delicate equilibrium in her relationships with her two kindred Great Powers.

If these are the fundamental conditions of Canada's survival as an independent nation to what policies do they give rise ?

First, as a consequence of her assertion of her independent status, Canada has been led to insist that, in matters of foreign



policy, she is completely autonomous and cannot be committed by the British Government without her own consent. In a statement made at Geneva in September, 1936, the Prime Minister declared :

“ The nations of the British Commonwealth are held together by ties of friendship . . . rather than by commitments to join together in war. The Canadian parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members of the Commonwealth may be engaged ”.

This does not mean, he was careful to point out, that Canada will in no circumstances be prepared to join in a Commonwealth war. It does mean, he said, “ that any decision on the part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the parliament or people of Canada in the light of all existing circumstances ; circumstances of the day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved ”.

Canadian governments have been so consistent in thus declining to admit that, in matters of foreign policy, they can be automatically bound by the decisions of the British Government, that they have even been chary of any close consultation with London looking to the evolution of a common policy lest, by such consultation, they should become morally responsible for the execution of such a policy.

“ Occasions arise ”, the Prime Minister told the Commons, in May, 1938, “ where consultation is both necessary and possible . . . The difficulty, however, is that a United Kingdom government must be responsible to its own people for its actions. . . . They are closest to the danger point and must bear the main brunt of any misjudgment or failure. They might be prepared to take advice which fell in with their own views ; but otherwise they would find it difficult to do so unless the adviser could guarantee them against the consequences ”.

Secondly, the refusal to allow Canada to be committed by the British Government to participation in a ‘ Commonwealth war ’, has run parallel to a refusal to allow her to be committed by the League of Nations to a ‘ League war ’. This attitude has been strengthened, of late, by the frank realization that Canada is, after all, a small Power, whose action on behalf of the League could only be of importance if it were to supplement that of an effective *bloc* among the Great Powers. “ We must keep ”, the Prime Minister has reminded us, “ a sense of perspective. We have neither the power nor the knowledge to settle the

destinies of countries thousands of miles away. We are no more likely of our own motion to intervene in Europe than Sweden or Bulgaria or Switzerland is to intervene in America. It is sometimes forgotten that in Canada itself we have an area as large as Europe, with problems . . . quite as difficult to deal with as many of the problems . . . which constitute a great part of European 'foreign affairs', that we are not asking and will not receive any help from outside in meeting these difficulties and that we are unlikely to have any surplus of statesmanship or good fortune to bestow elsewhere".

Fundamentally, however, the Canadian reluctance, in Mr. King's words, "to organize or join in crusades in other continents", springs, as is natural, from Canada's unique sense of security born of her isolation in North America. "The talk which one sometimes hears", said the Prime Minister last year, "of aggressor countries planning to invade Canada and seize these tempting resources of ours is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours and our lack of neighbours; it ignores the strategic and transportation difficulties of trans-oceanic invasion; . . . at present, danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and second-hand in origin".

The Prime Minister's present attitude of non-committal caution is, of course, far from satisfying all sections of Canadian opinion. In some quarters it is contended that Canada has no foreign policy, a contention which, when analysed, usually turns out to mean that the speaker feels that Canada is insufficiently active in support of Geneva or London or Moscow, according to the centre of the speaker's interests. As the Prime Minister has said, however, provided that the policy of a country is rooted in its own interests or in the ideals in which those interests are sublimated, it can never be entirely identical with that of any other Power.

It is hardly to be expected, indeed, that the Canadian Government should risk alienating any important section of opinion by too categorical a declaration of policy, for Canadian opinion is itself sharply divided on these issues.

The most vocal, if not the most numerous, body is that which is usually labelled 'isolationist'. Isolationism is really the political expression of the geographic separation of North



America from Europe, but it finds an intellectual basis in a conception of Canada's national interests. Exponents of this school of thought argue that the combination of Canada's geographic isolation with her position under the strategic lee of the U.S. makes her entirely safe from attack by any Power save the U.S. itself, and that, against the U.S., no defence is possible. They believe, therefore, that Canada, in itself, is uniquely safe and that the only danger of her becoming involved in war arises from her connection with the British Commonwealth and with the League of Nations. Let Canada, they say, stay at home and follow the example of other nations by taking the fullest possible advantage of her position. They are not, be it noticed, pacifists. They would fight for what they regard as Canada's vital interests, but they contend that those vital interests are to be found only upon the North American continent. M. Henri Bourassa gave characteristically vigorous expression to their point of view, in the House of Commons, as long ago as 1926. "Let us declare", he said, "for a bold policy of nationalism. . . . No more undertaking to send our sons to shed their blood on the battlefields of the world. No more spending of millions of dollars in time of war to depopulate this country, and then other billions of dollars in time of peace to bring foreigners in to take the place of native sons, sent to be killed on the battlefields of Europe. . . ." As for the isolationists among English-speaking Canadians, most of them would share the views, if not the acrid tone, of Professor Underhill, when he wrote recently : "We must therefore make it clear to the world, and especially to Great Britain, that the poppies blooming in Flanders Fields have no further interest for us. We must fortify ourselves against the allurements of a British war for democracy . . . and against the allurements of a League war for peace and international order. . . . We should close our ears to these European blandishments and . . . sail past the European siren, our ears stuffed with tax-bills. All these European troubles are not worth the bones of a Toronto grenadier".

The second school of thought, that of the imperialists, is, like the isolationist school, ultimately based upon sentiment ; but, like the isolationists again, it finds reasons of national interest

or honour upon which to support itself. Some of the exponents of this view place their emphasis chiefly upon the necessities and obligations of mutual defence. They remain unimpressed by the isolationist belief that Canada is safe from attack, and they are still more unimpressed by the isolationist belief that the sea-borne trade of a neutral Canada would be safe in time of war because Britain would have an obvious self-interest in protecting it. They believe that the British fleets are still an essential element in the safety of Canada and, still more, of Canada's overseas trade, and that, since she enjoys the benefits of the Commonwealth connection, Canada should share in its liabilities. Another group within this school values the British connection chiefly because of the moral purposes and ideals which, it believes, the Commonwealth still represents. Members of this group, for example, would claim that, pending the organization of a really universal system of collective security under the aegis of the League of Nations, the Commonwealth represents the greatest actual force which is making for peace and international order in the world to-day, and that its disintegration would constitute a step backward rather than forward in the interests of world unity.

Lastly, there are those of this school who point out that Canada's survival as a nation implies not merely a nominal independence but a real freedom to go her own way in the shaping of her own policies, institutions, purposes and ideals. They feel that the greatest danger to that freedom lies in the possibility of the cultural absorption and political domination, if not the ultimate annexation, of Canada by the U.S., and in the Commonwealth connection they see the chief hope of offsetting the ever-present pressure from the south. The severance of Canada's connection with the Commonwealth would mean, they believe, the destruction of that delicate equilibrium between her geographic position as an American nation and her political and cultural associations as a member of the Commonwealth, upon which her real independence as a separate entity has rested.

The third great school of opinion comprises the friends of 'collective security' as organized under the League of Nations. In this matter, Canadian developments have run closely parallel to those in Britain. The Canadian Government, like the British



Government, and for the same reasons, has shared the League ideal but has always been alive to the difficulty which besets a complete and literal implementing of the Covenant. The Canadian, like the British, Government, must obtain the means to wage war from Parliament ; it knows that its course in a crisis must depend on the view taken by public opinion, and it knows that that opinion will be largely, if not exclusively, governed by the nature of the question upon which war breaks out. Like the British Government, again, therefore, it cannot, if it is to be honest, commit itself to obligations which may involve war under circumstances which it cannot foresee. Even in the halcyon years of 1919 to 1933, therefore, the Canadian Government repeatedly exercised itself first, to secure, the deletion of Article X from the Covenant and, when that proved impossible, to minimize its obligations under that Article. "Canada" her chief delegate told the League in 1920, "will look with critical eye indeed on a clause so easily susceptible of being read as making everybody's wars their wars".

With the steady deterioration in the international situation since 1933, the Canadian Government's reluctance to be automatically committed by the decisions of Geneva has naturally increased. In the House of Commons, in May, 1938, Mr. King declared "our belief that at the present juncture of world affairs it is not possible to make the League an international war office, an instrument of force, military or economic". He insisted on the "general unwillingness of peoples to incur obligations which they realized they may not be able in time of crisis to fulfil, obligations to use force and to use it at any place, any time, in circumstances unforeseen and in disputes over whose origin . . . they had had little or no control". He stressed "the difficulty of putting on economic sanctions unless the countries doing so possess overwhelming force and are firmly bound to apply military sanctions if the occasion arises". "So far as the Canadian Government is concerned", he concluded, "the sanctions articles have ceased to have effect by general practice and consent and cannot be revived by any state or group of states at will".

Under the stress of the ugly realities of the years since 1933, indeed, the 'collective security' school in Canada has largely

dissolved into its component elements. For in Canada, as in Britain, the cause of the League had been sadly confused with the cause of peace. When the Canadian member of our League of Nations societies declared for the Covenant, he was not thinking of it as an international instrument which bound his country to do certain specific things in certain situations. He was merely making a declaration of moral principle, a declaration in favour of peace and against war. For at no time between 1919 and 1935 did our League of Nations societies ever explain to their followers that the application of Article XVI of the Covenant against a Great Power might mean war. The Canadian, like the British, people was allowed to drift along under the amiably vague assumption that the League would achieve its purposes by some alchemy of good will and round-table discussion.

If any of us ventured to enquire what was to happen if some Great Power should prove to be deficient in goodwill, we were told that it would be subjected to economic sanctions ; and if we persisted in enquiring what was to happen if the offender should feel powerful enough to prefer to fight rather than submit tamely to economic sanctions, we got no reply at all. For the very word 'sanctions' was designed to prevent clear thinking about the problem. Sanctions was a much pleasanter word than war. It was high-sounding and it dodged the question. Say to people: "Let us apply sanctions against an aggressor"—and you made them feel both moral and comfortable. Now that Canadians find themselves invited, not to apply sanctions (that technical instrument of righteousness) against the aggressor (always conveniently anonymous), but to go to war against certain Great Powers, they may still feel moral but they feel much less comfortable.

Now, therefore, that it has become clear that the League cannot create world peace without we ourselves being called upon to do anything more painful than pass moral resolutions condemning the aggressor and calling upon someone else (usually Great Britain) to undertake the dangerous business of stopping him, our advocates of 'collective security' are resolving themselves into their real elements. Probably a majority of them—since they were always really pacifists rather than



genuine supporters of the League—have gone to swell the ranks of the isolationists. Others are moving towards a 'Commonwealth front' as offering the next best thing to that universal league which is plainly unattainable for the present. All enjoy the melancholy satisfaction of placing the blame for the failure of the League squarely upon the shoulders of the British Government.

For we may notice here one curious phenomenon of Canadian League opinion. Although Britain has at least contributed half a loaf to the League, and the U.S. no bread, in League circles in Canada it is always London and never Washington which is blamed for the League's collapse. Although the U.S. is immeasurably richer, stronger and safer than Britain, a curiously unconscious North Americanism makes Canadian supporters of the League accept excuses for the U.S.'s refusal to give a lead in the direction of collective security, the validity of which they will never accept when those excuses are urged on behalf of Britain.

In the light, then, of this divided state of the public mind, it is not unfair to read into the Prime Minister's latest pronouncements upon foreign policy a desire not needlessly to alarm any considerable section of opinion. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 30th, he gave comfort to all sides. He gave a categorical assurance that "so long as this Government may be in power", there will be no conscription of men for overseas service. That, presumably, was for Quebec. He could not accept, he said, the view "that regardless of what government or party may be in office, regardless of what its policy may be, regardless of what the issue itself may come to be, this country should say here and now that Canada is prepared to support whatever may be proposed by the government at Westminster". That was for our nationalists, in or out of Quebec. He insisted that "we must . . . choose between keeping our own house in order and trying to save Europe and Asia". "The idea", he said, "that every twenty years this country should automatically . . . take part in a war overseas for democracy or self-determination of other small nations, that a country which has all it can do to run itself should feel called upon to save, periodically, a continent that cannot run itself . . . seems

to many . . . sheer madness". That was for our isolationists. On the other hand, he reminded the House that ties of affection, of common institutions and of trade between Canada and Britain are "still a very strong and determining factor". He stated clearly that "a world in which Britain was weak would be greatly worse for small countries than a world in which she was strong . . . and that an act of an aggressor aimed at the destruction of Britain would constitute a menace to the freedom of every nation of the British Commonwealth". "All these forces", he declared, "combine to make concern for the security of Britain a deep-felt and powerful factor in the shaping of Canadian policy". That was for our imperialists.

Ten days earlier, indeed, Mr. King had declared that, while parliament must decide upon policy, "if there were a prospect of an aggressor launching an attack upon Britain, with bombers raining death upon London, I have no doubt what the decision of the Canadian people and parliament would be".

Any attempt, therefore, to estimate the direction of Canadian foreign policy, must take account of all these factors. None of them can be ignored. None of them is all-sufficient; and whether they will work in combination or in conflict must depend upon special circumstances and upon the action of more powerful countries than our own. Canadian policy must take account of our political connections, of our geographical position, of the racial composition of our people, of our own internal preoccupations. In short, it must be a policy based on the Canadian scene. Under these conditions, it cannot be a flamboyant or a spectacular policy. In the words of the Prime Minister: "It is simply the sum of our countless daily dealings with other countries, the general resultant of an effort to act decently on every issue or incident that arises, and a hope of receiving the same treatment from others".



## PORTUGAL AND HER EMPIRE

By WILLIAM C. ATKINSON

AT a time when defeatist politicians in this country would have us write off the British Empire and pray only to be left alone in our insularity, it is well to remember that we stand committed to the defence, not of one Empire, but of two. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Windsor, 1386, is not only the oldest, it is become the farthest-embracing, in our diplomatic annals. Originally a friendly pledging of peace and mutual succour between two countries, 'for ever', later re-affirmations have found both countries transformed into Empires, and its scope has successively widened.

It was in 1661, on the occasion of the marriage of Catherine of Braganza to Charles II, that it took on its present significance. Catherine was retiring and unbeautiful, though Charles allowed her pretty eyes and a pleasing address. But she brought England Tangier and Bombay and many trading rights besides, and the last, secret, article of the Treaty of that year ran: 'The said King of Great Britain, in consideration of the great advantages and increase of his dominions accruing to him from the marriage agreement, undertakes and commits himself herewith to the defence and protection of all conquests and colonies pertaining to the Crown of Portugal against all its enemies, present and future'. Catherine is no more: the Treaty, including this clause, was solemnly re-affirmed in 1703, in 1815, in 1899, in 1904, in 1914—and in the House of Commons as late as May 26 last. What began as a personal, and highly unpopular, piece of bargaining by Royalty is become a cornerstone of our policy. Why?

Portugal launched the first empire of the modern world, and blazed the trail of all the subsequent overseas expansion of western Europe. That Empire sprang, not as with Spain

from a stroke of chance, the gift of a foreign visionary, but from a century of dogged perseverance and fearless challenge of the unknown. A prince of the blood—the half-English Henry the Navigator—began it: the nation completed it. Within half a century of rounding the Cape of Good Hope the Portuguese had reached far beyond India, to China and Japan, ‘and did the world stretch farther’, said Camoens, ‘they would have gone there too’.

Of that Empire, vaster far than a nation of little over a million inhabitants could hope to hold, there remain to-day territories that are still impressive enough in extent—they rank Portugal fourth among colonial powers—but infinitely more significant in distribution. They are scattered over three continents and many seas: in Europe, Madeira and the Azores; in West Africa, the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea, São Thomé and Príncipe Islands, Angola; in East Africa, Mozambique; in Asia, Diu, Damão and Goa in India, Macau in China; in Oceania, Timor. The West African possessions in particular form a chain every link of which would be vital to British communications with her Empire in the event of a conflict in the Mediterranean; the Azores, Madeira and Cape Verde Islands are to the Cape route what Gibraltar, Malta and Suez are to the Mediterranean. The Cape Verde Islands are equally vital to communications with South America and even, by air, with North America. And Mozambique, Goa, Macau and Timor mean no less to us in the East. It is a prime British interest that none of them should ever fall into the hands of a hostile Power.

The history of this Empire falls into three chapters. The first, that of discovery and commercial exploitation, still reads as one of the most thrilling narratives of Renaissance effort—and inspired the greatest of Renaissance epics. Behind it lay considerations of deep biological necessity. Portugal’s frontier with Spain was perhaps the least natural of all the medieval kingdoms of the Peninsula, and Castile has never got over the surprise that it alone should successfully have resisted re-absorption. The country’s economic resources, basically agricultural, fall far short of self-sufficiency. It was to counter these weaknesses that Portugal struck roots overseas, and the



conception still underlies the whole Portuguese policy of Empire.

Portugal spent herself over-generously in the result. The drain on the population, already exiguous, left whole regions like the Algarves so depopulated that African slaves were brought back in large numbers to prevent their going derelict. And when in 1578 the young Sebastian, a crusader born out of his day, perished with the flower of Portuguese chivalry and manhood in Morocco and the country fell into the lap of Spain, the enemies of Spain—then most of Europe—fell on the Portuguese possessions as their legitimate spoil. The recovery of national independence in 1640 thus brought a considerably diminished patrimony, and a shift of balance. India was all but lost. Brazil, soon afterwards recovered, inherited its importance. But the fulcrum was still Africa, and now that Brazil, however filial its sentiments, is independent, Africa remains the centre of Portuguese pride and ambition.

The 'occupation' of her holdings there fifty years ago modern Portugal regards as only less epic. The task imposed on the nation by the Conference of Berlin in 1884-85 was in fact herculean. Other Powers, awakening late to the conception of Africa as an appanage of Europe, thought to dispose of Portugal's historical claim to so much of it by advancing a new definition of colonial rights. Such were to be held valid, the Conference laid down, in the strict measure in which the territory in question was effectively occupied and the security of commerce could be guaranteed. 'We must make haste if others are not to get in before us and make our task impossible', the Portuguese Foreign Minister wrote home from Berlin. Others did get in, to the extent of frustrating a dream of centuries, the joining up of Portuguese East and West Africa by the effective annexation of lands that Portuguese explorers, soldiers, missionaries and traders had opened up and long considered their own. It was an Englishman, Rhodes by name, living in South Africa for the good of his health, who shattered the vision of a map *couleur de rose* wherein the Portuguese flag waved from ocean to ocean by one of his own of the Union Jack waving from Cairo to the Cape. Lord Salisbury's Government invented the pretext for the notorious ultimatum of 1890.

Portugal perforce acquiesced, and, thinking her own thoughts about an alliance which, made between kings, did not seem to spell fair play between peoples, made an abortive attempt to proclaim a Republic.

Angola and Mozambique remained, close on a million square miles effectively occupied by a nation of some five million people. But, again, the strain had been excessive. 'The colonies are devouring us, men, blood, institutions', wrote an eminent historian of the contemporary scene. 'This mission is a holocaust'. Weakened and disillusioned, and faced at home with imminent bankruptcy, Portugal now possessed an Empire which she could neither finance nor govern. And then Germany, desirous of a place in the African sun, began to cast envious eyes. Britain's part in the Anglo-German Treaty of 1898 is eloquent of how much the name of Albion still has to live down in foreign esteem. In the event of Portugal being forced to raise loans abroad, the two Powers arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to grant such, planning to secure them on the customs of Angola, Mozambique and Timor and visualizing an early transfer, by force if necessary, of the sovereignty of these territories in consequence. Portugal fortunately managed to evade bankruptcy, England had stirrings of conscience, and in 1899 the two countries re-affirmed their Alliance, leaving Germany on the step.

In 1910 Portugal did at last expel its monarchy. No millenium followed. Shedding further illusions at every turn, the country touched new depths of weakness. Germany found a pretext for renewing her proposals, in more sinister form, in the supposition that our Alliance had remained a mere sentimental bond between two reigning houses and was now accordingly invalidated. She proposed to Grey the technique with which post-war Europe is become so familiar: again a benevolent loan secured on the colonies, as a first step to economic stranglehold, the fomenting if necessary of internal revolution, armed intervention in the alleged defence of German interests against Portuguese maladministration, and so annexation. Britain was to receive her spoils in Mozambique, Germany in Angola. Grey, following his policy of 'appeasement' towards an increasingly hostile Germany, agreed, or feigned agreement.



On one point only he was adamant. We would sell Portugal, but not our soul. All must be above-board, and he insisted on the publication of all three agreements, of 1898, 1899 and 1913. Not as yet impervious to world opinion, Germany was momentarily at a loss, and this time the Great War saved Portugal.

The story of how, abolishing the Republic in its turn after sixteen disastrous years, Portugal has now found her feet as a Corporative State is well known. What has not been stressed is the ever increasing importance the 'New State' attributes to its Empire. Dr. Salazar, himself for a moment Minister of Colonies, began by insisting on the same financial rectitude from them that he demanded from the home country. However slow the pace, self-respect, the first step to resurgence, could only be had by paying their way. Since 1929 the colonies taken together, and since last year taken individually, have in fact never once lapsed from solvency. And with solvency and accumulating surpluses large-scale development is becoming possible. Six-year Plans for Mozambique and Angola were launched last year; they cover harbours, communications, airports, agriculture, State services for colonist and native alike. The part the colonies are playing and are destined to play in the economy of Portugal may be instanced by her imports of cotton from Angola.  $6\frac{1}{2}\%$  of the total in 1931, they were 34% in 1937. Newer methods are believed to make possible the figure of 90%, and a British scientist has recently been appointed by the Ministry of Colonies to supervise their application.

Economic development is but one aspect—and not the primary—of Portugal's attitude to her colonies. Portugal is one of the few countries left in Europe with an expanding population. In the last twelve years the increase has been 1,400,000, or 20% of her present total, giving a density now of 200 persons per square mile, which is more than the country can adequately support on an agricultural economy. Some intensification of agriculture by further irrigation is still possible: it will alleviate but not solve the problem. Industrialization on a large scale is faced with many obstacles, power costs, lack of raw materials, technical inexperience, restricted markets. Every

year, in consequence, many thousands of Portuguese must emigrate. In the last half century over a million have gone to Brazil. Of recent years Brazil has closed her doors, although, alarmed at the heterogeneity of her population—in a batch of this year's recruits seventy out of a hundred could not speak Portuguese—that country has now proposed that ten thousand peasant families from Portugal should be invited to settle at once in the State of São Paulo alone. The colonies are therefore of vital importance for relieving surplus population, as vital as is the importance to the colonies of white settlers, if a tithe of their potentialities is to be realized.

This reciprocal need explains the third phase in the history. After the discovery and the 'occupation' comes, to use the Portuguese term, 'fixation', the stabilizing of a volatile element. It is not enough that Portuguese should go to the colonies to make their fortunes and return home once the ambition is achieved. The Government would have these territories become in effect an extension of the homeland, sundered by geography but by geography alone. Experience in Angola and Mozambique has shown that at altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 metres the Portuguese can thrive and reproduce and show no sign of physical or intellectual deterioration over many generations. Traditionally these lands have not been 'colonies', a term only adopted, for purely administrative convenience, in 1926; they are the *províncias ultramarinas*, the overseas provinces, and the present *régime* is sparing no effort to implement that conception. The first Article of the Colonial Act appended to the Constitution lays down that the said Constitution applies equally to the colonies, and a law of 1937 extends to them, with due allowance for local conditions, the corporative system. The rights and interests of the natives, especially with regard to labour exploitation, are safeguarded in the second Title of the Act, and tribes and potentates alike have recently given eloquent testimony of the warmth of their attachment. In view of the relative poverty of much of the soil, economic development will always be dependent on a plentiful supply of manual labour from races whose subsistence level is much below that of the European. But the safeguards are specifically related in the text to the principle of sovereignty as well as to those of humanity.



The newly appointed Governor-General of Angola, before leaving for his post in March last, gave expression to the official point of view.

"We look on the colonies as integral parts of the fatherland, as territories which must be made as densely Portuguese as Portugal. . . . The formula that the colonial Powers are exercising in Africa a civilizing mission for the execution of which they are responsible to the group of so-called civilized nations is giving way to that of a Portugal pursuing in its colonies a nationalizing mission the execution of which admits in right no judgment but its own—a mission inclusive of the other but that gives another direction to our colonial policy. . . . In obedience to the traditional concept, the genuine expression in Africa of the economic imperialism of the industrial countries, we have in the past made of Portuguese Africa a common good for all nations, reserving only the homage of sovereignty, the burdens of which did not interest others, and we have allowed to be opened in their favour every vein by which the gold essential to colonial development could escape, of the lack of which precisely those who were freely turning it to their own advantage were to make an accusation against us!"

To that process a definite halt has been called.

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Nothing in the Colonial Act is more significant than Article 45 : 'The colonies may not contract loans in foreign countries'. Portugal knows now in full and is not likely to forget the story of those pre-War Anglo-German agreements. As told in Vol. X of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, published last year, they make sober reading alike for Portuguese and Englishmen. And the last couple of years have seen perhaps the most notable development of all. The Portuguese people was already fast becoming colony-conscious, with Dr. Salazar's visit to the African possessions in 1932, the First Imperial Conference held in Lisbon in 1933, the First Colonial Exhibition in Oporto in 1934, the First Economic Imperial Conference in 1936, the impressive 'Historical Exhibition of the Occupation' of 1937, and the 'Colonial Week' that every year carries the popular interest one stage further. It is now becoming keenly alive to the possibility that one day it may have to defend those colonies. The 1937 Exhibition bespoke legitimate pride in past achievement. Foreign visitors were welcome to Lisbon to see and be impressed, but Portugal's affairs were essentially her own. Since then she has been rudely awakened from her peninsularity. The Spanish Civil War threw a searchlight on the strategic significance of the Peninsula in another world conflict, and though

for political reasons Portugal's sympathies lay with the insurgents in Spain she was never oblivious to the real meaning of the presence there of Germans and Italians. The latter did, in fact, cause her moments of acute anxiety on several occasions.

The experience has enabled her to set in proper perspective the less spectacular penetration of her own country, through commercial and cultural channels, by Germany and Italy during the past ten or fifteen years. Germany is now a very close second to Great Britain in exports to Portugal, her achievements in the field of *Machtpolitik* have deeply impressed the forces, largely equipped and partly trained in Germany, and her unsparing efforts to forge cultural bonds have set the British Council a task of the first magnitude if the deep-rooted sympathies of the Portuguese people for this country are still to stand where they have stood for the past eight centuries.

This changing concern is symbolized in the State visit of President Carmona to Angola last year and in that to Mozambique on which he is now engaged. It is the first time—if one except João VI's involuntary flight to Brazil in 1807 before the advancing forces of Napoleon—that any head of the State has visited the overseas provinces, and the moment has given the occasion a clear-cut significance. Standing by the monument raised at the mouth of the Congo River to Diogo Cão, the explorer who in 1482 claimed for the Crown of Portugal the vast territories of modern Angola, President Carmona made what was perhaps his shortest and certainly his weightiest speech. 'I feel sure', he said, after recalling the associations of the spot, 'that my words express the mind of Portugal past and present, of the generations living and dead, of all those who have toiled for Portugal in these lands, sailors, soldiers, missionaries, planters, traders, when I declare before God and man that Portugal will not be faithless to her vocation as a great civilizing force, and that Portugal at home and overseas is eternally one and indivisible'.

'Eternally one and indivisible'. Stout words, but not mere rhetoric for local consumption. Other nations have had colonies, have lost them, and lived. To Portugal the dominions are limbs of the body politic, any amputation of which would mean, much more than impoverishment, the lively risk of



bleeding to death. As the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, but lacking the racial complications, so they stand to the metropolis, and Portugal since 1926 has re-found a pride that will never allow her to exist on tolerance.

It will, of course, be said that no one threatens these colonies. Franco's wishful talking of a new imperial Spain has loosed speculation as to where an exhausted Spain is to find herself an empire at this date. She is too late for Abyssinia, and Signor Mussolini's promise of Gibraltar scarcely fills the bill. Early in the war leaflets circulated in Portugal showing the arms of Spain side by side with the *quinas* of Portugal. If meant as a *ballon d'essai*, it was soon pricked. Portugal, like the newcomer to income-tax, is not joining. It is thanks to Germany that the colonial question is become such a disturber of the peace; but Germany professes to want only the return of her former African possessions, and her quarrel is therefore limited to the mandatory powers, of whom Portugal is not one. So Dr. Salazar would reassure the nation by publicly characterizing as mischief makers those who speak of danger from this quarter. Dr. Salazar does not, of course, suppose that this particular leopard has changed its spots. A Germany in possession of her former African colonies would straightway rekindle her old ambitions, to move north from the one into Angola, south from the other into Mozambique—and would lay her plans, the third time, for success.

But it is unnecessary to invoke even this degree of the hypothetical. A more immediate cause for disquiet comes from more immediate friends. Influential British quarters have whispered on occasion of a re-distribution in Africa, in the name of "appeasement", to which Portugal would be expected to make her contribution. More specifically there has been talk of some form of condominium over part of Angola. Mr. Eden as Foreign Minister denied to the House that such suggestions enjoyed any Government support in this country. Dr. Salazar, thinking perhaps of Grey and 1913, told the world in effect that it wouldn't make any difference if they did. 'Contrary to all rumours, we are not selling, ceding, leasing or sharing our colonies. Our Constitution forbids it, and our national conscience would not allow it'.

It is idle, however, to pretend that the danger does not exist. If not directly, indirectly. The coming of war will find Portugal with us, and Germany against her. The attack on our imperial communications will be in large degree an attack on Portuguese harbours and islands. The Non-Aggression Pact with Spain of March last may assure her land frontiers—or it may not, for Spain has since been constrained to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact. Her Empire frontiers may not be assured by any Pact—they can only be defended. So Portugal is taking no chances. Distant, small, limited in resources and needing every escudo for economic development, she, too, has been forced to bow the knee to the god of rearmament. The Budget for 1939 shows the Army estimates doubled and an increase of 75% over 1938 for the Navy and Naval Air Arm. The Portuguese Legion formed in 1937 gives military training to a volunteer force of some 75,000 men, or roughly half the number the regular army would have available on mobilization. A law of January last decreed that the colonies shall bear their due share in the cost of defence, which hitherto has been assumed in whole by the home country, happy in the remoteness of the contingency; and a military mission has spent the last six months of 1938 surveying defence problems in Angola and Mozambique while the British Services Mission in Portugal was discussing the same problems, which in practice would be no less our concern than hers.

There is doubtless nothing very formidable in all this. Earlier threats to the Empire found their opening, as we have seen, in financial laxity. With the wheel turned full circle and an economist Premier, and a purist at that, who refuses to mortgage the future even to ensure that there shall be one, while the nations around vie with one another in condemning unborn generations to imponderable millstones, Portugal may go under now precisely because of her financial rectitude. The new Army total of £3,600,000 is but half the cost of a battleship. What will £315,000 do when divided between the Navy and its Air Arm? These are gestures, heroic in relation to the capacities and resources of a country whose estimated revenue from all sources for 1939 is £25,336,800, microscopic in relation to the demands of the situation. Portugal in short cannot defend her



Empire, and there is evidence in recent modifications of her naval building programme that she recognizes as much. Concentrating on smaller craft for home waters, she relies on the British Navy to take her Empire, too, under its wing. In comparison with this commitment our recent undertakings to other small European nations—not Empires—appear modest.

But whatever its magnitude, it does not admit of question. Members of Parliament have asked in the House recently whether a Treaty going back to the fourteenth century is not an anachronism. It has never been less so. Italy would fain drive us out of the Mediterranean, and it is still too early to say what our policy, or lack of policy, over Spain may have cost us in this direction. A Portugal subservient to the Axis would drive us out of the South Atlantic. And the Axis has been bringing great pressure to bear in the last few months. Portugal has an authoritarian *régime*. Her detestation of everything to the left of right-wing Liberalism is born of experience and deepest conviction. Her adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact would be logical—and is most ardently desired. But Portugal has not signed the Pact. The 'New State' may be authoritarian: that is an aspect of the essential relativity of government. It is not totalitarian, nor pagan, nor aggressive, nor unprincipled, and it will not barter nor whittle away its independence. Only once in 800 years has that independence been lost, and it was then—and from Portuguese waters—that the only serious threat ever directed to the occupation of these islands, the Spanish Armada, was launched. That fact will always be a salutary reminder to both peoples. While geography remains, time is impotent to lessen the vital concern of each country and empire in the independence of the other.

## THE SELF-BETRAYAL OF EUROPE

BY LUDOVIC NAUDEAU.

**I**N September, 1938, at Nuremberg, the writer sincerely admired the magnificent parades organized by the Nazi party in honour of its leader. The moment was a grave one. All hearts, those of many Germans as well as those of the foreign visitors, were filled with anxiety. Adolf Hitler was about to deliver the speech which was to sound the death-knell of Czecho-Slovakia.

It is only fair to the Germans to admit that they know how to treat their guests with hospitality. I, a foreign journalist, was shown perfect courtesy by the German officials at this fateful time. They took pains to arrange accommodation for me in a private house, as the town was overflowing with hundreds of thousands of people, who had assembled for the occasion. This was no small favour, as no one, without official influence, could have found any lodgings whatever in Nuremberg at this time.

I had, therefore, every reason to be satisfied. But is not everything in this world a matter of comparison? The fact that I was being put up privately was proof that I was unable to find accommodation in any of the principal hotels of the town. Who then, occupied these rooms? Doubtless generals, ambassadors, princes, ministers, high officials? Had this been the case, I should assuredly have had nothing to say. But by chance I happened to see leaving one of the hotels a whole group of Japanese gentlemen, who, I learned later, were members of a journalistic delegation from Tokio and Osaka. Only then was I filled with humiliation. In my perplexity I began to wonder how substantial were the fundamental principles of the racial theory.

Here I am, I thought sadly to myself, a Northern Frenchman, as my passport testifies, 6ft. 3in. in height, fair, with blue eyes,



representing the authentic and undisputed type of pure Aryan—here am I, relegated to private lodgings, while these little Mongols, at most 5ft. tall, strut about, proud to be seen leaving the best hotels. But the creators of the racial doctrine, Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Vacher de Lapouge, have they not all written that the French, born in the Northern districts from the Pas de Calais and the Aisne, are pure Nordics of Germanic race, indeed more genuine Nordics than certain citizens of the Reich?

How hard it is, I thought, for a Franc-Salien, 6ft. 3in. tall, to be so slighted, and this in a town situated in a district named Oberfranken Unterfranken and Mittelfranken. Must I resign myself to see Europe betray herself, and not even in the name of the Francs-Saliens whom I represent, voice a melancholy protest? But the *Führer* is known not to take kindly to contradiction, and as some philosopher has said, “one should never argue with a man who commands forty legions”.

Europe betrays herself! If it were only a question of rooms in some Nuremberg hotel, I would willingly efface myself, only too happy to leave them to our amiable Japanese colleagues, in memory of the happy days I spent not so very long ago in their country. But, as one knows only too well, the present situation goes beyond unimportant trivialities. These merely symbolize the fearful disorder of European thought, which causes the Japanese to be treated here as allies, from whom valuable support is expected.

It is true that present Japanese policy is not altogether clearly defined. Various tendencies appear to conflict in the inner circle of the Tokio Government. Recently we received the assurance that at least a section of Japanese statesmen are of the opinion that their country should cease to provoke the Democratic Powers. But as this agreeable news reached us, the Japanese general staff at Tientsin published a kind of manifesto to the effect that British and French concessions in this port should cease with the least possible delay. Since then there has been the blockade. If we consider not the words but the recent actions of the Japanese in the Asiatic zone where our own interests are of major importance, we are forced to the conclusion that these actions have been extremely menacing. In taking up a

position which has been premeditated for some time, the Japanese Imperialists appear, moreover, to execute their intimidating manœuvres at times when they best serve the interests of the Axis Powers. In February, the Japanese occupation of the large island of Hainan, which blocks the gulf of Tonkin and commands access to our Indo-China, produced in France the gravest anxiety. On April 1st, the Japanese, continuing their tactics, announced their intention of occupying the island of Spratly in the same way. This archipelago of rocky islands has no economic importance but is of real strategic value—and was considered by France as being under her protection. Such events may well be followed by serious consequences. For instance, the principal centres of French Indo-China will be directly menaced by Japanese aviation established on the island of Hainan. (This island is approximately 400 kilometres from Hanoi, 780 kilometres from Saigon, and 650 kilometres from the famous bay of Cam-Ranh, where our principal naval base is established.)

Japan certainly has everything to gain and nothing to lose by her alliance with Germany and Italy, which permits her the use of white armies in the extension of her domination over Asia. Germany and Italy will inevitably be punished one day for their complicity with the enemies of Europe, of which they form a part. But, sacrificing the future to the present, and their grandiloquent racial prejudices to their momentary advantage, they consider it politic to encourage Japan in her adventures. Japan is only too willing to pursue these adventures, but in her mind they are not of a temporary nature. The points of vantage she seizes are milestones on the path of her destiny. Japan's actions must inevitably cause great anxiety to the colonial Powers, impinging as they do on their most vulnerable points. And they can be carried out with the minimum amount of risk to Japan, when the greater part of the British and French navies are kept near their native shores by the extreme tension of European affairs.

The Japanese occupation of the island of Hainan is not only a matter of grave concern to us Frenchmen, but Hong-Kong is 480 kilometres away, Singapore, where the British have just completed colossal fortifications, is only a distance of 1,600



kilometres from Hainan. As for Manila, the capital of the Philippine Islands, still under American protection, a distance of 500 kilometres separates it from the new Japanese conquest. Actually, after the occupation of Hainan, the Philippine Islands are more and more hemmed in by the Japanese, the latter already being the masters not only of Formosa, but of the Marianne and Caroline Islands, taken from the Germans. Japan, by her audacious initiative, has thus considerably reduced the value of the famous strategic triangle Hong-Kong, Singapore, Port Darwin (Australia), the importance of which was recently stressed in the German review *Deutsche Rundschau*, and within which the British Admiralty counted on having free play for the defence of the most important lines of communication. Let no one mistake it, the Japanese occupation of the island of Hainan marks a new era in the retreat of the white race, which began thirty years ago when Port Arthur was taken by the Japanese, and which continued twenty-four years ago, when the same nation, then our Ally, seized by force the German colony of Kiao-Chao on the shores of the Yellow Sea. Since then Japan has seized the whole of Manchuria, invaded a large part of China, and compromised British interests in Peking, Shanghai and Canton ! We, most of all, have reason to be anxious at the arrival of the Japanese at Hainan because of our immediate vicinity, but it also constitutes a menace for the rich Dutch East Indies and brings nearer the time when Australia will be feeling her lack of security. As soon as the Japanese have established a submarine base at Hainan, they will threaten all maritime routes converging on Singapore, and communications with Australia will be endangered. To our mild protests the Japanese reply with courteous formulæ, pacific assurances and vague promises. But they have nothing to learn from us in the matter of proving that speech was given to man in order to disguise his thoughts. Long before the arrival of Europeans, who, in their feudal conflicts, knew nothing of the subtleties of diplomacy, the Asiatics were already masters of the arts of etiquette, politeness and dissimulation.

Apart from questions and representations that are not followed by action, what are we to do to calm the ardour of the generals and admirals of the Mikado ? All the forces of France,

as we have remarked, are concentrated in the Mediterranean, and it appears hardly likely that Great Britain, without being absolutely forced to do so, will send an expedition to Chinese waters to operate in the above-mentioned triangle.

The complexion of the situation may be changed if one day the U.S.A., alarmed by the continual invasions of Japan, decide that it is time to put an end to them. Then their great naval power, allied to that of Great Britain, would rapidly transform the face of things. Everything depends on the value that the Americans set on their Chinese trade and on their position in the Philippine islands.

At the present time it is difficult to determine to what extent America intends to perpetuate her strong position in the Far East, which she owes to her supremacy in the Philippine Islands. Would she fight to prevent this archipelago from becoming part of the Japanese empire? If she became entirely disinterested, or if a general conflagration in Europe immobilized the greater part of the Anglo-French forces in the West, it is certain that the Japanese would take advantage of such circumstances to force the white race further along the path of concession.

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While the white nations paralyse each other by their antagonisms, Japan, intoxicated by long-cherished fantastic ambitions which she does not attempt to conceal, conquers China (that other British colony) threatens France in Indo-China, extends greedily towards the Indies, dominates the main part of Asia, and makes a reality of that "Yellow Peril" which Wilhelm II. denounced fifty years ago.

The vacillations, hesitations and changes of front of the various European Powers in Asia have been continual. In 1895, for example, the Franco-Russian alliance joined momentarily with Germany, and Russia, strong in the coalition of which she formed the centre, demanded that the Japanese should evacuate Port Arthur, thus depriving them of the fruits of their victory over China. Then she calmly occupied Port Arthur in their place.

In 1897 it was Wilhelm II., who under pretext of the massacre of certain German missionaries in Shantung, sent out a large fleet with the mission of occupying Kiao-Chow. The year 1900



marks the culminating point of European solidarity in China, although beneath the apparent manifestations of this solidarity, *i.e.*, the international force to deal with the Boxer rising, the most bitter competition arose.

At the end of that military engagement, Wilhelm II. directed the diplomatic action between the Empress of China and her advisers, who were in refuge 200 leagues from Peking, and the European ministers who had the task of meting out vengeance for their misdeeds. It was agreed that vengeance should be exemplary. The negotiations lasted a year (October 1900 till September 1901). Germany's plans became plain, recalling Bismarck's procedure at the Berlin Congress. They consisted of exciting the greed of Russia on the one hand, and of England and Japan on the other, in order to bring about a general partition, of which Wilhelm II. hoped to be the arbitrator.

In 1903 it was England, anxious at the Russian thrust towards India, that allied herself with Japan, whom she armed against the empire of the Tsar. In 1914, by contrast, Russia, France and England, now allies, encouraged the Japanese to expel the Germans from Kiao-Chow. Since then, we must admit, Germany has cunningly reversed the situation. We encouraged Italy against the Austrian Empire; to-day, Germany, giving us a dose of our own medicine, is encouraging Italy in her demand for Tunis, Corsica, Djibouti and heaven knows what else. Now allied to Japan, who once stripped her, she is pushing all her resources against England and France.

To-day a frenzied Europe is bringing about her own ruin. Anyone who has lived in Japan knows very well that all whites, whoever they are, are regarded as intruders, to be driven out of an Asia which is reserved for Japanese domination and exploitation.

How can the white races dream of defending themselves, if the largest white nation, in its vexation at losing its possessions, forswears European solidarity, and continually perverts its science and spirit of invention? But, a German might reply, how can a Germany full of rancour and discontent remain part of this European solidarity—and why should she remain part of it? Why should she be loyal to Europe and to the conservative Powers when she herself has nothing left to conserve? 'You

do not wish to let us have back our colonies? Very well; you will be threatened in your own, Germany has no need to show solidarity in a cause in which you have made it plain you do not wish her to be interested. You did not wish to have us as partners, so you shall have us as enemies'.

Once again it is the question of German colonies which enters this debate. We are repeatedly told that Great Britain is opposed to the restitution of colonies possessed by Germany before 1914. In France, we understand that the British approach this problem with a tremendous mixture of feelings. On the one hand, being realists, they admit that an empire of 80 million inhabitants ought to have its share in the exploitation of distant continents, but, on the other hand, they fear that, if restitution be granted, Germany would be provided with positions which she would use to-morrow to prepare a new series of conquests. One would naturally wish to satisfy the demands of a pacific, industrious Germany, whose ambitions were purely economic, but an insatiable Germany with a passion for power and continued expansion is naturally an object of mistrust.

What would be the actual state of the world if Germany again found herself in possession of her colony of Kiao-Chow and exploited freely a sphere of influence in North China? Before considering this hypothesis we should also have to assume that Germany had not adopted an attitude since the last quarter of the nineteenth century which inevitably caused coalitions to be formed against her. We must, therefore, suppose the existence of a Germany entirely different from the one which existed, and which remains the real Germany.

Is it not disconcerting that the German people, so mild, so reasonable, so intelligent, and even—when they do not feel themselves in a strong position—so obsequious, should have produced, in less than half a century those two prophets of her destiny, Wilhelm II. and Adolf Hitler? Everyone agrees to-day that if, after 1870, Germany in her position of strength, had kept to rational, moderate and humanitarian methods and had restricted herself to the peaceful development of her colossal resources, no one would have dreamed of declaring war on her. She could have continued at will her expansion across the world. Had she abstained from menacing the possessions

of others, she would have found, naturally and pacifically, a leading place in the constitution of the colonial empires. It is simply her own virulence and precipitation, her exposition of theories which would result in the subjection of other Europeans, her furious antagonism, her unbridled appetite and fantastic visions, which have ended by the alliance of the whole world against her. Because she had achieved the best material organization in Europe, even before the beginning of this century, Germany had already conceived her great dream of becoming the dictator of civilization, and would not commit herself to respect the rights of other Europeans, whom, in her naïve infatuation, she considered her inferiors—to be reformed and re-organized. But her ambitious plans threatened the world with greater disorders than the advantages offered by her organizing powers. The whole world rose up to render impossible a hegemony which a certain aptitude for punctuality and discipline did not justify. That with which Germany wished to endow Europe—her administrative capacity and machinery—comprised nothing miraculous, and appeared to engender fewer benefits than the evils likely to be caused by her greed and vanity.

Exactly the same situation arises to-day when the Nazis, stressing the necessity of increasing their living space, talk of conquering (after half Europe), Russia's treasure of the Ukraine. Hardly do they return to Memel before they surround this town with troops and fortifications, showing by their feverish activity that there are no limits to their efforts at domination. But, says the German spokesman, "before our rearmament when we were weak, exemplarily weak, you thought yourselves justified (indeed, because of our weakness) in majestically refusing us all satisfaction. What can one make of that?"

This argument, let us agree, is a troubling one. It leads us to self-criticism. Certainly all Europeans are more or less responsible for the chaos in which they find themselves. The occasions on which we have acted rationally have been infinitely rare. In the great majority of situations our destiny is decided by hazard and improvisation.

With regard to Asia, Europeans, in their approach to this continent, have never attempted a general view of the whole.



More often unity has been abandoned to trading competition, private interests and religious propaganda. The various white nations for the last hundred years, as our history testifies, according to the circumstances of the moment, destroyed what they had admired, or admired what they had destroyed.

It was, as all the world remembers, under the threat of the canons of the American commander Perry in 1854 and after the Anglo-French bombardment of Schimonosaki (1863-1864), that Japan was forced to adopt European armaments, which she originally wished to avoid. The instructors, officers, professors and armament merchants who came from England, France, America and Germany, engaged in frantic competition to furnish Japan with the means with which to fight us. All the methods and machines employed during the Manchurian war originated in Europe or America. After 1919, the white races continued their self-betrayal, and technicians of all nationalities hurried to Tokio, anxious to receive their commissions, and to furnish the Japanese general staff with the most recent creations in the art of destruction. To-day, in spite of the official disapproval of some Governments, it is entirely due to European inventions that Japan is able to invade China with success.

If Japan, as a result of circumstances at the moment impossible to realize, were to find herself, after 1939, completely cut off from all sources of scientific progress and invention from which she has abundantly drawn in Europe and America for the last 70 years, what would be her future? Has the gift of the genius of invention, which has been for so many centuries the undisputed monopoly of the white races, been assimilated by Japan so as to represent a sort of intellectual autonomy? For example, would the Japanese have ended by inventing aeroplanes, of which they know nothing at the beginning of this century, had we Europeans not supplied them with gradually perfected models?

The white race is its own greatest enemy. At the present time, the Pangermanists' conception of European unity is a sort of administered dominion, exploited, marshalled and ransomed, like Bohemia, by the Master Race. As long as this disastrous folly prevails in the German mind, nothing can stop the self-betrayal of a Europe divided against herself which is rapidly preparing her own downfall.

## THE REBUILDING OF ROME

BY SIR GEORGE YOUNG

**I**MPERIAL Rome is being rebuilt in a day, as an Empire of Italy. International Rome, once the Holy Roman Empire, is being rebuilt—so to say overnight—as a German Empire. What of the Rome that still represents the Catholicity of the Church and the Congregation of Christianity? Will it remain just conservative in compromise, or will it become constructive for the conservation of those fundamental truths of conscience and traditions of conduct upon which Christian civilization has been built? These are questions of peculiar importance at present to Christians of every creed and country.

The answer must be sought in recent pronouncements by Princes of the Church and in recent proceedings of the Papacy. The encyclicals of Pius XI. have shown that the Church realizes its responsibility for preaching and promoting Christian Socialism for the more ethical and equitable organization of society. But Pius XII. has not had time as yet to make a pronouncement as to the principles and procedures to be followed by the Church in what may at any moment become a Trial by Battle: a struggle between static democracy, based on moral law and mental liberty, and dynamic dictatorship, built up out of a legendary potentate and a least-common-multiple of mass-mentality. So for a pronouncement on this issue we will take that of Cardinal Verdier, the builder of churches in Paris and the rebuilder of the Church in France. In a recent speech he said that—"the Church and the great democracies, including France and its Empire, are to-day the defenders of Christian civilization".

As a protestant and progressive professor of political science I believe this to be true. But as an ex-diplomatist and democratic politician I believe that this crusade may be defeated by the paynim Paladins of Mahound, unless the spiritual and

political leaders of Christian civilization can concert as to the principles and procedures for its pacific defence. It is indeed a fact that the future—perhaps the fate—of Christian civilization now depends on the statesmanship and steadfastness of four imperial institutions. They are the French military imperium, the British naval empire, the empiric imperialism of the United States and, last but not least, the spiritual empire of the Papal See. All of these systems are democratic in the sense that their policy is pacific and their point of view progressive. And all are progressive in the sense that a normally conservative control admits liberal discussion of different opinions and objectives—and adopts by consent changes constitutionally carried out.

For want of such concert the first three of these democracies have already been forced by aggressive dictatorships to sacrifice—for ends of peace—continental insurances and collective securities by which they had safeguarded their systems and civilization against the event of war. But the fourth of these international institutions, the Papal See and the Catholic Church, is, in this respect, different. For national Churches can defend themselves by supporting and being supported by the State's armed forces. But the Catholic Church even when it had real temporal power was, as it still is, supernatural. And the days are over when the Vicar of Christ could call a crusade to combat a Paynim advance against Christianity or proclaim an Interdict to counter the aggression of a Potentate against the Catholic Church. The only national basis of the Papal See is now the control by Italians over its Councils. The only fighting force ready to rise in its defence is now to be found in the races and regions of Spain. Yet Italians and Spaniards have, with the Church's sanction, been mobilized in a crusade under a Spanish military dictator leading Moorish levies in alliance with a German dictatorship that is persecuting Christianity! How has this come about and what will come of it? Has it come about because the Church has been misled by the same want of faith in facts and want of foresight in the future as the three democracies? If so the consequences are obvious. The democracies can make good their political mistakes, at considerable cost, by military armament and action. But the Church can only make good any mistake it may have made by a



reinspiration of its spiritual authority and a reorientation of its pontifical policy.

To an outside observer the mistake that the Catholic Church made in Spain was of the same character and consequences though not similar in circumstance, to that which it made in Austria.

In favouring and financing that experiment of an Austrian Centre-party *régime* the British and French democracies were following a policy promoted by the Papal See. And they again followed the same lead in their admittedly unpopular and apparently impolitic attitude and action in respect of the Spanish *coup d'état* and civil war. For it was the attitude of the Spanish Prelacy and of the Papal See towards the *coup* as a crusade for the Church and Christianity that gave authority to the assumption by British, French and American public opinion that the Spanish Republic was anti-Christian and that the Spanish "red terror" of 1936 was a campaign of the Comintern and Communism against Christian civilization. And it was this assumption that enabled democratic Governments to recruit religious idealism for a non-intervention policy which was in effect an intervention against Spanish democracy. The policy of "non-intervention" was from the first condemned by progressives as a desertion of international democracy and by professionals as a danger to national defence. But it was condoned to the last by religious feeling as a peace crusade for Christian civilization against Bolshevik barbarism.

Our democracies are not going to outlast the dictatorships if they go on making the mistake we made in Austria and Spain. For, in adopting the realist procedure and even the religious propaganda of the dictatorships with regard to Spain, the three imperial democracies and the spiritual democracy of the Church created that division of their own moral forces that the dictatorships would otherwise have failed to effect. Thus in the democracies Protestants and Progressives were divided between Christian sentiment and common sense. In the Church Catholics were split between the political partisanship of the Spanish Prelacy and the pastoral philanthropy of the Basque and Catalan priesthood. Even the British Conservative Party was split between concern for the secular traditions of imperial

defence and international democracy and for the assumed truth of a Communist menace in Spain, the latter being an assumption authorized by American Presidents, by European Premiers and by one of the most authoritative of modern Popes.

Really the only resemblance between the Spanish Republican revolution and the Russian Communist revolution was that Spanish and Russian Clericalisms had committed their respective Churches to co-operation with, and even to some controlover, an inefficient class *régime* and an inequitable social system. Indeed, in Spain, Clericalist control had for centuries been so intolerant, and the incompetence and corruption of the Ruling Class so intolerable, that for a century rebellion and revolution had always first expressed themselves in anti-clericalist disturbances and in destruction of ecclesiastical buildings and institutions. A ban on the Jesuits and a burning of Churches had for over a century been in Madrid as recognized a symptom and safety-valve as a street riot in Paris or a Trafalgar Square meeting in London. So that the anti-clerical excesses that followed the outbreak of war in Spain were the after-effects of a local Spanish influenza, not a premonitory symptom of the infection of Spain with Russian scarlet fever

It is now beginning to be realized in England—that Spanish Communism and the Spanish Red Terror was a Bolshevik boggy used for political and even party purposes like “Gold for Russia” or the “Red Letter”;—that appeasement is not peace;—that Fascist totalitarianism and intolerance is a worse menace than Stalinist Communism in respect of freedom of conscience, the Catholic faith and the Christian religion;—that this is so mainly because the Communist religion of Civism is in principle not only compatible but consonant with a Christian Socialism such as inspires the encyclicals of Pope Pius XI or the addresses of Archbishop Temple;—that the Fascist religion of subservience of all Christian opinion and suppression of all Christian organs to the State and to the despot, by right of his divine mission, is incompatible with Christianity;—that Communism for this reason could and did abandon the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, as well as the permeation and persecution of Christianity, whereas Fascism cannot and has not;—that

Communism in its first destructive phase only purges and persecutes the propertied and privileged class, including the prelacy, and deprives the Church and the Religious Orders of their property this being in no way fatal to the spiritual authority of the Church and favourable to a reinspiration of its appeal, whereas Fascism is forced in its first phase to reduce both the intellectual opposition to it by persecutions of the intelligentsia, and the numerical odds against it by "purges" of the peasantry and proletariat, *i.e.*, that part of the population wherein chiefly reside the roots of religion and the foundations of the Church ;—finally that Communism, being international in its strategic world objectives, has had no difficulty in modifying its international tactics from conflict with the democracies into co-operation with them, whereas German and, in diminishing degrees, Italian and Spanish Fascism, have nationalist and imperialist strategic objectives that must destroy all international institutions and ideals. These are now accepted axioms for international problems, and the British Cabinet, having sacrificed Madrid, is now hurriedly seeking alliance with Moscow. But the Roman Curia is still obsessed by the "Bolshie Bogy".

Yet Rome is more imperilled than London. For Fascism in its first phase is forced to destroy all ideals, institutions and individuals that actively oppose or even passively obstruct its objectives. These are blasted out, blown up or beaten down much as are civic buildings or battle fronts under bombardment. So the first international institutions to go are the jerry-built new sky-scrapers, the last are the broadly-based and deeply basemented buildings of old. Thus the League of Nations is half ruined and what remains is probably past repair ; while International Public Law, that labyrinthine agglomeration of codes, customs, and conventions, though riddled like a sieve and reduced to a public convenience, still survives. The international control by money power exercised through the Royal Courts and the ruling classes of Europe up to the Great War, and thereafter through the banks and big business of Paris, London and New York, has been in part destroyed by the reorganization of Russia, Germany and Italy as totalitarian autarchies ; and German Jewry, the core of that international system, has been



cut out. With this internationalism of the wealthy has perished the beginnings of the internationalism of the workers which, already weakened by the division between revolutionaries and reformists, between Socialists and Communists, has now been wrecked by the conscription of the Russian, Italian, German and Iberian proletariats as forced labour for totalitarian reconstructions. The offensive has now come up against the last line of democratic defence—the internationalism of the Christian religion. This had been half ruined by the Reformation which had set up National State Churches in the Western and Northern democracies. One of these Erastian edifices deeply rooted in the national morality and mentality has been razed—and may be replaced by a new religion of German paganism. The only international institution and ideal that still remains intact enough to serve as a Shrine for the unity of Christian civilization is the Catholic Church.

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Now, it is not the progressive factors and forces in a community that defend its racial traditions and religious truths in the last ditch—it is the Conservative. Most of us remember that it was not the House of Commons that defended our laws and liberties during the intolerant totalitarianism of the Great War. ‘The House of Lords throughout the war did nothing in particular—and did it very well’. To-day it is neither the Lutheran pastors in the concentration camps of Germany nor the Anglican deans in the columns of *The Times*, heroic as they are, who can save Christian civilization from being rattled into barbarism. It is the martyrs of devotion to pastoral duty in the Spanish priesthood and the effect given to their sacrifice by Papal policy. A sacrifice which seems to have been as heavy on one side as on the other, and therefore can only be given a sanction by a policy that is impartial as between the partisans.

Unfortunately, as has already been indicated, Catholicism in Spain has had two characteristics which have frustrated the Church in Spain in its function as the citadel of the Church. One is that, while the Spanish priesthood in the Northern and Central races and regions were real representatives of the religious faith in their congregations, the prelacy were not equally representative of the communities in Spain. The Spanish prelacy in the

Middle Ages strained the Churches' authority and almost destroyed its appeal. First of all, as Churchmen, by suppressing the native mozarabic ritual and mystic religion. They did this to enable the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy See in Rome to maintain the unity of the Christian World by maintaining the uniformity of Christian worship. In the second place, as Spaniards, by allowing the tendency of the Spanish temperament towards terrorism to tempt them into adoption of the coercions and cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition. For the same Spanish temperament that has made the Spanish priesthood the bulwark of the Church has more than once made the Spanish prelacy its Bastille.

If the end ever could justify the means, then persecution of Jews and Protestants was justified for the maintenance of the Church's authority that had brought Christendom out of the dark ages into the dawn of civilization. And it is arguable that the maintenance of peace by the super-national authority and super-natural appeal of the Church would have been worth more to humanity than any check to progress by clerical conservatism. Some of us would even admit that it would have been an advantage if the Catholic Church had checked the industrial revolution and the machine age until the conscience and common sense of civilization was capable of controlling the contributions of scientific discovery. But, unquestionably, a conservative end does not justify a coercive means. And any possibility of the Church retaining such power was precluded by the persecution of Spanish progressives. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of *their* Church. Toleration is the rock on which any Church must be built—terrorism is a quicksand in which any Church will soon be engulfed.

Similarly to-day—if ever persecution could be justified it would be in the cause of revolutionary reconstruction. To enforce the Fascist programme of restoring Christian civilization to a sense of social responsibility and to reconstruct the State as a community of citizens with equal opportunities and ethical objectives. A reconstruction of society is now not only recognized as ethically essential, but is realized to be economically inevitable. The pendulum of progress is swinging us swiftly away from the capitalistic competitive chaos of extreme

individualism imposed by the industrial revolution and the machine age back to an organized social system. To some of us it seems a reaction to mediævalism—but to others it is seen as a revolution spiralling up into a superior stratum and a more stably scientific social structure. But, however that may be, the process is automatic. We can steam with the stream, but we cannot struggle against it. We can steer ourselves, but we cannot stop. For example, we might have organized our social reconstruction after the war in co-operative countries and by common consent. Now it must come, probably, by another general conflict. Democracy and popular government might have been adopted as the principle of and procedure for reconstruction by consent. Now it is having to adapt itself to the principle and procedures of dictatorship by accepting, at least provisionally, some measure of personal government and coercion. Pacifist internationalism might have continued to control militant nationalism by a mass-mentality and a modern method. Now it will have to rely on the Machiavellian philosophy and policy of the balance of military power, and on the mediæval authority and appeal of the Catholic Church.

To an outside observer like myself Christian civilization is unlikely to survive unless the Princes of the Church can revitalize the body of the Church and reinvigorate its brains. For there are admittedly two aspects and attributes of the Papacy—one pastoral, the other pontifical. Sometimes one aspect is in the ascendant according to the policy of the Church and the personality of the Pope or his Secretary of State. Leo XIII. was pontifical, Pius X and Benedict XV were pastoral—and the late Pius XI pontifical again. The authoritative Pius XI and his able Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli, had to deal with the violent invasions of the Churches' rights and responsibilities by the new totalitarian States. These began with the persecutions and proscriptions of the Russian Communist revolution. And being the first of these offensives and one especially odious to the privileged and propertied classes it became, as "Bolshevism", a bogey that obsessed the minds of Christians like Pius XI to the point of overlooking of the later anti-Christian aggressions of Fascisms.

It seems possible that the Church has begun to adapt itself



by the choice of Cardinal Pacelli as Pope. Pius XII will be a "pontifical" Pope, as good a strategist and perhaps a better statesman than Pius XI. By his allocation of additional Cardinals to North America and Spain he has raised the representation of the democracies in the councils of the Church. His next step might well be to strengthen the relations between the Papacy and the peoples. Such a policy involves a recognition that the ancient association between the authoritative continuum of the Church of Rome and the authoritarian Conservatism of the propertied and privileged ruling classes is no longer consonant with the ideals or even the interests of Catholicism. In *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno* Pius XI indicated that he had recognized this in principle, though he did not reconstruct his policy accordingly. He continued, like our Conservative statesmen, to seek by appeasement association with Fascist rulers who had usurped the political power of privilege and property and who were fraudently converting them to the augmentation of their autarchies. Which is quite as fatal to political tradition and spiritual truth as the dictatorship of the proletariat—and more final. Because the dictatorship of the proletariat should, in principle, evolve, and is at present evolving, into new democratic institutions; whereas personal dictatorship rests and must continue to rest on military force.

Moreover, passing from the ephemeral to the fundamental, Catholicism and Christianity are democratic institutions in that they draw their vitality and virtue not from the favour of the powerful and propertied but from the faith of the poor. The Concordat with Mussolini negotiated by Pius XI, and that with Hitler, negotiated with Pius XII when Nuncio, brought the Church no doubt direct pecuniary and political advantage. But an annulment of either of these on account of non-observance would bring the Church an augmentation of its spiritual authority and a readjustment to new political re-alignments and to new popular relationships.

The development of this association between a conservative Papacy and the Catholic peoples offers obvious difficulties. In some Catholic countries, such as France and Spain, the old alliance between the prelacy and the propertied privileged ruling

class is still active—and, as a result of open or obscured class war, is even aggressive against the popular movements for social reconstruction. With the result that the latter are anti-Clericalist, preponderantly anti-Catholic and partly anti-Christian. Moreover, these French and Spanish ruling classes, in order to maintain their resistance to reconstruction against this popular pressure, have had to accept the assistance afforded them by the diplomacy of the Italian and German dictatorships for the defence of the Church and Christianity. This has brought the Church into conflict with nationalist as well as with socialist sentiment in the masses. Catholic Socialism, as in Germany, Austria and Spain, had bridged the class chasm caused by Clericalism between the Church and the common people. But there is no way of restoring the relations between a French working-class Catholicism and a Church associated with political reaction and with a German Fascism that is persecuting Christianity. Similarly, the Spanish working-class will remain antagonistic to a Church associated with military dictatorship and assisted by Moorish mercenaries.

The complete domination of both *régime* and religion by dictatorship in Germany has destroyed for the time being the political relationship between the Curia at Rome and the Catholicism of Germany. And it is of interest to enquire whether the development of dictatorship in Spain will have the same result. It will be recalled that after the Republican revolution of 1931 the balance between Conservatives and Progressives in the Cortes was restored by the Catholic centre-party of the C.E.D.A. and by the national organizations of Catholic action supported by Catholic Youth. This party came to power for two years (1934-36) and was turned out by a General Election. After the outbreak of war it was suppressed, and its leader Gil Robles exiled, by the Nationalist Socialist Dictatorship. This has left Catholicism in Spain politically represented only by Clericalist reaction based on Navarrese Carlism and by a Prelacy which presses on the dictatorship a restoration of that position, privilege and property of which it was deprived by the Republic. Whereas the Spanish dictatorship, by a recent agreement as to propaganda with Germany, indicates that any new concordat with Rome will be effected within the same

limits and executed on the same lines as the concordat with Germany. Señor Suñer, brother-in-law of General Franco, Minister of the Interior and leader of the Falange, thus defined this future conflict in an interview for the *Völkische Beobachter*. He said that "it was the Catholic spirit which had given unity to their movement, but this did not signify political dependence on Rome". He pointed out "the limits that must exist between the spiritual power of the Church and the political power of the State. Religious and moral education would be entrusted to the priests, but political education would correspond to the Falangist movement". Which is the self-same conflict that has led to a suppression of Christianity in Germany and nearly led to a schism of Catholicity in France. Even though the Spanish dictatorship will rebuild the churches and renew the Concordat, what will this avail if the churches are empty and the Concordat is not implemented?

The question, therefore, is whether the Papal See can now save Catholicism and Christianity in Spain from the consequences of Spanish Clericalism having identified the Church with political reaction and with foreign oppression for the third time. Spanish Clericalism had associated itself with the Austrian imperial intervention for the repression of Spanish laws and liberties, with the French invasion for the restoration of the despotic Ferdinand VII and now with the Italian invasion for replacing Republican democracy by military dictatorship. And even though Italian intervention may end German influence will not. The Spanish dictatorship will not be developed by its reactionary and combative force—Carlism, but by its constructive and revolutionary force—Fascism. Totalitarian reconstruction and autarchic Nationalism are in principle incompatible with such an international institution as is the Catholic Church, as evidenced by the German example. And, though a compromise can be effected, as in the concordats, no real co-operation or even confidence results. Indeed, to an outside observer, it would appear that the conflict between the Catholic Church and the Police-State is all to the good of the Church, and that a concordat in Spain, so far from re-establishing the Spanish people as the popular front of Catholicism, would make a fatal and final rupture. That is would indeed, widen the



schism between the pastoral or specifically spiritual element and the political or especially Spanish element into a chasm in which not only the Church but Christianity in Spain might be engulfed.

If these opinions are correct then the conclusion is obvious. The Church *can* fulfil its function in the future of Christian civilization and can make Spain again a stronghold and strategic base from which to permeate the new totalitarian States with Christian principles. It can do so if it will reorientate its pontifical policy so as to re-inspire its spiritual power. If it will become Christian instead of Carlist. If it will propagate its pastoral tap-roots in the Spanish people and prune its sucker-shoots in the higher branches of the Spanish polity. If it will renounce the restoration of the exceptional position and educational privileges of the Religious Orders and of the political partisanship of a Catholic Centre-party. If it will reinforce the priesthood materially and morally and restrict the prelacy to its regulating and representative functions. If it will confine its lay organizations to parochial activities centreing round the village Church, as prescribed by the prudent policy of Pius XI in Germany. If it will restore its relations with the industrial workers in Spain, as it has in France, relying for this purpose on such organizations for personal service, as the French *Jeunesse Ouvrière chrétienne*, which now has a membership of a quarter million, rather than on Catholic Trades Unions or a Catholic Centre-party. Above all, if it will use its mediation to mitigate the penalties imposed on the Spanish people by a dictated peace.

On such lines I believe that the Church may hope so to adapt itself to political adversity in Spain as to make of it a spiritual advantage. It may also hope to establish relations of confidence and co-operation with an autarchy that is now an executor of the Church but might become its executioner. And still more it may hope that when Spain, by evolution or revolution, again becomes a democracy, possibly of a new description, the Church may have so recovered the allegiance and affection of the Spanish people as to have the authority to lead them thereafter in the paths of peace. And if Pius XII can restore peace in Spain then his message of peace which was his first pronouncement as Pontiff will find a real and ready response throughout the World.

## THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC CHAMBER

BY S. G. HOBSON

**M**EN of every shade of opinion and interest are convinced that Parliament, as at present constituted, is outmoded ; but that does not mean that they would cut it away like worm-eaten timber. On the contrary, recent events in Europe and China have but confirmed our democratic convictions. Parliament is still to the vast majority the palladium of liberty, the expression of sovereign citizenship. Nevertheless, all is not well ; we see it invaded by a rising flood of new ideas, purposes and developments. The situation is anomalous, On the one hand, there is an unshaken belief in the historic mission of parliamentary institutions, so rich in wisdom and tradition ; on the other hand, they are falling into disrepute. And these two contrary currents run through each of us. It is as though the average man should say : ‘ I am a democrat and I still believe in Parliament, but . . . ’ Actually, recent events, at home and abroad, are rapidly teaching us the uncomfortable truth that our political and economic institutions must be adapted to modern conditions, so that we may hold our own in world affairs. Nor have we any precedent or model to help us. Ours is still the historic *rôle* to lead.

The constitutional aspects of this problem must be left to abler pens than mine. All I can do is to note that the post-war economic and cultural growths, whilst urgently needing co-ordination, are, in purpose and texture, definitely outside the ambit of Parliamentary administration. The English instinct for a minimum of intervention in industry by Parliament is by no means confined to financial groups who gain by a policy of *laissez-faire*. There is a deep-rooted conviction that Parliament is constantly pressed to undertake tasks alien to its true mandate. Our sense of historic continuity strengthens this view. Down to the advent of large-scale industry, the business of Government based on Parliamentary assent was to collect taxes and spend

them. Parliament itself was concerned with politics, with public policy. Whilst theoretically omnipotent, it mainly confined its own authority to the army, the navy and a carefully restricted civil service, whose growth was regarded with apprehension. The Englishman's distrust of bureaucracy is in his blood ; indeed his attitude towards any legislation is always negative. When new measures are mooted, he says : ' Must we really ? What a nuisance ! ' (We all remember pictures in *Punch* and other periodicals of the choleric country gentleman who only looked to Parliament to " put down " something new which he cordially detested.) In these later days, with our elaborate political programmes and crowded legislation, the Victorian attitude to Parliament seems obsolete. Nevertheless, it is reviving—with a profound difference. There is a growing conviction that we must evolve a new machinery to cope with ten thousand complexities, mainly functional, for which Parliament is not fitted, either in personnel or settled procedure.

In that phrase " settled procedure " we find our clue. Let us suppose that Parliament has divested itself of all extraneous tasks, mainly economic, demanding functional rather than political treatment. It still finds itself confronted with a range of political issues of the first magnitude—foreign policy, military and naval problems, education, public health, municipalities, Dominions, Colonies, Dependencies and mandated territories, with the demands of the ever intrusive Treasury. Heaven knows, there is enough work there to keep busy the faithful Commons. Yes, but how vitally important all that is to our present and future welfare ! We cannot afford to make mistakes. We have known that for centuries—and so, by trial and error, have evolved a settled procedure. We might with truth affirm that, subject to the quality of our Parliamentary *personnel*, it is a major factor in our legislative processes. Its keynote is deliberation ; it does not yield an inch to gusts of public passion, storms of anger, fright or impatience. Deliberation is the dominant influence at the sittings of the High Court of Parliament. I would not argue that this procedure is settled beyond amendment—quite the contrary—but I would argue that it could not, with safety or satisfaction, be so amended as to enable Parliament to legislate efficiently the great volume of



industrial change now become essential and urgent. Not forgetting that, on grounds of public policy, the Commons must have the last word, devolution of powers on an Industrial Chamber is imperative. And, I would add, it must be conceded in no niggardly spirit.

Even the most cautious must agree, I think, that we have reached a critical stage in our political and economic history. Under outside pressure the political alignments tend to be confused—a confusion which reflects the moods and doubts of an electorate, a considerable proportion of which remembers the great war. In all the Parties little fissures and divergencies have been heard, if not felt. They are at least symptomatic. No Parliamentarian, so far as I know, has reached any definite opinion as to the right answer of this country to the Fascist and Nazi challenge to our political and industrial supremacy. I cannot recall any period in modern times when our vision has been so blurred, our impulses so spasmodic. Political progress seems to have reached a blind end; no guiding principle, passionately adopted, as in former days, has come to the surface. It is the custom to ascribe all this indecision to the constant threat of war. A moment's reflection, however, must convince us that this shrinkage of doctrine amongst all the political parties ante-dates Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler, if not their emergence at least their later aggressive period. Whilst doubtless they have hastened and perhaps precipitated the present Parliamentary paralysis, we must look to a deeper and more permanent cause. The Labour Party, for example, floated into our ken on a wave of idealism, the creation of the earlier Socialists. We have seen it gradually degenerate into opportunism, making political capital out of passing events. It still declares its Socialist faith but makes no conscious effort to realize its dreams. Nor can we discern a lingering trace of the Tory doctrine that inspired Salisbury and Randolph Churchill. The link that binds together the Government forces is good old Imperialist nationalism, from which Labour only timidly dissents.

Now there is no reason to suppose that the quality of our Parliamentary *personnel* has deteriorated. The types have changed: the cultured squire, with his Horatian tags, has yielded place to a more pushing and forceful man of affairs; the

Gladstonian Liberal manufacturer has been supplanted by the trade union official and his sympathizers. But the great gift of character is there in abundance. To this we add an astonishing experience of affairs in all parts of the world. The entry of women into Parliament has not changed the current. They have done reasonably well. If oratory in the grand manner has disappeared, the modern stylè has its own attractions. It eschews rhetoric but responds to ideas and emotions. A few years ago I was greatly struck with the high level of Parliamentary speech reached in the debates on the Revised Prayer Book. Probably we have all of us observed that, when the House is concerned with large questions of public policy, escaping for a time from the drab details of finance and industry, the speeches are worthy of the occasion. Sometimes oratory comparable with the past delights us. The helplessness of Parliament faced with economic problems of supreme importance cannot be traced to personal incompetence.

A curious feature of Parliamentary life to-day is the stubborn resistance of the Labour Party to any breach, however small, in the continuity of proceeding. They seem to be more traditional than the most obstinate Conservatives. The reason is not far to seek. These men, many of them Nonconformists, were brought up in the belief that Parliament is the child of liberty; that its rules and customs are therefore sacred. But this insistence upon the dots and commas places them in a dilemma which must become increasingly embarrassing. For they were sent to Parliament to secure legislative sanction to far-reaching industrial changes, mostly contentious, but some of accepted value. Having failed, they go back to their constituents and charge the failure in part to the wickedness of their opponents (this is, of course, common form and deceives nobody) and in part to the clogged condition of the Parliamentary machine. But, like all the other members of the House, they cling to power and are reluctant to face changes. Their impotence and not their desire will ultimately compel them to resort to devolution.

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We may, I think, assume with confidence that Parliament to-day does the work for which it was constituted as well as, or better than, its predecessors; that its rules of procedure have

been wisely developed and are applicable to its true functions ; that its personnel, whatever the changes in type, is competent and up to average. Where then, lies the root of the trouble ? Unquestionably in its functional inability to cope with vital economic issues which have been superimposed. Observe, please, that this is irrespective of current controversy upon Socialism, Individualism, *laissez-faire* or other theories. Employers as well as wage-earners are constantly knocking at its doors. What they get is compromise, delay and frustration. Deliberation is essential when dealing with affairs of the spirit, with legislation affecting fundamental policy ; but in industry, time is the essence of the contract ; delay is too often fatal. And therein we discover the distinction between politics and economics. They are as different as my dinner is from a sonata. Had we had an Economic Chamber with the requisite powers, the industrial horrors of the last twenty years might largely have been avoided.

That period is a tale of tragedy. Employers and managers have supped with anxiety ; millions of wage-earners have gone through hell. The story of coal, iron, steel, shipbuilding, cotton, and a score of minor industries is appalling ; we need a modern Dante to describe it. Parliament has been ineffective when it has not been helpless. Why ? Because at the back of its mind Parliament believed that, strictly considered, these horrors were none of its business. A little judicious help here and there, the dole or what not, why, certainly ; but any idea of drastic change with far-flung co-ordination, emphatically, No ! That was the business of the employers and employed who *must* get together and do something. We have reached what the logicians call an antinomy. Two rights, each destructive of the other, clash on the rock of tradition.

Since, as I write, Parliament is discussing the Cotton Bill—an obviously futile and restricted measure—let me recapitulate the main facts of that distressed industry. I quote from the Report on the Cotton Manufacturing Industry to the Minister of Labour, presented on June 15th, 1935. Four years ago !

“ It is notorious that, since the war, the Lancashire cotton industry has suffered a severe contraction in demand and output, and that this contraction has assumed alarming proportions in the last five or six years. This reduction in the scale of the industry has been fully reflected in the



weaving section. The production of piece goods which according to the Census of Production returns was 7088 million linear yards in 1907, and had risen to 8050 million linear yards in 1912, had shrunk by 1924 to 5590 million linear yards and by 1930 to 3179 million yards, a fall of 60.5 per cent. since before the war. The trade estimates that since 1930 there has been a further fall of over three per cent. According to Worrall's Textile Directory, the number of looms in Lancashire fell from 805,000 in 1914 to 792,000 in 1924, 704,000 in 1930 and 518,000 in 1935, a percentage decrease since the war of 35½ per cent."

Too late now to waste tears on cotton waste; it was not surprising that in the Commons debate a Member said that, in all but name, Lancashire has become a distressed area. But can we deny that this terrible state of affairs affects, spiritually and materially, the nation as a whole? If it were not within the competence of Parliament to grasp the nettle, the only sane conclusion is that there should have been an economic authority fully charged with the task. Should have been; should be now: in fact, was never more urgent than now. Consider the suggestion of Mr. Anthony Eden and his friends that "a National Government be formed which should be entrusted with full powers over the nation's industry, wealth and man-power". On that I express no opinion; but the proposal is based on emergency—the possible imminence of war. Is it then suggested that, except in war, there is no emergency? The industrial depressions of recent times (which on analysis are found to be mainly financial), if the remote *sequelæ* of the great war, came upon us in peace. There were, in fact, many thousands who welcomed a war-scare that increasing armaments might decrease unemployment. To such depths did we sink when there was no war-cloud on the horizon. A cool survey of the past decade proves that, with ever more acute international competition, we spend our days in unrelieved emergency. Since, *ex hypothesi*, the business of Parliament in the economic sphere is only to relieve or mildly regulate, how can we resist the inference that an Economic Chamber with large powers is now overdue?

Even if we grant the need for a more authoritative co-ordination of production and distribution, the critic, mindful of Parliament's prerogatives, will demand a scrupulous definition of "large powers". Nothing must be done to impair Parliament's ultimate authority. We are confronted with two principles, one constitutional and one philosophic, which call

for consideration. But first a word about co-ordination. The fatal defect in existing proposals is that they are all sectional. The cotton trade illustrates my meaning. Suppose that it overcomes its internal difficulties. That is only the first step in its revival. Beyond lie large problems of world-trade with its intricate problems of credit. That credit, in its turn, is to some extent determined by conditions, particularly of barter, prevailing in any country with which we trade. Obviously, something more than good salesmanship must be called in aid. No one trade in itself suffices. But an Economic Chamber, in *liaison* with the Board of Trade, with the Consular Service (or its equivalent in our Dominions and Colonies) could and should fill the void. For thirty years I have been puzzled why we have not used our Consular Service to far greater advantage. With but slight reorganization, mainly by functional additions, we have in it a magnificent buying and selling agency, backed by national credit, unequalled by private enterprise. In my own travels, east and west, I have been told by Consuls of many opportunities that whistled down the wind because there was no one available to seize them. Long ago I raised the question. It was answered by Lord Curzon who devoutly hoped that our splendid Consuls would never descend to the level of commercial travellers! I believe that had we organized our Consular Service in the East on these realist lines, the situation to-day in China would be vastly different. Be that as it may, it is evident that an Economic Chamber, with its tentacles over the earth, could not only restore but widely expand our economic influence. Incidentally, it would be an unrivalled instrument of peace.

The constitutional problem touching Parliament's prerogatives is not, I think, difficult to solve. The constitution of an Economic Chamber—or House of Industry, as some of us call it—implies the separation of the economic from the political. It means in practice that all that mass of industrial legislation now vainly clamouring for Parliamentary attention must, in the first instance, be dealt with by the Economic Chamber. To some this separation may seem impossible; to me, who have been living with the idea for a long time, it seems as desirable as it is inevitable. Who is there, with any knowledge of the inner

workings of the House of Commons, who will deny that beneficent legislation is frequently mangled or defeated by "the interests"? Hardly a day passes where private financial pressure on Parliamentary measures is not seen or felt. This foreign element in our Deliberative Chamber vitiates politics and frustrates sound economic advance. On analysis, we shall find that the cause of it is not human frailty but a dangerous confusion of functions. My criticism would be that Members too readily allow themselves to be dominated by the economic factor. As who should say: "This is good and necessary, but the money interests insist that it is untimely". In this connection, "untimely" may be a harmless word with a sinister meaning. Nevertheless, the House of Commons, being the sovereign authority, must have the last word in all measures and decisions adopted by the Economic Chamber. What then should be the procedure? Strangely enough, we find our precedent in the Church Assembly Act. Legally considered, the Church is a sort of National Guild, a corporate body with powers defined by law. It has its Upper and Lower Houses; it passes its measures through first, second and third readings. Then it must await the final assent of the House of Commons, who may accept or reject but cannot amend. The good Commons cannot amend, because functional problems—in this case touching faith—are not in their province. The application of this principle to the Economic Chamber is obvious. The constitutional prerogatives of Parliament are effectively safeguarded whilst the functional efficiency of the Economic Chamber is not impaired. The English practice of joint committees would doubtless be invoked.

We are, in fact, moving into an era of function, involving a re-valuation of all our social and economic activities, with an ensuing new hierarchy of values. What, for example, is the functional, as distinct from the financial, difference between a greyhound track and a cotton-mill? A thousand similar contrasts instantly come to mind. Yet our national wealth must be finally based on functional utility or we shall gradually sink in prestige and influence, as distinct from financial dominance. In its own sphere, the Economic Chamber will meet with spiritual problems of profound significance.



## DIET AND DEMOCRACY

BY F. L. McDougall, C.M.G.

THE relationship of man to his food supplies has gone through many changes. In a completely primitive society, before the advent of agriculture, food supplies depended upon the animals which the individual or the tribe could capture or the berries and roots they could find. The cultivation of the land brought more certainty of supplies ; but the fact that there was " corn in Egypt " was of no value to the Israelites unless they migrated to the land of plenty. Until the coming of the machines, the petition in the Litany " from plague, pestilence and famine ; Good Lord deliver us " was of dire significance in all countries. Had the medieval churchman realized, however, that the great epidemics, which swept every country, were the inevitable results of periods of starvation, he would have reversed the order of the words in this petition even at the expense of euphony. Increase of population was conditioned by the availability of locally produced food. The fact that in the two centuries preceding the industrial revolution the population of this country only increased by some half a million people is the most striking commentary on how absolute was this dependence. Steam transport, together with the improvement of roads, immensely increased the areas from which man could draw his means of subsistence, and this was one of the most important factors which led to the upward surge of population in Western Europe during the nineteenth century. Between 1800 and 1900 the population of the United Kingdom increased by 29 million people in spite of a loss by emigration of some 9 millions. At the end of that century, in the countries of Western civilization, the fear of physical starvation had completely disappeared, and we had tended to a somewhat smug belief that modern progress had solved food problems—and that only very unfortunate or improvident families suffered

from any lack of food. We realized that in less fortunate countries, such as China or India, famine continued to be a menace, but we were unconscious that nutrition was a problem of real importance so far as Western Europe or the United States of America were concerned.

The great increase in public interest in problems of nutrition has been due to the realization of the important results that can be obtained through the application of what is known as the "newer knowledge of nutrition" to public health and social and economic problems. As recently as ten, or even five, years ago the intelligent public were quite unaware that any serious problems of malnutrition existed in countries so relatively advanced as the United Kingdom. It was realized that the very poor might sometimes not have enough to eat; such cases, however, were regarded as statistically unimportant, and it was comfortably assumed that the operation of various forms of public assistance rendered the lack of a reasonable minimum supply of food to the individual a rare occurrence. Gradually, however, the significance of modern research into the effect of various food factors on health and indeed on the maintenance of life itself began to demonstrate that adequate nutrition was not simply a question of the absorption of a sufficient number of calories nor even of a reasonable balance between carbo-hydrates fats and proteins. With the recognition of the part which vitamins and small traces of mineral salts play in human physiology, it was appreciated that a diet consisting of plenty of white bread, margarine, jam and tea, even when rendered slightly less monotonous by the occasional addition of some tinned salmon, or a little meat, was most detrimental to health and was an impossible basis on which to secure healthy mothers and children.

The fact that in 1935 the publication of Sir John Orr's report ("Food, Health and Income") immediately secured the widest publicity showed that the public mind was ripe for the consideration of these problems. In September of that year the Australian delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations secured permission as a matter of urgency to place the subject of nutrition on the agenda of the Assembly. There, in spite of the pre-occupations of this essentially political conference

with the Abyssinian crisis, three days were devoted to a discussion of the the relationship between food, health and agriculture. It was not surprising that this initiative should have come from an agricultural exporting country. An insistence by such countries on the need for increased consumption has been the logical effect of the shock which they sustained when they found at the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 that the only subject in which a considerable measure of agreement could be reached among the great nations was on the desirability of measures to *restrict* agricultural production in order to safeguard the post-war agricultural protectionism of the importing countries.

The readiness of the public mind to accept nutrition as a problem of immediate importance is exemplified by the results of this initiative. No one will dispute that the League's activities have been carried on under the worst possible conditions during the last three years, but in spite of this the League campaign for improved nutrition has already achieved remarkable results. The final report of the Mixed Committee set up by the League became a "best-seller" among League reports, although it was sold at the high price of seven and sixpence. The volume of press notices exceeded those on any other League activity. The British press welcomed it with full-length reviews and leading articles, and the *New York Times* described it as the most significant publication of 1937. The Mixed Committee recommended Governments to establish National Nutrition Committees, and no fewer than twenty-one countries have accepted this advice. These national bodies have generally been constituted of members drawn from medicine, public health services and from agriculture. Dietary surveys are being conducted in many countries, and a vigorous interest in nutrition is displayed not only in the advanced countries of Western civilization but also in Hungary, Rumania, Egypt, Iraq and Chile. A start has been made on the study of the food supplies of the Far East, and the United Kingdom Government has set an admirable example in requiring Colonial Governments to give serious attention to the problem of nutrition in the Tropics.

It is desirable, therefore, to take stock of the position that



has been reached and to consider the answer to the question—‘where do we go from here?’ In the international field this is a task which the League organizations are facing. And in this matter the League is fortified by the knowledge that the enthusiastic support of the United States of America can be counted upon, and indeed all countries co-operate save Germany and Italy—whose rulers may well be anxious to avoid their populations thinking too much about standards of living. Last November a meeting of representatives of the National Nutrition Committees was held at Geneva at which the progress made in each country was reviewed and plans were laid for further international co-operation.

So far as this country is concerned, the recent Nutrition Conference arranged by the British Medical Association afforded an excellent opportunity for national stocktaking. Had the Association arranged for a conference on nutrition in relationship to health, it would have been a matter of interest but not of surprise. The B.M.A. did not, however, limit the agenda of the Conference to the medical or health aspects of the nutrition problem, but deliberately included the consideration of agricultural and economic aspects. As invariably happens at such conferences, many divergent points of view were put forward. Sir Arthur Salter, who gave the Inaugural Address, was mainly concerned with the question of food supplies in time of war. He stressed, however, the serious fact, brought out in Sir John Orr’s “Food, Health and Income”, that 50 per cent. of the population of this country does not obtain a completely satisfactory diet and discussed the effects of Government policy on this situation. He drew attention to the tendency of Governments to be more concerned with the sectional interest of producers than with the general interest of the consumer and suggested that “we are thus building up a form of bastard socialism to which I believe private enterprise without the state, or full state socialism would be preferable”. Distribution costs could, he believed, be lower and there was need for educational propaganda on food values. He suggested that if English people would become more critical of the way in which their food was cooked, it might have a most important effect on the health and happiness of the nation. Sir Arthur Salter concluded

by urging that the medical profession should insist, without cessation or relaxation, upon adequate supplies of food for the country both in war and in peace.

The medical aspects of nutrition were, of course, fully discussed the principal speaker being Professor Cathcart, who adopted a somewhat conservative attitude, emphasizing the gaps which still existed in our knowledge in both the physiological and the sociological fields.

With regard to the agricultural problem Lord Astor was the principal speaker on the situation in the United Kingdom. He was able to bring great authority to the subject since he was the Chairman of the League of Nations' Mixed Committee on Nutrition—and has also been the Chairman of a distinguished group who, after five years study of the problem of British agriculture, recently published an important report based on their prolonged enquiries. He maintained that, although malnutrition was due both to poverty and ignorance, the former was undoubtedly the main cause, and he suggested that the next great British social reform ought to be the complete elimination of malnutrition. If the nation determined to carry through such a reform, the effects would be reflected not only in improved health but would provide the real type of assistance which British agriculture needed. He suggested that in order to raise the dietary of the people of the United Kingdom to an optimum level, it would be necessary for the country to obtain 80 per cent. more milk, 40 per cent. more butter, 55 per cent. more eggs, 30 per cent. more meat, 120 per cent. more fruit and 85 per cent. more vegetables. The basis of British agricultural policy should be to supply more of those perishable foods where proximity to the market gives the farmer a natural advantage. Owing to the cost of re-armament, he pointed out, there would be less money available either for the expansion of social services or to subsidize agriculture, and it was therefore essential to limit wasteful expenditure on wheat and sugar beet and to use such sums as would be available to maximum advantage. He severely criticized the present trends of agricultural policy and in particular the vesting of statutory powers, in relation to the prices of food stuffs, in marketing boards, which he described as "monopoly producer trusts elected by farmers alone,

responsible to farmers alone". The Milk Marketing Board had "invented a new crime—punishable by fine—that of selling cheap milk—and he quoted from the Milk Board's official publication which stated that the Board's policy was "to produce a little for a lot rather than a lot for a little". Lord Astor suggested that such policies conflicted absolutely with the public interest.

Dr. K. A. H. Murray, of Oxford, supported Lord Astor by instancing the way in which the progressive farmer was reducing costs, and producing more food with the employment of less labour.

In the discussions in Overseas Empire Agriculture, it was suggested that the present decade might be regarded as a period of regulation of output. The Dominions had met the fall in food prices by increasing the efficiency of their own production and regarded restriction schemes with great dislike. They were prepared to become reluctant adherents to certain restriction schemes but maintained that in a world still full of poverty, and where poverty was a cause of both international and social friction, it was madness not to do everything possible to increase consumption.

One of the most interesting sessions of the Conference was devoted to a discussion of family allowances. Here Mr. Amery presented an overwhelming case for action and was supported by Mr. Cadbury with practical experience in the working of such allowances. Trade Union doubts about this policy were duly brought forward but without any spirit of vigorous opposition.

In the final session the question of education in relation to nutrition was discussed. Here Mrs. Henry Haldane, speaking on behalf of the Women's Institutes, pointed out that food "is one of the major pleasures of life and people, very properly, do not like their pleasures interfered with".

While the Conference cannot be said to have arrived at clear-cut conclusions, its outstanding value was to demonstrate that the solution of nutritional problems cannot be sought through the medical profession or public health services alone. It requires that those charged with the formulation or administration of agricultural and commercial policies should have regard to the nutritional needs of the nation. There will, of course, be those



who will tend to interpret Professor Cathcart's cautionary admonitions as meaning that we still have far too little knowledge to formulate sound nutritional policies. Such a point of view is highly convenient for those who desire to postpone action. It is possible to urge that far more must be known about the precise physiological requirements for certain food factors, that far more elaborate dietary surveys must be carried out, or that the poor should be admonished to make better use of their incomes rather than that action should be taken to supplement these incomes through social provision, such as family allowances or through policies designed to keep prices at moderate levels. There is no doubt that in many countries a combination of sectional interests, on the one hand, and of conservative instincts, on the other, still constitute a formidable mass of inertia which will increase the difficulties of a democratic Government finding the necessary resolution to deal effectively with this great social reform. On the other hand, it may perhaps be more likely that the forces tending towards early progress will prove sufficiently strong to stimulate more vigorous policies. Much the more important of these factors is the real interest which the general public takes in the subject itself. This interest is by no means confined to the United Kingdom, the United States or Scandinavia. In France the National Nutrition Committee is making important progress and is said to be enlisting the interest of the peasants in the marriage of health and agriculture. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe Governments, faced with the fact that their populations had become much more vividly aware of their own desperate poverty, are turning with considerable interest to nutrition in both its public health and agricultural aspects. The Government of India has been probably the first Government in the world to alter an import duty on nutritional grounds—namely, the importance of dried skimmed milk to the health of school children. The movement is thus world-wide, and its international aspects may be expected to have a stimulating effect upon the national efforts of many countries. Further, although it cannot be denied that there is need for further research on both the biological and sociological sides, yet there can be no doubt that we are in possession of sufficient information to formulate sound ideas on what should

constitute an optimum national diet. The Technical Commission of the Health Organization of the League of Nations has already presented to the nations the basis of such an optimum standard. It may well be that further research would vary by 10 to 20 per cent. upwards or downwards the standards of requirements of proteins, minerals or vitamins which were adopted by this most authoritative Commission. When, however, it is realized that in most of the countries of advanced civilization from 30 to 50 per cent. of the population cannot obtain anything approximating to this suggested optimum and that, in the poorer countries, the proportion who are living well below this standard probably rises to more than three-quarters of the whole, then clearly it is not necessary that positive action should wait for further statistical evidence or for more complete agreement between scientific authorities as to the exact requirements of the human body for, say, iodine or for the various constituents of the vitamin B complex.

There is another and perhaps even more urgent reason why progress should be made, namely the need for finding economic means for easing political tensions. Just as there is no doubt that malnutrition is mainly caused by poverty, so the poverty of certain nations and of large classes within other nations is the soil from which political tendencies, hostile to the world's peace, can most easily develop. It is a commonplace to say to-day that democracy is on trial. Perhaps this statement can be made truer and more significant by borrowing from Signor Mussolini a word which he constantly uses and to say "pluto-democracy is on trial". It is not without significance that all the creditor countries of the world are democratic. The one thing they cannot afford is that they should be regarded as irrevocably hostile to change or that in their desire to preserve their own financial and economic advantages they should deny an extension of these advantages to other countries. This means that they should make the raising of the standard of living throughout the world their particular concern—a policy which would, as a matter of fact, be essential in order to avert the ravages of unemployment, should it happily prove possible to solve the present state of continual emergency and to progress towards the limitation of armaments.

## THE DIPLOMA—A *Sketch*

By LUIGI PIRANDELLO

(English version by JOAN REDFERN)

WHEN Donna Mimma used to pass through the village, everything, somehow, seemed unreal—the sky a bit of painted cardboard, the sun a crimson ball; the cobbled streets, the stumpy belfry, the *piazza* with its fountain, seemed suddenly like a great big toy, smelling of glue.

A miracle? Not at all! It was only that in the eyes of everyone the little old midwife was mysterious. Wasn't it she who had "bought" them—practically all, except the old—at Palermo, with papa's money.

The children used to question her :

"Where did you buy us?"

"Ooh! such a long way away! At Palermo".

"But how did you get there?"

"In my ivory coach. And I drove through long, long roads, at night, in the dark —"

"Why in the dark?"

"Well . . . there was the moon and the stars . . ."

It was always night when Donna Mimma drove away; and night, too, when she returned, quietly, very quietly.

"Why quietly?"

"Because tiny little newly-bought babies can't bear any noise".

"Was Bettina bought?"

"Yes, and cost a lot. But her papa was set on having a little girl with big brown eyes—"

"Was Paolo bought?"

"Yes, Paolo, too. Paolo cost a trifle more, for he's a boy, and boys, when they're big, can earn money, like papa. And d'you know, I bought even papa! As a tiny baby. He was fearfully expensive. He cost—hmm!—he cost a thousand lire!



And I carried him back in my ivory coach, and laid him in the arms of his mamma (now departed to heaven, God rest her soul!)”—and Donna Mimma crossed herself piously.

The children stared at her. They stared at her trim little figure swathed in a long black shawl, at her greying head tied in a blue silk handkerchief, at her dark eyes and button-shaped nose.

They couldn't make her out. Why should *she*, of all others—this clean, tidy old woman, who appeared in the house when mamma was ill (and the next day there was always a new little brother or sister)—why should *she*, of all others, have this work of buying babies? They touched her gently, with timid little hands, they stroked her shawl, they looked into her face.

For thirty-five years, in that whole village, Donna Mimma had worked alone. There had been only she. Or rather, there had been only she till a week ago.

A week ago there had come another—an unmarried girl! . . . Was it *possible*? What on earth were things coming to?

She was a girl from Turin, an impudent minx who strode like a man. And, if you please, she'd a “diploma”—from the University! . . . (A diploma—what nonsense!). And she'd even got a brass plate on her door, and said everything out, as if birth were natural! When she passed Donna Mimma on the *piazza*, her high heels going “clack! clack!” on the pavement, her short skirt showing silk-stockinged legs, the old woman looked away in horror, as if the flames of Hell were spurting in front of her.

Absorbed in the scandal of an unmarried midwife, poor Donna Mimma didn't notice what was happening—how people were looking at her, with pitying embarrassment, as if trying to tell her something, and not finding the words. And when the doctor seemed to avoid her in the street, she was puzzled. But *why*? . . .

She was soon to know why. That shameless minx had gone and called on him, to ask him to recommend her. And she'd shown him her diploma? (What use was a diploma? What counted was experience . . .)

Stopping at the pharmacy she unburdened herself to the young fellow behind the counter.

“Have I a diploma? And didn't I ‘buy’ you all—yes, even

yourself—and nearly everyone in the village? And those?" (She pointed to a group of children peeping in at the door) "And this?" (She lifted a fat urchin above her head). "And those . . . and those . . ." (She waved a hand at the street). Did I need a diploma to buy them at Palermo? A diploma indeed!"

The young fellow turned away, grieved. He hadn't the heart—no, he simply hadn't—to hint at what was coming. But she was soon to know.

Next day came a Summons. It was sheet of paper, half printed, half written. While struggling to decipher it, she got a message from the Mayor: Would Donna Mimma please come at once—

"What! His Lady?" she asked the servant. "But it's a month too soon—"

No, no, it wasn't that. Would Donna Mimma come at once to the Town Hall, for a Communication.

She went. There she found the Mayor, embarrassed and miserable. He too had been "bought" by Donna Mimma; and his boy, and his girl, and soon she'd be going to Palermo to "buy" him a third—or rather . . . well, no . . .

"Dear, dearest Donna Mimma", he said, showing her a letter, "just look at this idiocy! How on earth am I to tell you! No good trying to break it gently. It's like this: Those fools forbid you to practise your profession. There! . . ."

"Me? Forbid me?"

"Yes, because you haven't a diploma. It's the law".

"The law? What law? A new one?"

"Not new, no. It's always been the law. But you see . . . we were fond of you, and trusted you, so we let things slide. We were fond of you (oh, curse that Board!). You see, when there was only you . . . But now there's another, that girl from Turin, and no one's been employing her, so she's lodged a complaint. It's dreadful, Donna Mimma, but you'll have to retire . . . Or else (why not?)—go off to Palermo and *get* a diploma—"

"Me? To Palermo? When I've never left this village in my life? Study at a university, when I can hardly write? After thirty-five years of experience? At my age? . . . That Minx has got me ousted! But *has* she? No, she hasn't, I'll

go to Palermo, I'll go, I'll go . . . For how long? Wha-a-t? . . . What's that you say? For two years? Did you say two years at my age? . . . Oh, but I'll be even with that Minx. I'll go to Palermo, I'll *get* the diploma. Then, ah! then—I'll shake it under the nose of that shameless one. I'll show that I too, Donna Mimma, can say all the difficult words in the books, like doctor . . . I'll go, I'll go . . .”

There was no stopping her. In her anger and bewilderment the words came leaping, tripping on each other. The Mayor, distraught, tried to comfort her. Yes, indeed, indeed it was a shame! But what were two years? They passed in a flash. And what had *she* to learn? The thing was a formality. Let her give that Minx a good lesson. Then (kind, good fellow that he was) he tried to get a laugh from her. After all—ahem!—she'd feel cosy and at home in Palermo, having gone there practically every week for thirty-five years! . . .

But not a smile did he get. Donna Mimma, hitching up her shawl over her head, hiding the bright blue handkerchief, held it to her face, to hide the tears that were falling in torrents.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Rosina too? Why of course she was bought. Why not? And I went in my ivory coach, a long, long way, in the dark, to Palermo—”

“How much did she cost?”

“Mmm! . . . a lot! She cost . . . she cost—more than a thousand lire! A bargain though—with those golden curls and blue eyes. How did I buy her? Why, of course, with her dad's money—”

“Her papa's, you mean”.

“Oh, bother! Did I say ‘dad's’? Here's a great big knife for correcting me!”

But who on earth is speaking? Not surely the Minx, the girl from Turin? The girl that two years back was like a man in petticoats? But yes, it is she! No longer, however, in a short skirt, with her high-heeled shoes going “clack! clack!” on the pavement. She is in a long black shawl with a fringe reaching to her feet. And on her head, yes! is a handkerchief—a handkerchief of sky-blue silk! Oh, but how changed!—talking of “buying” babies, of going to Palermo in her ivory coach, and



buying them with "dad's" money. She says "dad" because she comes from Turin, and that foreign way of talking while dressed as a Sicilian peasant, is delightful.

When she walks through the streets she keeps her eyes on the ground—from modesty. And if now and then a glance escapes her, a sly little glance, very nearly a wink—well, what harm in it? And her malicious little smile is very sweet, bringing out her dimples.

The mothers are all "Madam" now, and as pleased as punch. (Good morning, Madam . . . At your service, Madam). And how nice to have everything explained to one, point by point, scientifically! Poor Donna Mimma, poor old thing, used to talk of God, and that was all. But this sweet young girl is quite as religious, and modern into the bargain.

The children worship her. From her lips the old legend of the ivory coach is like a beautiful fairy-tale. When they were told that Donna Mimma was coming back, they cried, "Nasty Donna Mimma! Don't *want* Donna Mimma!" Worse still the mothers didn't want her. She was rough and ready, not refined like this girl. And how touching that a smart young lady from Turin should dress in shawl and handkerchief, like a Sicilian peasant! Whereas Donna Mimma . . .

"What? . . . A *hat*? . . . Is it *possible*!"

"Yes, yes, a hat! A great enormous hat, like an organ-grinder's monkey—"

"But a HAT? Why a hat?"

"Because she's studied in Palermo, and knows everything, like a doctor. And her hair's snow-white".

"But a *hat*! . . ."

"Yes, yes, a hat. When she arrived this morning crowds came to look at her, and the boys marched behind her, shouting and singing. She was nearly mobbed . . ."

When Donna Mimma learnt about the Minx, how she dressed in shawl and handkerchief, and talked of the ivory coach, and of "buying" babies, her blood turned to gall. So that was her game, was it? To take the bread from her mouth by aping her? A-ah! the impostor! Twisting her hands, stamping and sobbing from rage and indignation, Donna Mimma paced her tiny room. And for the first time in her life she uttered an oath.

But her hat, she'd keep it! Yes, there, *there*, on her head. She'd gone to Palermo, she'd got her diploma, she'd half destroyed herself with toil and misery. Well, now she'd set up—no longer a midwife, oh, no!—she'd have a brass plate, with “QUALIFIED OBSTRETICIAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PALERMO”. There! And she'd visit her clients at once, a once, and in her hat! Now that she'd got her Diploma they weren't likely to desert her—for that Minx! . . .

But no sooner did she appear than a crowd came round her. Urchins pelted her with orange peel, yelled rude words at her, turned somersaults round her. Catching sight of a group of little ones, she called to them: “My children, don't you know me? Don't you know Donna Mimma who bought you with papa's money? You, Bettina . . . and you, little Paolo. Come to Donna Mimma”. And she knelt beside them, ever took off her hat.

But no, they had forgotten her. Eyeing her suspiciously they stared at the hat on her knee. Struggling not to weep, she shoved it on her head, and marched off.

The village had betrayed her. Worse still, science had betrayed her. Science learnt badly, and late, that had cost her those years of martyrdom, had confused her experience. She could throw away her hat, but not science. Here was the hurt, the irreparable damage . . .

One day she was sent for in a hurry. The Minx was busy, and there was no one else. As the case was urgent, she went. Jamming her hat on her head, she went. Well, now she would show them! She'd show that she knew everything, almost like a doctor, everything that the Minx knew, and more . . . But by dint of showing, of applying, of remembering, she grew confused. Her little hands no longer *saw*. At last she had to send for both Minx and doctor. . . .

No one employs her. Every day she goes to the pharmacy to make a scene. It is said that she has taken to the bottle—because, after making these scenes, she often goes home to weep and weep. And tears, of course, are one of the great signs of tippling.

## MOSCOW VIEW

BY PAT SLOAN

TO advocate a Pact with Russia to-day no longer denotes "Left" tendencies. "I ask the Government to take immediate steps to secure the adhesion of Russia in a fraternity, an alliance, an agreement, a pact, it does not matter what it is called so long as it is an understanding to stand together against the aggressor", said Mr. Lloyd George early this year. In the *Picture Post* of March 11th, Mr. Winston Churchill wrote: "If Russia were prepared to co-operate . . . I would welcome her assistance in maintaining the peace of the world". And there are, of course, the more guarded statements of the Prime Minister himself.

But "will Russia come in?" This has been one of the most prominent questions in newspaper posters and headlines over the past three months. It is a question which, actually, had already been answered by Stalin in the most categorical terms on the day before Winston Churchill's article appeared in *Picture Post*. For, on Friday, March 10th, Stalin made a four-hour speech, a great part of which was devoted to world affairs and Soviet foreign policy. In that speech Stalin said: "We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country." This categorical statement deserved front-page headlines. Was not this the first time that the leader of the ruling party of any country had stated that it was the policy of his party to support the victims of aggression?—Yet it received scarcely any notice over here.

In that speech on March 10th Stalin was not making vague promises as to the future. Already, during the Spanish war, the Soviet Government had proved its readiness to render aid to a victim of aggression. Again, when the Chinese people united to drive out the invaders, the Soviet Government proceeded to



render them aid on a considerable scale. And, in his recent speech to the Russian Parliament, Molotov drew special attention to this fact in these words :

“ You are well acquainted with Comrade Stalin’s statement about giving support to nations which have become victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their countries. This fully applies to China and her struggle for national independence. We are consistently pursuing this policy in practice. It is fully in line with the task which faces us in Europe, namely, the establishment of a united front of peaceable Powers against the further extension of aggression ”.

The question of recent months has, therefore, been posed wrongly when it has been asked, ‘ Will Russia come in ? ’ The real question with which we are faced to-day is ‘ Will Britain and France declare their readiness with Russia to come to the aid of the victims of aggression ? ’

The Soviet Government stands for the preservation of peace. But it considers that peace cannot be preserved by allowing aggression to take place unimpeded. It holds the view that peace can only be preserved by joint action to stop aggression. And it believes that the very threat of joint action, with, if necessary, the full use of economic sanctions, could still stop the aggressor without leading the world into further war. Its desire for peace is not, as is sometimes suggested, something new. It is too often forgotten that the main slogan of the Russian Revolution was “ Peace, Bread and Land ”. And the first of these was Peace. And, on the second day of its life, the Soviet Government appealed for “ an immediate peace . . . without annexations or indemnities ”, in fact, a peace without those very ingredients which have given Hitler a basis for his constant war propaganda inside Germany. At the World Disarmament Conference the Soviet Government proposed, first, universal disarmament ; then, equal proportional disarmament all round ; finally, it voted for the American proposal for a one-third reduction all round, while the Americans themselves voted against. And when, in 1935, two out of the three most aggressive States had left the League of Nations, the Soviet Union made a point of joining.

When sanctions were applied against Italy in 1936, the Soviet Government was the first to make them operative. And when they were withdrawn it was Litvinov at the League who said :

"There have been noticeable attempts inside and outside the League to attribute this failure to the League Covenant, its imperfections, and the type of membership of the League. Hence far-reaching conclusions are being drawn which may have the result that the League itself will be buried together with the independence of Abyssinia. Such attempts and conclusions must be vigorously rebutted".

He then went on to analyse the cause of failure, showed that it was due to the incomplete application of sanctions, and finally expressed the hope that "in the next case the victim will be rescued wholly from the clutches of the aggressor".

The "next case" arose within a fortnight of this speech. General Franco's rebellion broke out in Spain. The British and French Governments at once resorted to the policy of "non-intervention". "The Soviet Government", said Litvinov at the League Assembly, "adhered to the pact of non-intervention in the affairs of Spain only because a friendly country feared the possibility of an internal and international conflict. We acted so in spite of the fact that we considered the principle of neutrality inapplicable in a war led by rebels against their lawful government". On the Non-intervention Committee the Soviet representative repeatedly drew attention to those same violations of the Agreement which are to-day being openly boasted and proclaimed in the German and Italian press. When, however, the Committee rejected each of his proposals for concrete measures against intervention, the Soviet representative maintained his Government's objections to a screen covering military aid to the insurgents from certain participants in the Agreement against the lawful Spanish Government. And so its policy remained for the duration of the war.

When Hitler marched into Austria, the Soviet Government proposed an immediate conference to prevent further aggression. Mr. Chamberlain turned down this proposal as "inopportune". When in September, 1938, the danger to Czechoslovakia became acute Litvinov told the League Assembly :—

"We intend to fulfil our obligations under the Pact and together with France to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with the representatives of the French and Czechoslovakian War Departments in order to discuss measures appropriate to the moment. Independently of this we consider it desirable that the question be raised at the League of Nations".

As to whether they would help the Czechs if France did not fulfil its obligations, Litvinov reminded the Czechs that the Soviet Union had not as yet been asked what its attitude would be in this eventuality. It was clearly understood in Prague, however, that Soviet assistance would be forthcoming if asked for.

In March of this year, when the Nazis marched into Prague, the Soviet Government again proposed an immediate international conference to stop further aggression. Mr. Chamberlain declared such a proposal to be "premature", and Mussolini underlined this by marching into Albania on the following Good Friday.

Then in the middle of April this year the Soviet Government made certain proposals to the British Government. No word of these proposals, however, was made public until, apparently believing that nothing was to be gained by allowing its proposals to remain any longer a mystery, the official Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* published them. These proposals have since been reaffirmed by Molotov in a speech to the Soviet Parliament.

The Soviet proposals, said Molotov recently, included three main points as a basis for agreement: "That an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, a pact of an exclusively defensive character, be concluded between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.; that a guarantee against attack by aggressors be extended by Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. to the States of Central and Eastern Europe, including all European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R. without exception; and that a concrete agreement be concluded by Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. regarding the forms and extent of the immediate and effective assistance to be given to each other and to the guaranteed States in the event of an attack by aggressors."

When these proposals were first mooted the British Government, according to *Izvestia*, turned them down completely. Instead, it proposed simply "that the Soviet Government should come to the immediate aid of Great Britain and France, should they be involved in hostilities as a result of carrying out their obligations they had assumed in guaranteeing Poland and Rumania". Such a proposal included no guarantee to the U.S.S.R.; it left the question of the time at which aid was to be



given to the guaranteed countries to be decided by Britain and France; and nothing was said of those small States on the Soviet border which nobody had guaranteed and which might very likely be victims of aggression.

At a later stage the British position was modified to this extent: the principle of a Pact of Mutual Assistance between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. was accepted. Still, however, no guarantee was accepted with regard to the Baltic States.

It has been suggested, even in quarters favourable to the idea of the Pact, that the Soviet Government has been unduly intractable concerning the Baltic States. What these critics do not realize, however, is that in proposing a guarantee to all countries of central and eastern Europe the Soviet Government is not only interested in its own security, but it is interested in seeing that the aggressors shall have no further opportunity of strengthening themselves by aggression. If, to-day, any pact were concluded which did not guarantee *all* territories in Europe, this would, in fact, be a promise of non-intervention if any of the countries not guaranteed were subject to attack. The Soviet Government has expressed its readiness to join in a guarantee of all countries in Europe, on condition that the Baltic States be also guaranteed. It is not ready to join in a guarantee so long as the Baltic States are not included—for the simple reason that such a Pact would be in fact a promise of non-intervention in the event of the Baltic States becoming victims of aggression.

Much has been said to the effect that the Baltic States themselves do not want to be guaranteed. It is not without significance that before Britain and France gave their guarantees to Poland and Rumania, the same thing was said about these two countries. When, however, they had been guaranteed by Britain and France they apparently immediately lost all the misgivings they might ever have had about a Soviet guarantee. The key to the question of the Baltic States is not whether or how, they want to be guaranteed by the U.S.S.R. The question is whether Britain and France, like the U.S.S.R., will declare their willingness to stand by all victims of aggression in Europe, including the Baltic States. Once such a policy were adopted, it appears almost certain that the Baltic States would not

object to any strengthening of such a guarantee by Russia, for this would make it less likely, not more likely, that their territory would ever become a battlefield. Finally, however, even if Nazi influence is already so great in the Baltic States that they were to reject such an offer of a guarantee, has a British Government ever refrained from guaranteeing another country from aggression, whether it liked it or not, when British vital interests were involved?

The firm stand taken by the Soviet Government has met with approval even in the ranks of Mr. Chamberlain's own party. In the *Evening Standard* on June 13th, Mr. Duff Cooper writes:—

"The Baltic States—like rabbits in the presence of a boa constrictor who has promised not to eat them—assure us in rather shaky voices that they feel quite safe and do not desire to be given any guarantee. The Prime Minister asserts that it is obviously impossible to guarantee a State against its will . . . If Russia considers that the integrity of the Baltic States is essential to her security we cannot blame her, and if we are asking her to undertake to assist us in a case of emergency we cannot refuse to give her a reciprocal undertaking . . . While talk is proceeding, time is flying. Sinister reports are current of German activities. If we hesitate this time we shall be lost".

And on the very same day as this article appeared in the *Evening Standard*, the Moscow *Pravda* was writing:—

"It is quite possible that we are dealing here with definite influence from outside, if not direct inspiration from those who desire to hinder the establishment of a broad defence front against aggression".

Such suspicions were expressed also at an earlier date when, in his speech of March 10th, when describing British and French policy, Stalin referred to a marked

"eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deep into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, 'in the interests of peace' and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents".

Is Stalin excessively suspicious?—The British and French reluctance to guarantee three States which border on Soviet territory in Europe suggests the contrary. On March 10th Stalin urged the necessity "to be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for

them". In insisting on a guarantee to the Baltic States, the Soviet Government is demanding that there should no longer be further loop-holes for appeasement or non-intervention. In demanding an immediate concrete agreement on the forms of action to be taken against aggression, it is guarding against a repetition by Britain and France of the French policy of last September when its obligations to the Czechs were simply ignored. On the other hand, in refusing to give a guarantee to all possible victims of aggression in Europe, the British Government is giving a new lease of life to the policy of aggression hopes of further appeasement and fascist expansion.

It has been said that the Soviet Government, if it does not find favour for its proposals with Britain and France, may become the ally of Hitler in the future. On the one hand, of course, the Soviet Government has always been ready to trade with any country, whatever its politics. The fact that Mr. Robert Hudson's visit to Moscow has borne no fruit, and appears to have been forgotten, was possibly one reason why Molotov mentioned the possibility of a new trade agreement with Germany in his recent speech to Parliament.

On the other hand, however, the Soviet Government will never at any stage refuse collaboration with all those States who wish to stop aggression. One reason for this is that, in the Soviet view, fascism inevitably means a policy of war, and a policy of fascist war must, at some stage, lead to an attack on the frontier of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Government is absolutely determined in its desire for peace, it is to its interest to prevent the fascist aggressors ever reaching the Soviet frontier and ever forcing the U.S.S.R. into war. The Soviet view is that aggression can now be prevented on one condition only—that a collective stand is seriously adopted. The spokesmen of the U.S.S.R. have advocated such a stand in the past, they advocate it now, and will do so in the future. But they demand one thing : that no direction be left open in which it is safe for aggression to be continued, that appeasement and non-intervention cease, and that immediate practical plans be concluded for stopping aggression, not only when it has already taken place, but in order to prevent it from occurring altogether.



## BALTIC NEUTRALITY

By WOLFRAM GOTTLIEB

THE Baltic States are coming more and more to the forefront of international affairs. First of all Russia requested Britain to fit them into her new security system. Visits of Baltic leaders to Warsaw then followed. And now they have signed Non-Aggression Pacts with Germany.

The reason for this activity is the extremely important strategic position of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. The vital interests of not less than three Great Powers clash in that region, and these interests are becoming increasingly "dynamic". In the past Russia, Germany and Poland each regarded the Baltic as its *Lebensraum*. Hence the repeated conversion of this area into a battlefield. To prevent such a thing from happening again has therefore been the main task of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia from the first day of their independence. It demanded more than ordinary skill to manœuvre among their big neighbours. The Baltic States therefore adopted a policy of absolute neutrality, when the League of Nations, which had offered them protection so far, failed. But even this neutrality becomes a dance on the needle's point in view of the latest Russian and German moves.

The relations of the three small States with Moscow were simpler than with any of their other neighbours. Ever since the peace treaties, when Russia recognized the sovereignty of her former territories, her attitude towards them had been correct, and the Non-Aggression Pacts signed in 1932 finally dispelled all fears. With regard to Poland there were always good relations between her and Estonia and Latvia. Past disputes between Warsaw and Riga about "arbitrary treatment" of the tiny Polish Minority in Latvia's southernmost corner were not serious enough to disturb their normal intercourse. Between Poland and Lithuania, however, there was,

of course, the conflict over Wilno. And it is only since Warsaw forced Kaunas to give up all hopes for the return of the ancient capital little more than a year ago, that there have been equally good relations between all the three small republics and Poland.

Baltic policy towards Germany presents a different picture. Latvia and Estonia have long-standing treaties with Berlin, e.g., the Latvian-German Pact of July, 1920, in which both parties disclaim all inimical intentions against each other. Germany has also made comprehensive trade pacts with the Baltic States, being their natural and increasingly active customer. Neither Riga nor Tallinn have ever had any conflict with the Reich, except some disagreement caused by more or less frequent interference of the Nazi press to "protect" the local German minorities against imaginary wrongs. For Lithuania, again, things were different. Her position was so delicate that during the final Memel crisis it was rumoured that Germany would march on to Kaunas. But when the Government declared its intention to fight, the German plans (if such there were) remained in abeyance, and after the transfer of Memel the Reich gave Lithuania the famous promise of Non-Aggression. Since Lithuania lies between Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Germany on the other, the Kaunas-Berlin agreement would seem to be a sufficient guarantee of Baltic integrity as a whole, so that no further security pacts are needed.

Nevertheless, the *Führer* has now offered Latvia and Estonia, too, specific Non-Aggression treaties, thus for the first time undertaking not to attack States who were not his immediate neighbours. Let us remember that the original German offer was made soon after the occupation of Prague but before the announcement of the new British commitments in Eastern Europe. The actual conclusion of the pacts was a typical piece of Nazi diplomacy to counter London's new policy. True, Field-Marshal Goering's *Essener Nationalzeitung* attempted to put a cloak round Hitler's intentions by declaring that the suggested pacts were nothing but the legal confirmation of an old established fact. The rest of the inspired press was more outspoken. The *Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung* bluntly described these pacts as a clear German answer to the "encirclement of the Reich", and the *Berliner Börsenzeitung*

added jubilantly that the German-Baltic agreement gained special significance in view "of the attempts of the producers of the encirclement policy to draw the Baltic States into their game". The Nazi aim thus becomes quite clear. It is to draw Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania away from the influence of the West, to increase the group of countries friendly to or at least not antagonistic to Berlin and to create right under the Russian and Polish windows a meadow where the Prussian war horse may safely go out to grass.

Yet, at the time when the offer was made, Latvia and Estonia could not but accept it. As long as there was hope that Geneva or the Western Powers would protect the smaller States east of the axis, they put up resistance to Berlin's increasing pressure. But the German victories in the spring of this year, which altered the whole strategic and economic balance of Europe, gave Hitler the key not only to Danubia but also to the Baltic. That is why the Latvian Foreign Secretary, M. Munters, shortly before Britain began to show active interest in the East, declared: "We acknowledge the great rôle Germany plays in our part of the world and we respect it". The Reich was quick to seize this opportunity. In the course of the same speech M. Munters repeated the previous statements of his Estonian and Lithuanian colleagues that their wish for peaceful understanding did not mean that they would give up an inch of their sovereignty and freedom. There cannot be the least doubt that each of the three nations will fight to the last man, should its integrity ever be violated. Popular feeling is getting increasingly outspoken in that respect, and it can be said on the authority of the Latvian Foreign Secretary that their armies and State departments are fully prepared for an emergency. But, on the other hand, the Baltic States have no desire to become a battlefield again—even with the revived hope of assistance from the West and Poland. The best they can expect in an emergency seems to be a victory on ruins. Therefore they cling to their neutrality as the only means to avoid this. And nothing seems more natural than their acceptance of pacts which recognize this neutrality in a binding form.

A refusal might easily have been interpreted by Berlin as a provocation. Moreover, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had



already concluded Non-Aggression Pacts with their other great neighbour—Russia. If they intended to remain absolutely neutral between the two adversaries, there was nothing left but to make similar arrangements with the other side. Had they declined, this might have produced the impression in Berlin that the Baltic States favoured Moscow more and might have tempted the Nazis to correct their fortune on their own account. But, apart from that, there were elements in the German offer which made it not only acceptable, but even welcome to Latvia and Estonia, since it expressed Hitler's definite desire that the Baltic States should continue their own national existence undisturbed. And, having obtained the German guarantee in addition to the Russian one, it meant that they now could be reassured from both directions.

The German offer in hand, Latvia and Estonia immediately consulted together in accordance with their alliance concluded in 1923, which not only pledged them to assist each other with their armed forces in case of aggression, but also to pursue a co-ordinated and common foreign policy. M. Munters went to Tallinn to confer with his Estonian colleague M. Selter. For the first time in Estonian history both houses of Parliament were convoked to secret sessions to debate Berlin's proposals which—in spite of a considerable opposition headed by the former liberal President of the Republic, Prof. J. Tõnisson, a personal friend of the late Masaryk—were accepted by the majority. In Latvia, in the absence of a parliament, an extraordinary meeting of the State Council took place. And during that meeting the Government announced that the projected pact with Germany contradicted neither Latvian and Estonian neutrality nor their previous international obligations.

But, as the German initiative is a countermove to Britain's efforts to organize a peace front in the East, it is essential to examine this development from her point of view too. It can be stated on high authority that the Foreign Office is following this matter with close attention. It regards such Non-Aggression pacts as unnecessary and useless, since the promise not to resort to war is already covered by the Kellogg Pact signed by all the States in the world. But Britain naturally cannot object if sovereign States try to ensure their security by additional

arrangements, so long as these arrangements are nothing more than what they pretend to be—mere passive acts disclaiming aggressive intentions. The British objection is withheld, however, only on the assumption that no secret conditions are attached to these pacts which would place Germany in an advantageous position in the Baltic. Since it appeared that the Reich desired a “benevolent” neutrality on the part of the Baltic States in case of war, Britain through diplomatic channels asked Latvia and Estonia for elucidation of this point, whilst making at the same time clear, what her attitude would be to all aspects of the new pacts.

Doubts about German intentions must have also arisen in the Baltic States for a time. They naturally wanted to know whether in fact Germany did not expect special favours. Questions to that effect were addressed to Berlin, but it is difficult to establish what the Germans replied. We know, however, from M. Munter’s speech in the State Council that the treaties do not contain any secret clauses or promises on the part of the three small States. This is the essential condition under which alone signature was possible. For the last thing the Baltic States want is to antagonize Britain which helped them to establish their independence and with whom they are united by the strongest cultural and economic bonds. Whatever the Reich may have intended by these pacts and however her press may exult about her new “peaceful achievement”—it is certain that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will maintain a complete neutrality. But any Power that attacked them would make them line up on the opposite side.

## CYPRUS TO-DAY

BY W. L. BURN

IN the estimation of the Empire of which it is a part Cyprus has passed backwards and forwards through all the phases from exaggerated appreciation to indifferent neglect. In 1878, at the time of the British occupation, it appeared both as the reward of a brilliant foreign policy and as the base for further successes ; while it was pictured, internally, as a land where the vines were of a richness elsewhere unknown and great lumps of gold were washed down by the mountain streams. That phase over, it came to be regarded (so far as it was regarded at all) as the bastard child of a hasty and regrettable liaison ; and a backward child at that. From the time when Joseph Chamberlain came to the Colonial Office efforts were made to remedy its backwardness, but the estimate of its imperial undesirability hardly changed and in October 1915 the British Government offered to cede the island to Greece on condition that she went to the aid of Serbia, then attacked by Bulgaria. The offer was not accepted and lapsed, but it was typical of the estimation in which Cyprus was held, and continued to be held, until the catastrophic changes which the last five years have effected in the Near East.

The capture of Cyprus from Venice by the Turks in 1570 was regarded as a disaster for Christendom. Three centuries later, policies had strangely changed and Disraeli's Government was concerned to avert, if it could, the disintegration of the Ottoman empire. In words which oddly foreshadow our present system of " pacts " Lord Salisbury declared :

" The only provision which can furnish a substantial security for the stability of Ottoman rule . . . is an engagement on the part of the British Government, strong enough to fulfil it, that any further encroachment on Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by the British Government undertaking, if given fully and unreservedly, to meet the contingency which would bring it into existence . . . "



To this end it was proposed that Britain should occupy a piece of Turkish territory as a "place of arms" from which operations, defensive as regards Turkey, offensive as regards Russia, could be instituted.

Malta in the west and Mohammerah in the east were too distant. The occupation of Alexandretta implied commitments on the mainland from which Britain was averse. Cyprus, moreover, seemed to offer two other advantages. It contained a largely non-Turkish population upon which the experiment of enlightened government could be tried, for the edification of our Turkish allies; and it was near the Suez Canal. So the Cyprus Convention of June 4th, 1878 came into being and the occupation of the island by Sir Garnet Wolseley's Anglo-Indian army was a notice not only to Russia but to Germany and Austria-Hungary that Britain, relatively powerless on the continent of Europe, could still find places where her strength as a maritime and imperial power could make itself felt.

Logically, the occupation was only the first step. The next was a railway from Alexandretta, by Aleppo, to Kuwait on the Persian Gulf, so that a British force, landed from Cyprus at the first-named town, could be easily transported to distant parts of the Ottoman Empire. But Disraeli's Government refused the necessary financial guarantee, thus showing its lack of faith in its own policy, and when Gladstone came into power in 1880 Cyprus already seemed a depreciating asset.

In the next decade the depreciation continued fast. The desire of the Ottoman empire to reform itself by British advice and assistance proved to be a delusion. The Turks preferred reform in their own way and their own time; and the position of Britain, as the guardian of Turkish territory, appeared both onerous and absurd. We seemed, as the saying went, to have backed the wrong horse; and Cyprus was only the concrete evidence of a policy which we were anxious to forget. Finally, the occupation of Egypt afforded to us a direct instead of an indirect opportunity of protecting our interests in the Canal.

At the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War of 1912 the British pointed out to the British the strategic importance of the occupation of the Dodecanese. That

occupation, nevertheless, passed without any effective protest from Britain ; and the offer of Cyprus to Greece showed the official estimate of its worth. The French, however, with their eyes upon Syria, appreciated better than we did the importance of the island, and Article 4 of the Franco-British Convention of December 1920, ratifying the relevant clause of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, ran thus :

“ In view of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government ”.

Nevertheless, the strategical possibilities of Cyprus have been largely ignored by this country ; in striking contrast to the Italian attitude towards the Dodecanese. The Italian occupation of those islands has had three notable features. In the first place, it has been a wonderful piece of showmanship. The Italians have made Rhodes, with its almost perfect works of restoration and preservation and its trailing masses of bougainvillea and hybiscus, a joy to see. In the second place, they have resolutely set themselves to Italianize the islands. Superficially they have been successful. The porter who carries your bags from the boat will be careful to deny that he is a Greek. He knows on which side his bread is buttered, for the attitude of the Italians to those Greeks who resist absorption has been unsparing. There have been two chief sources of friction. One is the heaviness of the taxation. A miracle like Rhodes is not produced for nothing. The other has arisen from the Italian attempt to gain control over the Orthodox Church in the islands by detaching it from the Patriarchate of Constantinople and placing it, as a nominally autocephalous community, under obedient puppets. There have been riots and bloodshed, carefully but not entirely concealed from outside eyes. The hardy sponge-fishers of Calymnos have proved particularly recalcitrant and it was rumoured at the time of the Abyssinian War that many Greek housewives, in the hope of a British conquest, were secretly stitching at Union Jacks.

The third feature of the Italian occupation has been the militarization of the islands. It has been the explicit ambition of Italy to make Leros, their chief naval and seaplane base, the “ Heligoland of the Aegean ” and they have gone a long way

towards achieving it. It was calculated that, at the end of 1935, there were 20,000 troops on Leros, 25,000 in Rhodes and some 250 aeroplanes in the whole group. It is a fair assumption that, considering the rate of Italian armament and the increasing velocity of Italian policy since then, the Dodecanese are now one of the most strongly fortified areas in the world.

What are the implications of this as they affect Cyprus? The wheel of time has come almost full circle. Once again we are faced with a potentially hostile Power in the eastern Mediterranean—and one to which that sea is vital in a sense in which access to it was never vital to Russia. Once again we have constituted ourselves the ally of Turkey, while Egypt is again an independent state. Thus Cyprus is placed in its true and dangerous position as a vital point in the fighting line.

In startling contrast to the Dodecanese, Cyprus is dangerously weak. Since 1935 there have been from time to time proposals to make a first-class naval base at Famagusta and a first-class aerial base on the great central plain, the Messaoria. Neither of these has been effectively proceeded with, although Famagusta, since the works of 1933-1935, can now accommodate ships of 6,000-7,000 tons. The Anglo-Italian Agreement has not prevented the arming of Libya and the Dodecanese or the seizure of Albania, but it has brought to a standstill the militarization of Cyprus. Have we the right, in view of the importance of the island or in view of the safety in time of war of its inhabitants, to continue for a moment longer with our hands thus tied?

It may be argued that we can "protect" Cyprus from Haifa. This argument is sound in the sense that a British naval force based on Haifa, assuming the accuracy of its intelligence and assuming that it was free from convoy duty, could intercept and defeat an Italian fleet bound for Cyprus. Almost certainly it could. But an Italian invasion of Cyprus is unlikely. Far more likely, and in time of war almost certain, is an Italian bombing campaign from the aeroplane bases in the Dodecanese or Libya. It is sufficiently clear that British aircraft based on Haifa and acting in the defence of Cyprus would have the handicap of a 200-mile journey to the scene of operations. For either protection or pursuit that handicap would be fatal.

There are other points for consideration. It is clear that the



Italian forces in Libya and the Dodecanese are too powerful to be there entirely for defence. Apart from Cyprus, the objectives of the former are Egypt and possibly Crete, of the latter, Anatolia. In any war in which Italy and Turkey were ranged on opposite sides, the Dodecanese would immediately become a theatre of bitter fighting. To the Turks the islands are not only a reminder of defeat but—at their very coast—a sharpened thorn in their side. The large Italian garrisons, on the other hand, are in very much the same position as the Italian garrisons in East Africa—they must break out in order to live, for it is from Anatolia that they draw most of their provisions. Of the two possibilities, a Turkish invasion of the Dodecanese and an Italian invasion of Anatolia with some such objective as Smyrna, the latter is likely to be first in time. But whichever precedes the other, our obligations are the same. We are bound to afford to the Turks such help as we can. The most obvious form which that help could take would be a counter-attack on Rhodes or Leros from Cyprus. Whereas it is some 300 miles as the crow flies from Nicosia to Rhodes, it is some 500 miles from Haifa. There is also this to be remembered. The Dodecanese afford innumerable bases for submarines and, until these were dealt with—that is to say, bluntly, until the islands were conquered—traffic in the eastern Mediterranean could not be safe.

Memories of the “rebellion” of 1931 and the burning of Government House, Nicosia, compel a brief mention of the internal situation in the island. It is not unprosperous. There again, in a sense, the wheel has come round. The island will never be an El Dorador but the recent exploitation of its mineral wealth, particularly its copper pyrites and asbestos, have resulted in its having, at the moment, the very comfortable surplus of £500,000. The main problem, however, that of the indebtedness of the rural population remains unsolved, although continuous efforts, recently intensified, have been made to deal with it.

These efforts, although their details are outside the scope of this article, have hardly received the publicity they deserve. On the other hand, two other features have received their due of notice. One is the existence of a Press censorship, a relic of the repressive measures of 1931, which, though it does not

exercise a day to day supervision, can descend heavily upon any newspaper which incurs the wrath of the Government, as the Greek weekly "Proia" and the English daily "Embros" did at the end of last year. The other feature is the refusal of the Colonial Office to re-constitute the Legislative Council. That is not to say that representation of a sort does not exist. An advisory with unofficial members was set up in 1933, while elected District and Municipal Councils give the Cypriots some opportunity of managing their own business.

To one school of thought, this opportunity is sufficient. The old Legislative Council, it is argued, was an intolerably factious and obstructive body. Moreover, though elected, it was not representative in the true sense. I have seen a statement which I believe (though I cannot guarantee) to be approximately accurate, to the effect that of the twelve elected Greek members in 1930, there were five moneylenders, five advocates, one bishop and only one peasant. Obviously the reconstitution of such a body in a community grievously burdened with debt would be undesirable. It is easy to slip from this into the argument that any form of representation is undesirable. It is, in fact, the old argument of the administrator who says: "The people do not want to be bothered with politics. They want good government, which I am trying to give them. An elected assembly would not merely be irrelevant to true progress; it would be definitely obstructive."

On the other hand, although the fringe of a peasant community is often open to very obvious criticism, the claims of its members to be the natural leaders of their less educated countrymen cannot be wholly put aside. Moreover, it was the lesson of Ireland that there are ambitions in a country which the grant of quite extensive powers of local government do not satisfy and which can only be satisfied by some form of elected assembly. Whatever may be done or not done for the moment, it will probably be found that the continued refusal of such an assembly to Cyprus is ultimately at variance with our tradition of liberal imperialism. When and if an assembly is restored, however, pains ought to be taken to see that it is really representative by allocating to the peasants a specified number of seats to be filled only by bona-fide members

of their class. Even this may fail to produce the right men until some advance has been made towards the solution of the problem of rural debt, so complicated is the web of fear and dissimulation which indebtedness has woven in almost every Cyprus village.

In other respects the internal situation is fairly favourable. The movement for "enosis" or union with Greece has the strength of every movement based not on material but on spiritual ideals. As a practical proposition, however, it has to face the probability that cession to Greece would be followed by conquest by Italy; and that, even if that cession were followed by the extension of the British guarantee to cover Cyprus, such a defence would be far less effective than the guardianship of the British fleet. Moreover, the Metaxas régime in Greece itself has not commended itself to many of the Cypriot exponents of "enosis". There is, in fact, a fair chance of turning Cyprus from the offspring of a regretted policy to a self-respecting and conscious member of the empire. But the first and the essential step in such a policy is to remedy the existing inequality between the supreme strategical importance of its situation and its military weakness.



## IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES—I.

BY RONALD HILTON

THESE observations are the result of a two years' stay in the United States as a Commonwealth Fund Fellow. I had met in Europe several American professors and students, and had long nourished a deep desire to visit a country where scholars achieve so much and yet remain humanly approachable, and lovable. The Spanish explosion unexpectedly blew me out of Iberia, and within a year I had decided to accept one of the generous fellowships offered by the Commonwealth Fund of New York (an institution similar to the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Guggenheim foundations). My English academic friends reacted in two opposite ways. The young, open-minded and well-informed received the news with enthusiasm. The older traditionalists curled their lips and were scarcely encouraging. The attitude of the latter group is perfectly understandable. My impression is, from everything that I have seen, heard, or read, that the United States of the nineteenth century was a decidedly raw place, and that consequently the traditional English prejudice against American life and ways was justified. However, the United States has changed fundamentally in the last half century. American universities which play a much larger part in the life of the country than is anywhere else the case, are at the same time an expression of the desire to change and the cause of the transmutation. The favourable, and in many cases the enthusiastic attitude of the young generation of English scholars towards America is a fitting recognition of a country which has come of age.

One of the results of European politics has been to place England at the head of science and learning in the Old World. This is due in part to the rise of these values in England, in part to their decline in other countries. In the same way, the standing of American universities has risen considerably

partly through intrinsic improvement, partly because of the decline of European learning. Whereas it has been the tradition for American scholars to seek guidance and inspiration in Europe, the tide has turned, and European university men will be compelled, if they are alert to realities, to come to the United States, at least for many things in many fields.

Having for several years frequented the universities of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, I cannot but feel that European scholarship is poisoned by nationalism. Kingsley Porter's theories concerning the Spanish origin of romanesque architecture provoked elation among Spanish archæologists, dismay among French scholars. The numerous hypotheses concerning the nationality of Columbus rub the festering pride of nations, even of regions. Philology, apparently far removed from current politics, is pervaded with political passion. Spanish philologists have been incapable of discussing in a scientific way the origin of the Catalan language. The Italian linguistic atlas of Corsica is inspired by the most evident aggressiveness. A distinguished Italian scholar with whom I once had a long conversation refused to listen to any suggestion that the ecclesiastical (Italian) pronunciation of Latin is unscientific; he obviously felt that any concession on this point would tarnish the prestige of his country.

Among American scholars such pettiness is hardly to be found. They are quick to resent any suggestion from supercilious Europeans that America is a newly-rich, crude, and inferior country; but unless provoked by European snobbery, they will seldom bring flag-waving into erudition. Many scholars tend to go to the other extreme, as for example Professor Fred Rippey, of the University of Chicago, who is a severe critic of the policy of the United States in Latin America. They may incidentally be condemned by the jingoist section of the American public, under the stimulus of the Hearst and similar presses, as unpatriotic, "unAmerican", or even communistic. Yet, despite the very close relations between American universities and public life, they remain aloof from petty political passions. American professors hesitate so little to entertain unpopular views that often the university authorities are compelled to exert repressive influence in order to avoid public friction.

Since the abdication crisis, the idea has become prevalent in the United States that the freedom of the English press is a myth, and that, *q.e.d.*, America is the only true democracy. In such an argument, the question of academic freedom should also be introduced; it would certainly not help the American standpoint. Few are the universities where professors have complete freedom of speech. This is in a way justifiable, since the numerous and often immense universities of America do much work which in England would be considered as of pre-university character; freshmen and even sophomores ("wise fools"—*i.e.* second year students) are little more than high-school students, and it would be dangerous to instil into such immature crowds radical ideas attractively expressed. Certainly, schoolmasters in English secondary and public schools do not have absolute freedom of speech.

It is significant that the American universities where professors enjoy most academic freedom are those which are famous for their graduate, rather than their undergraduate schools—Johns Hopkins, Chicago, and Harvard. In these large private universities there is also less prejudice against Jews than in smaller ones. There was recently a campaign at Chicago against "communism on the campus", but it was finally abandoned. One history professor there said to me, "I could in my lectures publicly denounce John D. Rockefeller [the great benefactor of the University of Chicago], and nothing would happen". Harvard, as a Protestant institution, is viewed with suspicion and jealousy by the dominating Irish-Catholic element in Boston, which, as everywhere in America, is comparatively unenlightened. On account of this "cockney-class" (as they have recently been called by John Gavin), one of the world's greatest universities has to be careful not to attract unwelcome attention by radicalism of any kind. Nevertheless, Harvard was still self-confident enough to elect recently a declared communist, Granville Hicks, to a minor academic post.

In the smaller Protestant universities, the situation is good but not perfect. Duke University at Durham, North Carolina, has grown to be one of the big universities of the country. However, it has not gone through the normal development of complete secularization, which is usual as denominational



colleges expand,\* and it is still largely Methodist in character. On definite issues, such as the Spanish Civil War, these universities have no official view from which a professor may not depart. However, anything which is not quite "respectable", anything which might injure the good name of the institution, is pursued with harshness or stealth, as the occasion demands. People closely connected with Duke University have told me many stories to this effect. The questions involved are usually petty; the incidents, often grotesque. Frequently, as in the case of the new municipal University of Pittsburgh, the authorities attempt to suppress any anti-capitalistic teaching for fear of discouraging possible benefactors. From a realistic viewpoint, it must be admitted that the attitude of the authorities is perfectly justifiable, for, if it be true that man does not live by bread alone, yet universities, like armies, march on their stomachs. It is possible for a university to do excellent work in most departments while completely avoiding politics.

Catholic universities sometimes appoint Protestants to their faculties, not out of a truly liberal spirit, but, so it is said, because they wish to cease to be a by-word for incompetence in the academic world. None the less, a professor in a Catholic college would risk his job, were he to express unorthodox opinions.

In the East, the great universities are endowed institutions (Harvard, Yale, Columbia, etc.). State universities, where they exist, play a very minor part. West of the Appalachians there are some outstanding private universities and colleges: Oberlin (Ohio), Chicago, Northwestern, Tulane (New Orleans), Rice Institute (Houston, Texas), Vanderbilt (Nashville, Tennessee), Stanford (south of San Francisco). Yet, in a general way, this vast area is the domain of State universities. Every State has one (that of California is spread over seven campuses) which, with the exception of Illinois, Louisiana, Tennessee, and possibly Oregon, where Reed College is situated, is markedly superior to any private institution in the State. Moreover, most western States have specialized colleges in addition. The State universities of California (Berkeley), Texas (Austin), Minnesota

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\*Columbia still has some Anglican affiliations: its president must be of that persuasion, and chapel service must be according to the Book of Common Prayer.

(Minneapolis), Wisconsin (Madison), Iowa (Iowa City), Illinois (Urbana), Michigan (Ann Arbor), and Ohio (Columbus) rank among the leading universities in the country. The University of California is generally admitted to be one of the four most outstanding in America, the other three all being endowed (Harvard, Chicago, and Columbia).

State universities may have private endowments; the University of California has been fortunate in the number and generosity of its benefactors, while the University of Texas has struck oil on its lands. But the bulk of the funds of State universities comes from the State itself, which has to appropriate the money at regular periods. The public character of the "land-grant colleges" (for many received gifts of land from the federal government) is expressed in the disposition that they must give military instruction to male students\*; this provides active student pacifists with an inexhaustible oratorical theme.

It would seem at first sight that State universities must be submitted to an unfortunate, indeed an intolerable, political influence. This is true in the case of some of the less well-established ones. Theodore Bilbo, on being elected governor of Mississippi, dismissed one hundred and fifty State professors. Another example was the University of Washington at Seattle, which almost exploded under the strain of political pressure.

The conservative Glen Frank lost the presidency of the University of Wisconsin owing to political differences with liberal Governor Phil. LaFollette. But most great State universities seem to be built on foundations of rock, against which political winds beat in vain. The University of California is proudly supercilious towards politics. This is reputedly due to the long-term (sixteen years) appointment of the Regents, which prevents any one governor of the State from nominating enough Regents to control the Board. The University of Michigan has likewise a reputation for good government: surprising enough in view of the fact that the governing body is elected by popular vote. It must be remembered that the United States has carried the principle of democracy so far as to elect many technical officers (*e.g.*, coroners,) by popular vote. The situation is peculiar in those few States—Texas, Louisiana (Baton Rouge), Ohio,

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\*The Morrill Act, 1862.

Wisconsin, etc.—where the State university and the State capitol are located in the same small town, thus facilitating lobbying on the one hand and political pressure on the other. Care was taken in the other States to keep the capitol and the university apart.

In only one way do all State universities play politics: in their attempts to curry favour with the public. Attractive and numerous extension courses are organized throughout the State. Several universities broadcast their lectures. The University of Wisconsin has done most in this respect. The permission of the professor concerned must first be obtained; some refuse it because they fear to be enticed down the broad and primrose path that leads to popularization. Finally, most universities have publicity bureaus, the task of which is simply to “sell” the university. The day after I visited one State university, a long article appeared in the principal newspaper of that region, in which all my chance expressions of approval were strung together to form an enthusiastic panegyric of the institution. The stimulus and the object were not difficult to guess. Such procedures may seem mildly grotesque, but they have their justification, and they scarcely seem out of place in a land where “morticians” (undertakers) advertise their wares with well-chosen slogans, and where chapels broadcast over the radio that they are the most touching place in which to hold your wedding.

In any of these different types of university, it is easier for the authorities to behave in a repressive manner than it is in English universities. The power of the president makes itself felt in every corner of the institution. He decides what the aims of the university should be, and the policy it should follow. He appoints and dismisses instructors in accordance with his views. This is made possible by the American system of short tenure. University “instructors” (teachers) are divided into five ranks, namely, teaching-assistants, instructors, assistant professors, associate professors, and full professors. Of these five groups, only the last two usually have permanency of tenure. Among the reforms which dynamic President Hutchins of Chicago proposes is the complete abolition of permanency of professorial tenure. The teaching staff of an American university being much larger than that of an English institution, the



president cannot have a paternal attitude towards his staff, and hires and fires them as though they were employees.

As a protection against the abuses which have arisen from this system, American professors have leagued together and formed the American Association of University Professors, whose main object is to protect the academic freedom and permanency of tenure of university teachers. It is once more clear that the situation of the American professor is comparable with that of the English secondary-school teacher. As an extreme measure, the A.A.U.P. blacklists institutions where the authorities have no respect for justice. At present there is a trio of offenders: Rollins College (Florida), Brenau College (Georgia), and the University of Pittsburgh. If open dismissal would create difficulties, the president often resorts to the method of "easing a man out". The almost unlimited power of the president may be unfortunate when he is, as is often the case, an unenlightened business-man presiding over distinguished scholars. When, on the other hand, he is a man of distinction himself, his power helps to keep the faculty on tip-toe.

The spirit of American scholars is on the whole generous and healthy. Whereas in England university teachers form a small segregated group, characterized by all those traits born of a cloistered existence, in America scholars, or perhaps I should say university teachers, are far more numerous and are in closer contact with life. They are earthly without being vulgar. The celibacy practised in the older English universities is exceptional, and the ascetic note is removed from scholarship. American university teachers are more jovial, in some ways more happy than English ones. They are approachable and tolerant.

American professors strike a note of simplicity. They dress decently but not expensively. In their office or study they often remove their coat, possibly their tie, and roll up their sleeves. This is quite excusable in temperatures of 100° in the shade. If they have been sitting for long hours at their desks, they may loll back on their swivel chairs and put their feet on the desk, an action which does not seem out of place. A few professors cast decorum to the winds; it is usually considered bad taste for even the students to chew gum, especially in class, but I have known an occasional professor who liked to masticate bovinely in his

leisure hours. One professor I met even spat periodically in the waste-paper basket. Admittedly there is a rude element among American university teachers. This can but be expected in a society where the gentleman-scholar scarcely exists, and where the well-to-do rarely enter university teaching, or indeed any teaching. On the whole, however, American professors give an impression of felicitous simplicity.

The pomp and circumstance of English academic life is absent. English academic paraphernalia (cap, gown, etc.) have become general here but appear normally only once a year, at the annual "commencement" ceremony, which professors delight in not attending. Only in the Graduate School of Anglophile Princeton are gowns worn in the dining hall every day. Formal dress for dinner is very exceptional. Faculty members eat healthy and inexpensive meals, usually without wine, since in most universities alcohol is forbidden near the campus. They avoid the English university custom of varying between bread-and-cheese lunches and opulent, well-wined meals.

Despite this lack of formality, the corporate life of American universities is very real. Most American universities, with a few notable exceptions, are located on "campuses" (or "campi") i.e., pleasant and often extensive tracts of land specially landscaped (a very American art) to provide the university buildings with agreeable surroundings. The thing and the term originated in Princeton at the end of the 18th century and spread thence throughout the country. Harvard, which has kept the traditional term "yard", considers "campus" to be "a classical affectation introduced by Princeton". Many professors and students spend all their working time in these pleasant surroundings. Most instructors have consultation hours almost daily, when students may call on them in their offices (the home on the campus of each professor is his office, which he sometimes shares with one or two others). Many instructors arrive at their office at eight or nine in the morning and remain there until the late afternoon. Their main preoccupation is work, scholarly or administrative, but a serious visitor is seldom rebuffed. Indeed, most American professors are only too ready to converse and exchange ideas. Appoint-

ments are convenient, but not necessary. The very heads of the academic hierarchy, the deans and the president himself, make a point of being accessible to all. Instructors retire for meals and relaxation to the Faculty Club, where life is more spontaneous and continuous than in the dignified Senior Common Rooms of Oxford and Cambridge. It is true that the card and billiard tables are too assiduously frequented in some Faculty Clubs. In most universities there is a large and luxurious "students' union" which affords like facilities to the students. These "unions" provide everything from lectures and reading-rooms to meals and "mixer" dances; they are run on a co-operative basis. American students do not buy books in such quantities as do English students and work more in the university library, where every facility is provided. Classes (which, of course, involve frequenting the campus) are more important and numerous in the American university system than in the English. For all these reasons there is far more corporate life in an American university than in an English one.

The staff (that is to say the administrative help) of American universities is more complex and numerous than in European institutions. The president himself is often a business-man, that is to say an administrator, rather than a scholar. President Robert Sproul of the University of California, one of the ablest in the country, rose to the presidency directly from the comptrollership. The librarians, and their numerous staffs, are not scholars, as in Europe, but administrators who have qualified from a library school; this explains the incredible efficiency of American university libraries, which on occasions has filled me with humbleness. Each academic department, which may comprise as few as three faculty members, has a woman secretary, and in some cases one or more clerks in addition. Dealing with large numbers of students in a system where classwork is of extreme importance, American professors undoubtedly have more administrative work than do European ones, but their secretarial staffs relieve them of a great deal of the burden. As part of the New Deal reforms, professors may now obtain special secretarial help for their research projects. It may come either from the W.P.A. (Works Progress Administration), which provides full-time, mature, unemployed workers,



or from the N.Y.A. (National Youth Administration), which supplies needy students, who, in return for about an hour's work a day, receive a small subsidy from the government. In order to be eligible, students must maintain at least a "C" average in their studies: admittedly not an excessive demand, since a "C" corresponds roughly to an English third class. W.P.A. or N.Y.A. help is not difficult to obtain. The grave disadvantage of both N.Y.A. and W.P.A. help is the unevenness of its quality. Sometimes it is outstandingly good, occasionally decidedly incompetent. Some professors regard N.Y.A. and W.P.A. workers as a burden rather than as an asset.

Petty rivalries may exist between institutions, especially in the question of sports, but the professors themselves are rarely parochial in spirit. They are faithful to their university, but they have a national, indeed an international interest in their subjects. They have usually studied at two or three different institutions, often in diverse sections of the country. American professors change jobs more easily than do English ones, and in the course of their career they may have taught in far-separated parts of the country. Whereas English universities hesitate to accept an outsider, American ones are glad to receive an infusion of new blood. For practically every faculty there is a national organization, which meets once a year at an imposing convention. Many professors travel a thousand or even two thousand miles each year to attend a three-day meeting. This may seem over-enthusiastic, but it is a proof of the broadmindedness of American university professors.

The healthy spirit of American professors is only half of the story of the greatness of American universities. The workmen would be helpless without their tools, which, in the science and scholarship of to-day, are becoming increasingly expensive and can be provided only by a wealthy community. Research workers in the natural sciences have much more liberty to buy or construct costly apparatus than they do in Europe. A good example is afforded by the cyclotron, which marks a most important development in physics. It is an American and more precisely a Californian invention, which became a reality simply because the University of California disposes of large sums of money and had enough vision to take the risk of losing a con-

siderable amount in an ambitious experiment. Fortunately Professor Lawrence was successful, so that physicists the world over are now following the impressive developments of the Californian cyclotron.

Research workers in the humanities have at their disposal vast and efficiently-run libraries. The great libraries of the country are the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Harvard Library. Many universities have collections of around a million volumes. The traveller from England is surprised to find, in universities whose names he scarcely knew, rich and highly organized libraries; and when he thinks of English university and college libraries, he is compelled to blush. Admittedly American efficiency, realism, and far-sightedness have been important factors in the florescence of these facilities; but they would not have been possible without the vast material wealth of which American universities dispose.

*(To be continued)*

## EBB AND FLOW

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

**T**HE King and Queen went upon one of the most laborious holidays that any sovereigns ever undertook. Happily they are of an age, and of a temper, to stand up to all its exactions ; there never was a couple better fitted to bring good will and to receive it in measure overflowing. The excitements of their progress have almost blotted out memory of perhaps the journey's most dramatic incident, when the world was reminded of forces which refuse to respect even royal time-tables ; but one man at least will not soon forget days and nights through which he had to guide his vessel with those illustrious passengers through the drifting ice floes. Thousands too will long remember the bitter disappointment which inevitably followed from the changes caused by the delay ; a single instance that I chanced to hear shows how widely it was spread. After the war the Duke of Connaught, who had been Governor General of Canada, desired to place in St. Bartholomew's Church at Ottawa a window commemorating those of his staff who went to serve, and fell. The commission for carrying it out was given to an Irish artist, Miss Geddes, then one of the co-operative workers whose establishment in Dublin is known as the Tower of Glass. Miss Geddes needs no commendation : since then she has carried out, amongst other works, the memorial window in Ypres ; but naturally the Irish group were eager that the King and Queen should find time to visit this proof of their fame ; and it had been so arranged, but the ice floes intervened. I am sorry for the miscarriage of their hopes, and the royal visitors will have had to find sympathy for scores of similar cases ; yet it is not sure that a king bred to the sea may not have been glad to find himself once more present at a struggle against its dangers.

Since those hours among the ice, which cannot have been



without anxiety for the expert, calamity at sea has struck the English-speaking navies, both sides of the Atlantic—grim enough in the United States, when twelve out of a submarine's crew were trapped irrecoverably, but tragic beyond words in the fate of the Thetis. To face sudden death is no great matter; but the chance of dying by slow suffocation without hope of deliverance is ugly indeed; and yet it has to be taken not only in submarine warfare, but even in the preparation for it. Still, a young Frenchman who showed me round his submarine near Brest said that he much preferred this way of doing his naval service, since he could be much on shore with his wife and children. Man certainly is a very courageous animal. *Illi robur et aes triplex.*

Fortunately, however, man is not at present enamoured of the risks which present-day fighting entails, and there has been a half-hearted spreading of hope throughout the European world; it may become confident when agreement is reached with Russia, and one can hardly doubt that this will happen. Yet evidently, even if confidence comes, it will come without enthusiasm; all recent elections prove that support is tepid, either for Government or for its opponents. This is a time difficult to interpret, and I have not been in France. But friends of mine, long settled there, who regard its people without any special liking, write that at present the temper of the French fills them with admiration. Everybody knows his place and is ready—doggedly and without bravado.

It is probable that Mr. Chamberlain's name is held in more esteem in France and throughout Europe than in his own country, for it is believed that Mr. Chamberlain has led England into fully sharing Europe's risk. In England, it seems rather that, though the mind of England is made up, England has made up its own mind. If ever a Government was obliged to revise its policy under pressure from Parliament and from the people at large, Mr. Chamberlain's has offered the astounding example. One thing has been constant with him—a declared intention to avoid a division of Europe on what are called ideological principles. That is where, under other guidance, the nation has differed from him. If the purpose of a national policy is to promote peace, there must be

**Courage—  
and Hope**

**The Mind  
of Britain**

division between those nations which openly and avowedly glorify war as a national industry, and those which regard resort to war, or to the threat of war, as a calamity. The rulers of Italy and Germany have left the world in no doubt of their attitude on this vital matter. All education and the whole national effort is directed by them to results which must be attained by armed force; Abyssinia and Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel show results attained; and the English nation is aware that full warning was given publicly by leading Englishmen of what was about to happen. Under pressure of these events, Mr. Chamberlain has been vigorously shutting the stable door, to see that at least no more horses shall be stolen, and the country, with its mind made up, accepts his decisions, and acts on them resolutely, but without gratitude. The one election for a considerable time back at which interest was notably shown by the voters was that which brought Mr. Vernon Bartlett into the House of Commons—a publicist who had been advocating the policy to which Mr. Chamberlain has subsequently conformed. If Mr. Churchill or Mr. Eden had to face a contest to-morrow, I do not think that their poll would be a light one. As things are, these gentlemen, out of office, carry more weight than the official leaders. They are of more value to parliament as an institution than either the ministry or the official opposition, which has evidently misinterpreted the general feeling as to military service. They are of more value than Mr. Lloyd George, whose personal distaste for Mr. Chamberlain has brought too much venom into his criticism—though no other man could have so forcibly driven home the essential need for Russia's co-operation. But it is thanks to Mr. Churchill, more than to any other man, or perhaps to all men together, that the nation accepted from Mr. Chamberlain the sudden and violent change of direction involved in the guarantees to Poland, to Rumania and to Greece, with the inevitable complement of compulsory service. That acceptance is likely to be merely acquiescence in Mr. Chamberlain's leadership, unless the character of his administration is changed by bringing into it the men who have really shaped its policy—and by a much less ambiguous attitude about Czechoslovakia. For it looks as if the man who signed the

agreement at Munich, and could not ensure that it was observed, has never permitted himself to recognize how great a crime was committed when Germany trampled out—at least for a time—that freedom.

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On another grave matter of policy, it looks as if the same kind of pressure were likely to bring about another reversal. What the Government have decided in Palestine pleases **Policy under** no party and serves no useful end ; and it shocks **Pressure** the conscience of humanity. The Jews ask no more than this, that they shall be allowed to enter Palestine, find employment there as they can, and acquire land by purchase. They have proved up to the hilt that they can create employment there for themselves, as well as for thousands of the Arabs, and can use the land of Palestine as it never was used before. The Arab claim is that an arbitrary limit shall be set to this civilizing process, and this claim has now been conceded by the Government—conceded after it had been urged by a campaign of anarchic violence, fomented by the dictatorships. And this blow to all the Jewish hopes, this frustration of all the work that has been done (done in defiance of all augury) on the soil of Palestine, falls at the moment when the Jewish race needs, as it has not needed for long centuries, some rallying-point, some consolation. When a Great Power has given conflicting pledges, it should decide on its future course in the light of the higher necessities, and no necessity in this world is higher to-day than to give some satisfaction to this oppressed and gifted race. Above all policy should not be dictated by fear—least of all by fear of the unknown, which in this case means fear of reactions in the Moslem world. It is from sentiment, a narrow nationalism, that the Arabs in Palestine stand against the admission of Jews up to the limit of Palestine's economic capacity to absorb them. It is from sentiment also, the passionate desire of a homeless people to have a root for their race that the Jews desire admission; but above and beyond this abstract sentiment is the crying need of some place of refuge for the hunted and harassed—a need to which there is no shadow of equivalent in the Arab case. There are people with money and brains behind the Jews seeking to develop a land which under long centuries of Arab possession has



been undeveloped ; and Great Britain, who forced on the Boers the admission of seekers after gold (many of them Jewish), now in the exercise of her mandate declares that the abler race, with its historic claim, shall not get its chance. It if were question of expatriating even a single Arab to make room for Jews, there would be a case to consider ; but the only hurt to be done is to Arab prejudices, which are none the more respectable because they find powerful echoes in Europe. It is already evident that uneasiness over the Government's decision (if decision be the proper word) is in no way confined to the opposition. Fortunately immutability is the last characteristic that can be claimed for Mr. Chamberlain's resolves.

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Mr. Joseph Hone wrote the life of George Moore so well that another task of difficulty and distinction has been committed to him. It would be wrong to say that he has done for Tonks what he did for Moore, since in the earlier book he contrived, without setting it down

**A Master  
of Artists**

anywhere in black and white, to convey how much in Moore was caddish. There is no such underlying censure in the portrait which he now presents, for the essence of its subject was a noble humility. Tonks could be pettish but never petty ; and nobody could read this book without liking the subject of it unreservedly. The subject is a character, a great character, who was also something of an oddity. Mr. Hone, a man of letters, with only the ordinary appreciation of painting which wide culture implies, has avoided technical discussion of the artist, leaving Tonks to set out himself that side of the story—by extracts from the correspondence of one who was first a teacher and inspirer of artists in the making. His unusual training—for he was highly qualified as a surgeon before he gave up that profession for painting—was no doubt a help in anatomy class, but that does not explain why, as one of his pupils puts it, they would rather be damned by Tonks than praised by any other professor. He had contagious enthusiasm both for the craft and for the art ; and as happens to every serious artist, his life was a long struggle after the unattainable. Illustrations in this book show how much he valued character as well as beauty ; but nothing in black and white can convey his always growing engrossment with

the untranslatable flicker of light that can caress in a gentle irradiation, or can dart like a probe. There have not been many artists in whom sensuous perception was allied to so alert and searching a mind, and it is a pleasure to read of his contempt for the jargon of what he called "Art-boys"—the critics who know everything about painting except how to paint.

The book is enriched by two contributions from other hands. Mr. Collins Baker, one of his closest associates, writes at the end some pages on Tonks as an artist and a teacher; Mrs. St. John Hutchinson sets down at the beginning "the portrait of a friend"—whose friendship had been a delight to her house for some five and twenty years before death came to one who to the end was indefatigably working—often on canvases which he had on hand for many years. One of these, 'The Toilet', is the last piece of his work that I saw; it came to the Municipal Gallery in Dublin from the "Friends of the National Collections of Ireland" and is a perfect example of what Mr. Collins Baker calls his "delight in a *genre* in which stuffs, and all their possibilities of rich textures, colour, folds and sheen, transfigured in light and shade, were treated with sensuous enjoyment". Tonks was past seventy when that work was finished: but a letter of his, quoted in this book, describes a late work of Steer's as

"a proper old man's painting which no young man could do. Give an old man his faculties and enough energy, and he can paint the best pictures in the world, perhaps it is hope makes me say this."

# THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

## GERMAN COLONIAL RULE

BY SIR WILLIAM GOWERS

**JUDGMENT ON GERMAN AFRICA**, by  
G. L. Steer. *Hodder & Stoughton.*  
12s. 6d.

**GERMANS IN THE CAMEROONS**, by  
Harry R. Rudin. *Cape.* 15s.

The title of *Judgment on German Africa* suggests at first sight Rhadamanthine or *ex cathedra* condemnation. Not at all. Mr. Steer has given us a conspicuously clear, impartial, concise and accurate history both before and since the war of the former German possessions in Africa, and a masterly summing up of the present position so far as they are concerned. He does not pronounce judgment; he marshals the facts, giving, as a judge may properly do, some indication of where the weight of evidence lies, and leaves the verdict to the reader.

Although German Colonial rule lasted on paper for some 30 years, in fact the real development and administration of the hinterland of their territories only began (as in the case of most tropical African colonies of other powers) with the twentieth century. Fourteen years is a short time in the life of a country, and during this period they were engaged in a process of trial and error, unwilling to learn, until rather late in the day, from the political mistakes and successes of their neighbours. The Germans, as Mr. Steer

says, handled nature better than they handled man. He faithfully recounts the tragedies and appalling bloodshed which accompanied their rule, notably in South-west and East Africa. He gives them full credit for such good work as they did do, and he would not deny them the restitution of colonies solely on the ground of their pre-war record. But the comparatively liberal and democratic Germany of pre-war days no longer exists, and Mr. Steer who is a South African and no sentimentalist, has no difficulty in showing that the transfer of African populations to the present totalitarian régime, whose *Führer* regards them as semi-apes and whose official colonial experts hold out no prospect for the African beyond that of becoming a State serf, would be a gross and unpardonable betrayal which would bring with it its own punishment.

For the return of German Africa to present-day Germany would be to hand our potential enemies a weapon to destroy the British Empire by severing its vital arteries. The strategic arguments which compelled the Allied powers at Versailles to refuse even to consider the return of the German colonies have, as Mr. Steer clearly and ably shows, tenfold force to-day. The plea voiced again



recently by General von Epp that the hardships of the German people are due to the withholding by the robber nations of the necessities of life with which its colonies would supply it is demonstrably baseless, and it is inconceivable that the leaders believe it themselves. Whatever may happen in the future—and Mr. Steer is not without hope—he concludes that it would be suicidal insanity for this country to yield an inch to the colonial demands of present day Germany. Few if any of the multitude of readers which this book deserves will find themselves able to disagree with him.

*Germans in the Cameroons* is written by an Assistant Professor of History at Yale University. It smells of the lamp—and a lamp made in Germany at that. It is the product of exhaustive and painstaking researches among German archives and it is, in so far as it deals with recorded facts, an accurate and useful piece of history. But Mr. Rudin draws conclusions which the facts recorded in his book are far from justifying.

In assessing the merits of German colonial administration he says, truly enough, that the qualification 'good' can only be used in a relative sense of any colonial system and that in the case of Germany the proper comparison is with the first thirty years of administration elsewhere by another Power. But he uses no such yardstick, although he could have found one ready to his hand, had he taken the trouble to study the history of the adjoining territory of Nigeria—half as large again as the Cameroons and seven times as populous—where problems similar to those of the Cameroons and on a far bigger scale were dealt with during the same period by very different methods and principles and with very different results.

His attitude to this is indicated by supercilious reference to his having been spared during his researches "complacency of talk about the 'white man's burden', thanks to a not unpleasant realism in the German attitude towards colonies". I can assure him that the victims of Dominik's expeditions in the north and of Puttkamer's plantation policy in the south would have whole-heartedly agreed as to realism, even though they were not able presently to comprehend that pleasant aspect of which Mr. Rudin enjoys the contemplation thirty-five years later.

Mr. Rudin has travelled extensively in the Cameroons, hearing from natives everywhere praises of the admirable German administration of twenty years before. He has also discovered and recorded a fact unknown to previous travellers—that the fauna of the Cameroons includes wild horses. He does not tell us whether the mares build nests.

He believes that "if Germany had been allowed to continue as a Colonial Power after the war her civil rule would have compared favourably with the best that the world knows to-day". Surely no one could draw such a conclusion unless he made the fantastic assumption that the retention of colonies would *per se* have prevented the evolution of the totalitarian Third Reich with its concomitant mentality.

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**DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALISM**, by Arthur Rosenberg. *Bell.* 12s. 6d.  
**MODERN DICTATORSHIP**, by Diana Spearman. *Cape.* 10s. 6d.

Dictatorship is so live an issue and so potent a factor in the post-war world that it behoves thoughtful people to study both its pre-suppositions and its

intrinsic merits in an effort to understand and to assess its significance. Diana Spearman's examination of modern dictatorship covers a wide field and will be found a helpful guide both to students of political theory and to the general reader. A merit of this writer's essay is the width of the survey undertaken and the warning, in thinking out the problem, not to confine the study of the subject to the obvious and dominant dictatorships in Germany and Italy but to countries weak as well as powerful, where totalitarian forms of government are in being.

Theories to account for dictatorship are inadequate if they fail to reckon with the psychological background. Dictatorship as the result of the War; dictatorship as a mass neurosis; dictatorship as the result of the introduction of democracy into countries not sufficiently developed to understand it, and dictatorship as a result of racial psychology, are explanations containing an undoubted element of truth, but neither separately nor together do they provide a complete and satisfactory answer to this problem of the change in the political attitude of large numbers of people.

Whilst realizing that in a crisis a dictator might appear in any country, even a country whose traditions were violently opposed to it, the question still presses—Why a dictator? All dictatorships are alike in their extreme reverence for a single, dominant leader. People are led to autocracy not only by its efficiency as an instrument in and after a crisis, but also by its emotional attractions. It is a psychological problem with which we have to reckon, and the attraction which 'the great man' has had for many people of very

different periods and very different stages of culture points to a psychological basis for the rule of the tyrant.

A further merit in Miss Spearman's close study of dictatorship as a form of government is her clear-cut contrast between the organization of the governments based on political equality with those of the aristocratic type of state. We are made to realize by contrast the merits and defects of both democracy and autocracy, and in the end our choice or preference must pivot round the problem of human freedom. Democracy cannot compete with the dictators on their own ground. It can offer neither the joys of obedience nor its rewards, nor the complete solution of every problem, personal or political. Democracy can only offer the responsibility of choosing for one's self. To those who shrink from that responsibility, democracy offers nothing. To those who accept it, it offers an opportunity for self-control, for sacrifice, for moderation. Such a survey of modern dictatorship as Diana Spearman has sketched should place this issue clearly before our minds and furnish us with the necessary data upon which to base a judgment and to justify a preference: in the modern world, Dictatorship or Democracy—which?

Is there another possible choice or preference? Dr. Rosenberg offers us an historical contribution to the present discussion of democracy, surveying the political history of the past 150 years. Yet he does not conceal his preference. He is both a democrat and a Marxist. He writes however entirely independently of every party or group interest, and his purpose is to help the reader to come to his own conclusions. The

book is intended to present primarily the practical political work of Marx and Engels during the period 1845-95. Part I. sketches Modern Democracy before Marx. Part II. deals with Democracy and Marxism 1845-95, and in Part III. the story is carried on from 1895 to the present day with a final critique of Democracy. In these days of contending ideologies our danger is that we may find ourselves the dupes of catch-words. A reading both of what Miss Spearman has to tell us of "Dictatorship", and Dr. Rosenberg's story of the evolution of modern "democracy" and "socialism", will help to a clearer definition of terminology and a keener appreciation of the issues confronting us.

H. MAURICE RELTON.

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**LOST LIBERTY?** by Joan and Jonathan Griffin. *Chatto and Windus* 8s. 6d.

**EYEWITNESS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA,** by Alexander Henderson. *Harrap.* 10s. 6d.

**WE SHALL LIVE AGAIN,** by Maurice Hindus. *Collins.* 12s. 6d.

*Lost Liberty* is primarily an examination of political principles. "We ourselves", the authors write, "had long thought peace the first aim of politics; yet Prague in 1938 seemed to force us to believe that there is something even worse than war. Which is true? Is liberty worth modern war? Is peace worth vassaldom? The fate of the people of Masaryk's Czechoslovakia raises this question mercilessly and is essential to its answer". In order to answer these questions Mr. and Mrs. Griffin provide an admirable account

of the preliminary destruction of the first Czechoslovak Republic as they were able to observe it during the autumn. There is another fundamental point with which they deal, fundamental to the understanding of the manner in which Nazi Germany prepares for offensive, and that is the artificial inflammation of the position between the Czech and the Sudeten Germans. No one familiar with the history of Bohemia and Moravia could suggest that the problem of the relation of the Czech and German-speaking inhabitants was an easy one, yet in the middle of September, 1938 there were many indications that this relation was without sight of real amelioration. In addition to the address of loyalty from the Bohemian nobility to President Benes at the time, Mr. and Mrs. Griffin are able to reveal the interesting fact that a day or so earlier—in fact on September 17—Dr. Lodgman actually visited the pro-Czech Sudeten German Social leader, Herr Jaksch, to offer to support the new democratic National Council of Sudeten Germans which had been established in order to arrive at a peaceful agreement with the Czechoslovak Government. Dr. Lodgman had led the intransigent German nationalist opposition to the Czechs in the early years after the War, and his behaviour on September 17th, whatever its motives, was an interesting indication of tendencies at the time. "The moment", write Mr. and Mrs. Griffin "when the Sudeten German problem had at last a real chance of being solved was the very moment Great Britain and France chose to betray Czechoslovakia".

Mr. Henderson's book is straightforward narrative and includes a detailed examination of the history



the Henleinist Sudeten German Party ; his extensive material about the methods of this organization, as employed in the factories for instance, and about the constitution and the functions of its militant formation, the *Freiwilliger Schutzdienst*, provide ample corroboration of Mr. and Mrs. Griffin's view that the Henleinists existed to provoke a crisis. Roughly speaking, Mr. Henderson considers that the Wiedemann visit to London in July, 1938, was the decisive incident which fore-doomed the Czechs ; it is not without interest that Captain Wiedemann stayed with Princess Stefanie Hohenlohe in London, and that the Hohenlohe family was subsequently instrumental in bringing about Lord Runciman's meeting with Herr Henlein on August 18th.

Mr. Henderson's account of the attacks of Hungarian terrorists and irregulars upon Slovakia and Ruthenia in October, "an attempt to apply pressure on the (Czecho-Slovak) Republic, in order to squeeze out the maximum of territorial concessions" in the negotiations which were supposed to be going on at the time, is particularly valuable. This is ground which has scarcely been trodden at all ; even to-day when Hungary has been able to take all Ruthenia, as well as a considerable part of Slovakia, it is not at all clear that Hungarian irregulars are not under arms and in action. Mr. Henderson also gives an extremely interesting account of Germany's patronage of the Great Ukrainian movement in Ruthenia during the short period when Chust had been liberated from the Czechs and not yet seized by the Hungarians. The typical Ukrainian attitude, he found, was that of a

journalist who said to him, " We know we shall have to pay for Germany's help, but rather than have no help at all we are prepared to pay ". Since the Germans gave them up to Hungary in March, 1939, it is said that the Ukrainians have, however, swung round to a pro-Russian state of mind.

Mr. Henderson more or less leaves his tale to point its own moral, though it is perfectly clear where his sympathies lie ; both his book and *Lost Liberty* ? are touched by the glory of the Hussite spirit ever cherished by the Czechs, who are deeply convinced that their nation has been identified through history with truth, indeed with right. Mr. Hindus' book has really nothing to recommend it except a certain sensibility to this very genuine Hussitism of the Czechs. Otherwise it is inaccurate and diffuse, and tells one nothing which is not better told elsewhere. As for endless incidents about taking a whiskey with Mr. Knickerbocker or some less famous journalist, they scarcely seem worthy of record, though Mr. Hindus appears to have attached extraordinary importance to them. He became quite indignant when left to himself in Carlsbad. " " Isn't there anybody here ? " " I said a little impatiently. " Not a single foreign journalist ? " "

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

LESSING'S DRAMATIC THEORY, by J. G. Robertson. *Cambridge University Press*. 30s.

This long and scholarly book is one more testimony to the immemorial spell of the Theatre. It sets forth the curiously belated rise of the German stage in the eighteenth century and the great part which Gotthold Ephraim Lessing played in the matter both as

critic and as dramatist. It occupied much of Professor Robertson's time in the last thirty years of his life, and no doubt much of its inspiration dated back to his years as a young student in Leipzig. He did not live to complete it, but Professor Edna Purdie took up the work after his death, verifying its innumerable references and quotations and bringing it to a dignified close. Its illustrations—the façade of the historic Hamburg theatre opened in 1765 and reproductions of prints of German actors and actresses—are curiously similar to drawings of many English playhouses and players of the same period.

The chief figure in the book is Lessing himself, whose name is perhaps the greatest in the roll of art critics. To the almost ferocious sincerity of a Sarcey he added a breadth of sympathy and a cultural range which made even Macaulay one of his warmest panegyrists. His *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, published in 1767-8 was the first modern handbook of the dramatist's art and also the first of the art of the actor. It has long ranked as a classic in Germany and in one of the volumes of the notable "Bohn Library" it is familiar to many English readers. As the author of *Minna von Barnhelm* and *Nathan der Weise* Lessing also stands in the front rank of German dramatists, and both these plays still hold the stage wherever a German audience can be assembled. Even in London I have seen them both followed by crowded houses with much the same rapt interest that an English audience bestows upon "Hamlet".

As Edmund Gosse once said, Lessing was the first continental critic to admit the full greatness of England's dramatic

literature; and he did so at a time when in Germany as in France the play of Corneille and Racine were placed above those of Shakespeare. "Lessing's defence of the English poet", says Professor Robertson, "penetrated circles that had hitherto only seen through Voltairean eyes". An idealist and an honest man, he could be very severe on dramatists, as when he described the heroine of a particularly crude tragedy as "dying of the act". Even of some of his brother critics we find him declaring that "the best criticism consists in making criticism suspect".

In enthusiasm no less than in scholarship, Professor Robertson's book may fairly be said to rise to Lessing's height.

H. M. WALBROOK

**WHAT NEXT, BABY? or SHALL I GO TO TANGANYIKA?** by A. Macdonell. *Macmillan*. 3s. 6d.

**NO MORE MUSIC**, by Rosamund Lehmann. *Collins*. 5s.

**THREE PLAYS: SUOMI, THE BRONTES OF HAWORTH, FAN BURNEY**, by Elizabeth Goudge. *Duckworth*. 7s. 6d.

Dramatic writings may be roughly classified under three heads: utterly brainless, rarely deserving publication, however popular they may be on the stage; the hopelessly high brow, rarely repaying production, however readable they may be in study; and the intelligent middle ranks that ought to be good value whether read or acted. All the plays on our list belong to some part of the large middle class. The places of times of their production—outlets, theatres, or Sunday evenings—indicate

their slight upward tendency, their freedom from such sentimental or crudely comic features as would secure them an easy public. They are in fact examples of the present-day theatre of practical ideas; in each case the playwright has written with a certain seriousness of intention, no matter what degree of humour may emerge. At this point our three authors take divergent paths: Mr. Macdonell is satirical, Miss Goudge is historical, Miss Lehmann is atmospheric. All three manners have classical or semi-classical precedents; all alike keep clear of experimentalism.

Odd as it may seem, Mr. Macdonell's play is at once the most obviously uproarious and the most cunningly contorted of them all. It is, he insists, a very broad satire on film stars and their managers, with a preface about the Star-system. All very well so far, but rather paltry. Some of us are bored with Hollywood beauties, and the real film fan will never like this play. On the other hand we have all run mad on politics, and the mere mention of a dictator jogs our interest. Mr. Macdonell never mentions a dictator. He *does* remark that a strange misapprehension got around when the play was produced after Crisis 1938. To cure all that his preface starts in on the European theatre . . . until the starry Amanda is entangled with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister is uttering words about "this nettle, danger" that we seem to have seen reported in the Press. Though political satire is not rare at the moment, good humour in politics is rare indeed, Mr. Macdonell is utterly heartless, and undoubtedly bitter at the core; but he is gloriously witty just beneath the

cinema-surface, and without tracing the forbidden analogy to its final details one may revel in the speed and lightness he achieves.

Miss Lehmann gives us *No More Laughter*, except those titters aroused by a collection of familiar types in a West Indian hotel. Her casual, blunt dialogue, with its insistence on the motions of trivial minds, is suited to the novel rather than the stage. "The moment I sit down to have a good think or a read", one character remarks, "all sorts of odds and ends come popping into my head. The ordering you know, or scratches on the paint, or something . . ." This "odds and ends" manner of writing is the prerogative of Virginia Woolf in the novel or of Tchekov on the stage. In either case the ghostly menace of a desolate fate looms through the trivial and transfigures it. Miss Lehmann here makes a bid for Tchekov. In her characters she assembles his negative qualities of inertia, restlessness, self-distrust, want of principle and lack of aim. She easily establishes a general pettiness. But to redeem it there is neither healthy satire, nor the Tchekovian haunting of some tragedy more deeply interfused. Her temperamental, Coward-like lovers, her repressed young spinster discovering a kind of limpet-love that cracks decorum, may be well observed, but they refuse to have importance even in the skilfully muddled atmosphere of storm and tropic tension that envelops them. The play has interest, but the title does indeed describe it: where there should ultimately be music, it is dumb.

Miss Goudge, another novelist turned playwright, has a more age-honoured sense of theatre. Her two plays about literary women are built up as historical



chronicles, revealing these heroines at certain key points of their lives, surrounded by familiar famous figures. The danger of this method is to rely on such names as Dr. Johnson and Thackeray, aided by clever make-up, to redeem flat dialogue. Miss Goudge should beware of this makeshift. But her Brontës and Burneys are gracious presentations; it takes, perhaps, a Shakespeare to combine chronicle and creation. Her third play is on quite other lines. Here, with passion and allegory, she approaches the political ideals at the back of Mr. Macdonell's insistent levity. The woman Suomi represents her country Finland which, is shown, through the example of a peasant family, struggling to freedom in 1899 and 1917. An echo of Ibsen is heard amongst the moving puppets. It speaks with more drama and intensity than Miss Lehmann's *Tchekov*, since protest echoes more resoundingly than defeat.

SYLVIA NORMAN.

**THE GOVERNMENT AND MIS-GOVERNMENT OF LONDON**, by William A. Robson. *Allen & Unwin*. 15s.

**HISTORY OF THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL, 1889-1939**, by Sir Gwilym Gibbon and Reginald W. Bell. *Macmillan*. 21s.

London is no longer a city. It has become what the experts call a 'conurbation' which is an ugly word for what is really a rather ugly thing. Dr. Robson talks of the new London as "flooding the countryside, creating new land values, exchanging new slums for old, sprawling far and wide without direction or control, devoid of coherence or integrity". It takes courage to

write a book so largely critical of capital as he has done. I can only think of Robert Sinclair's "Metropolitan Man" in recent years. Vestibular interests rise in their wrath and sentimentalists deplore the interference with tradition when such sweeping changes as Dr. Robson proposes are even mentioned. Two-thirds of this work are devoted to a sane and scholarly review of the past and the present London government. He finds a great deal to regret but not a little to praise in the way in which that gigantic problem has been and is being tackled but it is in the last third of his study that he really comes to grips with the Leviathan. Only a regional government—a Greater London Council, in his opinion, save the metropolis from continuing to "drift about helplessly with the tide, like a beach whale". He castigates the folly of national Government which hands of borough status after borough status to the London area much as if it were sort of medal, without realizing that by so doing it is making the problem of cultivating a sense of community and an efficiency of services in Outer London infinitely more difficult to solve. Particularism is rife, and localism strong because, in its jealousy of the capital, Parliament has for more than a generation now done its best to encourage them.

The greater London Council envisaged would be a smallish body, 150 persons. The councillors would be directly elected, and paid; the present voluntary system drastically limits the types entering local government. Such a Council would do away with as many "ad hoc" bodies as possible, because "ad hoc" bodies cannot co-operate

with each other for the good of London as a whole. (The evidence before the Barlow Commission on Industrial Population gave ample proof of that). Dr. Robson shows, for instance, how cumbersome and undemocratic is a body like the Metropolitan Water Board and how unnecessary it is for the Metropolitan Police to be under the Home Secretary instead of part of the system of the local authority, like the Fire Brigade. The Port of London Authority he would leave untouched, but he only envisages the London Passenger Transport Board's complete independence as temporary.

The voter at present is doubtless confused by the multiplicity of local authorities. Give him a Greater London Council with full control over the things that mattered in his daily life, and he might well respond enthusiastically, so that the election figures would no longer be so disgracefully small.

Dr. Robson, whose sense of tidiness is sometimes almost awe-inspiring, would remove the Home Counties from participation in metropolitan local government altogether. That would be a hard pill to swallow, especially for Middlesex men, but then Middlesex is the greatest anachronism! The present boroughs he would rationalize, too, so as to get diversity of character in the new areas. Poverty and industry in St. Pancras would be offset by the well-to-do dormitory of Hampstead and the refined gentility of Marylebone, and so on. The City Corporation with its oligarchic privileges would go altogether. I recommend liverymen and others connected with the City Companies to omit this chapter. It might give them an apopleptic seizure!

Finally, Dr. Robson gives an idea of what New York has done to reconstitute its government, not as an example to follow, but as a demonstration that the chief city of the new world is ready and able to adapt itself to modern conditions. Then he throws down his gage. Will London lag behind? Can London, whether it is preparing for peace or for war, dare to lag behind? This book is as stimulating as a cold bath, but unfortunately a great many people do not like cold baths.

Sir Gwilym Gibbon and Mr. Bell have written a very different kind of survey of London Government, but they have managed to make what is more or less an official history, timed to appear at the same time as the L.C.C.'s Jubilee, an eminently readable book, and that is an achievement. Their history is sound and immensely enlivened by cartoons from "Punch", though one gathers from them that our foremost humorous journal has often tried in the past to ridicule many of the efforts made in the name of social justice and administrative efficiency on behalf of Londoners. But the really important part of the story deals with the present day. Nobody who reads it can fail to understand better how the great institution which is 50 years old this year touches the lives of Londoners at a hundred points; municipal government comes alive in these pages. I would recommend in particular the chapter describing how the Council itself functions, which is a model of clear exposition and good English. Occasionally the authors tend to gloss over the Council's failures. Becontree, for instance, is described as though it had been a great adventure with a successful ending, whereas it is of course the most spectacular example

of how *not* to establish a satellite town. Apart from a certain tepidity of judgment, however, it is an admirable "biography" of the L.C.C., and ought to be compulsory reading in every London school.

KENNETH ADAM.

**THE OPEN SKY**, by L. A. G. Strong.  
*Gollancz. 8s. 6d.*

**PINK FACES**, by Betty Inskip.  
*Chatto & Windus. 7s. 6d.*

**BORSTAL LIVES**, by Louis Edward.  
*Gollancz. 9s.*

**BLIND MAN'S DITCH**, by Walter Allen.  
*Michael Joseph. 7s. 6d.*

Perhaps the principal difficulty that the contemporary novelist has to surmount is the money question; and it is always interesting to watch how various authors evade the dullness which, in present-day conditions, almost inevitably dogs the doings of those who have just enough money to get on with, and only just. Each of the books whose titles head these lines has had to elude the problem somehow; and each of them does it with more or less success.

Mr. Strong, an old and practised hand at the game, pitches his scene in a country where money has less importance than almost anywhere in Europe: the west coast of Ireland—and on an island off it, at that. His hero admittedly is wealthy in worldly goods, but his poor health has driven him to a corner of the world where they are of very little use to him. But in any case, in Kilree, there is precious little danger of any dullness creeping in. For one thing, the countryside itself, depicted by Mr. Strong's vivid pen, is full of excitement, and he succeeds completely in conveying the curiously exhilarating

yet soft atmosphere of the Atlantic seaboard, not forgetting the fair menacing attraction of many of wilder parts.

It is really rather a pity that *Open Sky* should have to come to its climax, but it would be too much to expect Mr. Strong to go on writing ever about Heron's gradual recovery from neurosis, his conversations with Sheila, half paternal and half flirtation, and his difficulties with the extremely eccentric elder population of Kilree. The ending is rapid and somewhat satisfactory, but we are left sorrowful that Sheila could not have spent so much of her generous nature in a wider world where meanness is too common. This is a real and a living book.

By contrast, *Pink Faces* evokes an atmosphere of mistiness. It may lose the title, but there seems to be a sort of pervasive rose-coloured tint about everything everywhere—not altogether unjustified, indeed, for the scene is laid in pre-war Anschluss Austria, a country that was smothered in false romanticism by the romance-hungry English. The money question is soon disposed of here; everyone is either fabulously wealthy or sponges on those who are. The two sisters Serena and Vicky are pleasantly differentiated, but they are a trifle hazy and two-dimensional, and never seem really to emerge from a sort of "Wood beyond the World". Austria has suffered much, and in contrast with the suffocating patronage of the English and American visitors herein depicted, one might almost be tempted to describe even the Anschluss as "a good thing".

There's no money problem in *Borstal Lives*, as none of the inmates has any money (except for illicit silver collect-



during "visits") beyond the threepenny allowance of pocket-money, increased to fivepence as a reward of virtue. Mr. Edward has not attempted to write a novel, and wisely so, for his series of vignettes of "Life at Borstal from Within" is a far more convincing way of conveying the atmosphere of the place. Actually, however, Mr. Edward does not really tell us very much about Borstal as a whole; apparently the life of each "house" within a Borstal establishment is fairly watertight, and contact with other "houses" seems greatly restricted. *Borstal Lives* leaves the uninitiated reader with a rather confused impression of complicated internal politics, liberally peppered with private slang; its strong point is the delineation of the characteristics of Mr. Edward himself and the odd dozen of personages—staff and boys included—who immediately surrounded him.

Some might say that Mr. Walter Allen has cheated the readers of *Blind Man's Ditch* by leaving his characters more or less suspended in mid-air at the close of the book; and in fact the various intertwined sub-plots that make up a complicated and fascinating whole could have been logically unwound and the volume brought to a conventional close. Here again an episodic treatment (though in larger slices) helps to bring out the vividness of the narrative; and the whole is illuminated by flashes of keen observation and insight into the small things that make life ridiculous and interesting. One of the most engaging points about the whole story is that every major event in it, even down to the murder of a shop-messenger with a case-full of silver, depends on the emotional disturbance aroused in the bosom of a lady-journalist by a love-

affair with a married colleague years before our story started. The young schoolmaster, enthusiastic despite himself, and the poor scholar singeing his wings at the candle-flame, are among the characters drawn with great sensitiveness and sympathy; but surely the slug-like James Bartholomew was too revolting to have got away with it quite as often and as easily as he did.

L. RUSSELL MUIRHEAD.

SUNDAY BUGLES, by H. A. Manhood.

Cape. 7s. 6d.

What a pity that Jan Steen and Hogarth were deprived the pleasure of reading these stories, for most of them depict what is called 'low life' and accomplish their task with gruesome geniality. Take, for instance, the tale entitled "Shovel my Acorns", where we rub shoulders, as it were, with grimness itself, only to ride off almost with laughter. There is a hint that a good-natured farmer at long last murdered his shrew of a wife and that she has been consumed, among the acorns, by the pigs of a neighbour; when the neighbour subsequently brings the farmer a present of pork it is refused. The village constable is uneasy at the woman's disappearance, finally the neighbour sees her being run over and killed in a nearby town, and the husband, when the news is broken to him, smiles slowly, appreciatively. 'I reckon', he says, 'I meant to finish her all right that day, but she hopped too quick'... Some of the best of these entertaining stories take place in Ireland; 'Mulvaney's Miracle' describes the adventures of a young Irishman who, starting from zero, comes over to Wales and England, where he prospers exceedingly. Having become possessed

of a cow he mixes her milk with a more potent liquid for whose manufacture he has omitted to obtain a license. He likewise has an uncompromising wife, from whom he is released by the agency of the bits of dynamite which he has brought with him from Ireland and practically forgotten.

Mr. Manhood's fertile imagination is well displayed in his account of what the hero did before he arrived at the South Downs where he was 'very pleased with their shape, like plump wrinkles in a frank, smiling face, he thought'. He had stopped here and there for strange labour, picking round black flints for glassmaking on a pebbly shore, selling winkles and cockles at a fair to oblige an old dame who'd broken her spectacles, minding a sick elephant for two days while the circus trainer travelled to a zoo for medicine and advice, and assisting in the salvage of a home-made yacht which had sunk on launching for some reason which Mulvaney could not wait to hear. . . . In the story entitled "Worm in Oak" we come across these words: 'I was still trying to decide when we reached the lakeside through a birch copse that quivered as with delicate interest in our quarrel'. And amid the starkness of some of the episodes 'distant flower beds seemed filled with sky-dust, so strong was the preference for blue among the flowers'. These sardonic, humorous, beautiful and variegated stories will appeal to all discerning readers. As old Alice Pomeroy said (when her daughter-in-law, believing that there would soon be an end of her, now that she had buried her old husband and taken to her bed, in which belief the younger woman had removed all the furniture of the downstairs rooms of the cottage to her

own new brick house), as old Alice said as she knocked with her umbrella at her daughter-in-law's door, 'So nice and thoughtful of you to carry my things down here all ready for me. I'm glad we shall get along famously together.'

HENRY BAERLEIN

## MISCELLANEA

**THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE**, by M. Oakeshott. Cambridge. 10s. 6d.

This is, literally, not in the conventional sense, a Text-book—and a most valuable one. Mr. Oakeshott, at the instigation of Professor Ernest Barker, has collected together what may be considered the authoritative and standard statements of the respective doctrines animating the various political systems of the contemporary world. Representative Democracy we have exclusively nineteenth-century writers—none the worse for that. The section of Catholicism includes, appropriately, excerpts from the Constitution of Eire, 1937. Communism is served by Marx, Lenin and the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. And it is an excellent thing to have reproduced here the text of the much-quoted article by Signor Mussolini himself in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*.

**DISGRACE ABOUNDING**, by Douglas Reed. Cape. 10s. 6d.

Those who revelled in *Insanity* will find as a fearless statement of the views held by any intelligent observer of the European scene will delight in the sequel. The author has a gift for presenting in a vivid way his own experience and impressions—this time

in Prague, Budapest, and Belgrade, as the juggernaut of German might and majesty moves on. And his biting comment on the class-prejudice, inertia and *laissez aller* of the men directing British policy will seem to many to be thoroughly deserved. Yet, because the prophet of woe has been proved right, he is not likely to commend himself any more to the panjandruns, who go on their way purblind and deaf to warnings. What distinguishes Mr. Reed from other captious critics of the Madarene policy is his realization that anti-Fascism, too, has its dangers and weaknesses. He has been strongly criticized on the Left for daring to suggest that the unhappy fate of Jews is as nothing to the plight of the non-conforming Aryans: that the 'pity the poor Jew' cry is by way of becoming a "dangerous racket". But he has the courage of his convictions, and there is a great deal of truth in what he says. His chapter on the strength of the Jews in Hungary—in the towns, of course—is highly illuminating. We should also take due note of the significance of this fact—Germany is already so much mistress of the Continent that the telephonic communications of M. Benes last September with London and Paris were all recorded on gramophone records in German! Mr. Reed has patented the forthright, slash-cut manner which is our English counterpart of Guntherian gossiping and melodrama.

**A NEW HOLY ALLIANCE**, by Emil Ludwig. *Robert Hale*. 3s. 6d.

Emil Ludwig's case for this excursion into political debate is that "the man who studies national characteristics can foretell the future up to a certain point better than the man who merely ranges

economic statistics in a row"; which is perfectly true. However, he is not so much concerned with prophecy as with somewhat commonplace reminders of certain features of the German character and *obiter dicta* such as: "in Hitler the German people find satisfaction for their deeper instincts of power, war and blood and "the affinity between Germans and Jews is the fundamental reason for their hostility". The chapters contrasting German with French and British psychology are well-phrased but unoriginal. And the 'solution' for our troubles of a solid combination of the three democracies, Great Britain, France and the U.S.A. is likewise somewhat flyblown. But perhaps it is not fair to subject to severe criticism what is clearly a sketch of some *magnum opus* of the future by a writer who is nothing if not prolific.

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**B.U.N.S.** A novel by frances gray.  
*Constables. 8s. 6d.*

Miss Gray is not the first person to provide innocent merriment by guying an armaments firm. British and United National Chemicals produces a certain poison gas, Sedonheit—twice as lethal as Lewisite—and supplies it to a foreign country; then waits until the said country becomes menacing thereby, which is the moment to offer the Government of the country where B.U.N.C. is domiciled a marvellous new anti-gas device—after, however, a suitable period of gas-warfare scare propaganda. And it is owned and managed by an auburn-haired, small, delicate but wiry woman, who is, purposely, just a little too good to be true, in keeping with the general de-bunking atmosphere which pervades the book. Among the attractive satellites revolving round this planet there are some whose character is excellently portrayed, others which are tenuous, shadowy by-products of the author's mind. But it is in the actual story that Miss Gray displays unusual skill and discernment, and it is for the story that the present reviewer read to the end.

**ELEPHANTS IN AFRICA**, by Frank Melland. *Country Life. 10s. 6d.*

It may well seem strange to recommend a book about the African elephant to the general reader, but Mr. Frank Melland, whose recent death we record with great regret, has a way with him which makes specialized knowledge not only palatable but a joy to the untutored. Unlike most pieces of miscellaneous information harboured by us all, "the elephant never forgets" appears to be a fact, and in Mr. Melland's opinion the elephant relies at all times

on memory and not on instinct. In man's lust for ivory which has spoiled the elephant's nature. By nature the elephant is prepared to live a Garden of Eden existence with man and be conscious no doubt of his vast bulk and superiority. But the elephant knows that man means danger, and his mother communicates this information to her children. To those, like ourselves who have no personal experience of elephant hunting, Mr. Melland's chapters on the family life of the elephant will make the widest appeal. The elephant places co-operation very high in his moral code, and Mr. Melland describes vividly the swift action of the cows in rallying round a wounded bull. Supported on both sides a badly wounded bull is often enabled to escape. The intelligence of the elephant is ranked very high, above that of the dog and horse, but below that of the chimpanzee and orang-outang. The full page drawings by Stuart Tresilian are admirable illustrations to an admirable book.

## WARNINGS AND PREDICTIONS

Viscount Rothermere. *Eyre and Spottiswoode. 5s.*

Lord Rothermere is the perfect example of the prophet without honour in his own country. Why this should be it is difficult to say, but certainly abroad his pronouncements never go unheeded. In this collection the most notable vaticinations are those with regard to the potentialities of nuclear warfare, which our ostriches in human form still delight to pooh-pooh, and at least valuable his scared references to Communism—or any social movement likely to change by any iota the established capitalist order of things.

## OUR CONTRIBUTORS

*For the benefit of our many overseas readers we provide here each month a brief sketch by way of introduction of our contributors to THE FORTNIGHTLY public.*

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Once again THE FORTNIGHTLY can profit from the momentary lull in the international turmoil to consider the deeper issues underlying surface events. Two articles in particular supply abundant food for thought, though they are not concerned with immediate topical issues. F. L. McDougall writes with particular authority on the question of nutrition which has come into prominence in recent years—as a result of the initiative of the Australian delegation at the League of Nations Assembly in 1935, and, then, through the instant success of the study on 'Food, Health and Income' by Sir John Orr published in the same year. Attention has recently been re-focussed on the subject by a conference arranged by the British Medical Association. Lord Astor, on that occasion, had some pointed comments to make on the continued conditions of utter poverty—and on the creation of monopoly producer trusts in recent expedients of agricultural policy. The sting of F. L. McDougall's article is in the tail, where he shows that the democracies will be judged, in the last analysis, by their success or failure in effecting—and that soon—a more equitable redistribution of wealth, at home and abroad. The author has been Economic Adviser to the Commonwealth Government at

Australia House, London, for several years.

The article by Sir George Young is interesting for its challenge to the Catholic Church; not that it is in any sense polemical, but it is the considered opinion of one who has had considerable experience of practical politics supplementing a special interest in political philosophy. Sir George Young started in the Diplomatic Service and, after service in the Great War, was for a time Professor of Portuguese in London University before taking up the teaching of political science and international law in various American universities. He has a wide experience of expert missions—and has written on subjects as diverse as Portugal, the Balkans, Constantinople, Egypt, Spain—the Freedom of the Seas, and 'Diplomacy Old and New'. He contributed to this review an article on Spain in June, 1937, and has made a thorough study of the political kaleidoscope in that unhappy country—with special reference to the influence and prestige of the Church.

Of Portugal until lately very little was known or heard in this country. Since the successful 'Portuguese week' in London, however, the special correspondents have gathered there and put Portugal on the map. W. C.



**Atkinson**, who wrote for us two years ago about the achievements of Señor Salazar, now contributes a most interesting study of Portugal's overseas connections, the importance of which we are apt to under-estimate. The author is Stevenson Professor of Spanish in the University of Glasgow.

For a sane and timely judgment on the question of Germany's colonies we are indebted to **Sir William Gowers, K.C.M.G.** (in a review of the new book by G. L. Steer, which has had—and earned—a good press). Sir William had a long and distinguished career in Africa, ending as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda Protectorate, 1925-32.

Home politics are, somehow, unsuitable for any substantial treatment in a review like *THE FORTNIGHTLY*. But, since we are all agreed that in these days Parliament—as established by tradition—‘is not enough’—the argument for devolution of matters economic on to an industrial chamber is overwhelming. There is no one better qualified to state the case than **S. G. Hobson**, who is the leading authority on guild and syndicalist ideas.

In the matter of topical issues our searchlight must play, necessarily, on the drama of Eastern Europe, the upshot of which is still not at all clear. **Patrick Sloan**, who explains the Soviet standpoint, is a specialist on his subject. After two years as a university lecturer in Economics in the University College of North Wales he spent five years working and travelling in the U.S.S.R.—and has written two notable books.

He is at present editor of *Russ To-day*.

The author of *Baltic Neutralities* **Wolfram Gottlieb** is a Latvian, representing in London *Brīva Zīrne*, the Government organ of his country and also a Lithuanian newspaper. The background material which his article supplies is essential to an understanding of the present diplomatic hide-and-seek in Eastern Europe.

For a similar commentary on the situation underlying present anxieties in the Far East we have turned to an eminent French journalist who has known that corner of the world very well since the time of the Russo-Japanese war. **M. Naudeau** is frequent contributor to *L'Illustration*—whose articles and pictorial features maintain a uniformly excellent standard.

Breaking with our usual custom we have decided to print in two parts our record of personal impressions of the universities of America to-day. **Ronald Hilton** is a widely-travelled, extremely able Oxonian who, after winning a host of scholarships at Oxford, obtained two years' Fellowship from the Commonwealth Fund to pursue his studies in modern languages and literature. He will shortly be taking up an appointment at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver.

The searching study of Canadian foreign policy, with which we lead off this month is by an Englishman who settled in Canada some twelve years ago. **H. N. Fieldhouse** is head of the Department of History at the University of Winnipeg.



## THE FORTNIGHTLY BAZAAR

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The Encyclopædia Britannica Book of the Year 1939 is, like its predecessor of 1938, an exhaustive and finely produced survey of the principal persons, events, and developments and affairs during the previous year. Such a volume is of immeasurable value to everyone concerned with public affairs, and the fact that its pages are splendidly illustrated will increase its importance as the years go by. All subjects are dealt with alphabetically, and contributors, like the contributors to the Encyclopædia itself, are first-class authorities on their subjects. The volume is splendidly bound and should be found inevitably in every self-respecting library. The price is £2 5s.

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The seventh season of the Open Air Theatre opened in perfect June weather in the Queen Mary's Gardens, Regent's Park. It is claimed for the theatre, and rightly claimed, that the Shakespearean season in the Gardens has become a national attraction, for there must be few foreigners, interested in the theatre, who come to London and do not attempt to see Shakespeare's plays performed in so beautiful a setting. This year *Much Ado About Nothing* was chosen as the opening play, Cathleen Nesbitt giving a grand performance as Beatrice, and D. A. Clarke-Smith proving every bit as good as Benedick. The second play to be chosen was *Pericles*, a romance described by John Bailey as unlikely to be often read or ever acted. However, in spite of the very doubtful authorship of the first two acts there are some grand passages in the rest of the play, and students of Shakespeare will be grateful for the opportunity of seeing in the best surroundings a little known play. The first performance was on June 20, but it had not yet been played when these notes were written.

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Theatres in the West-End struggle with commendable success—though in these days unless a particular venture 'comes off'—it comes off in the other sense very speedily. One play which has fully earned its transfer to another theatre is *Design for Living* by the inimitable Noel Coward. Diana Wynyard and Rex Harrison give sterling performances. After a run of some months at the Haymarket it has been taken over to the Savoy—where it is being played to popular prices. The American experimental play, with an all-women cast, 'The Women' by Clare Boothe at the Lyric Theatre has justified itself. It is certainly witty—and plays with a snap; but many of us cannot help preferring the straight play with some pretension to a story.

We grow accustomed to expecting a high standard of production of plays at the Unity Theatre and *Harvest in the North*, by James L. Hodson, is no exception to this rule. The play is not a new one and has been performed previously in Manchester with great success. The story of a mill-working family, it is a tragic portrayal of unemployment in Lancashire. Many of the individual performances in the Unity Theatre production were excellent and the play was produced by Andre van Gyseghem. Unity Theatre added to their recent successes by winning the Howard de Walden Cup in the National final of the British Drama League Community Theatre Festival Contest with their performance of *Plant in the Sun*. Unity Theatre have only one other virtue to acquire and that is punctuality, at least on first nights.

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The Embankment Fellowship Centre is a fine effort on the part of a voluntary body to house and rebuild in body and spirit destitute ex-Service men, who are over 45. Great work has been done at 59, Belvedere Road, London, S.E.1, where men who apply for admission are interviewed every day, and over one hundred men are always in residence renewing their health, self confidence, and acquaintance with their former trades. As long as a man seeks work he is never turned away, but experience has proved that with very few exceptions the men do find work again without two months of their entering the centre. In the Centre's financial year of 1938-39, 550 men were put back into paid employment. The Embankment Fellowship Centre needs funds but they also need old suits in a good state of repair, for many, indeed most of the men, arrive under-nourished and insufficiently clothed. The Centre would welcome such gifts.

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The Pioneer Health Centre, St. Marys Road, Peckham, S.E.15, one of the most interesting of all sociological experiments of our age, is in danger of closing down for lack of financial support. This would be a grave disaster and a serious indictment of our bureaucratic methods, which, while admitting the good deeds and the fine biological research work done at Peckham, cannot do anything to help, because Peckham cannot be found under any known heading in the card index of good works. Most people are aware of the work done at this 'family club' where all members are subject to regular medical examination, but those who are not and, indeed, those who are, would do well to acquaint themselves with "Biologists in Search of Material", the story of the Health Centre, published by Faber and Faber at half-a-crown.